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INTRODUCTION
Congress has a bureaucracy.
Legal scholarship, judicial discourse, and doctrine about Congress and
statutes have focused almost entirely on elected members of Congress and the
ascertainability of their purported intentions about policymaking and statutory
language. In recent years, we and others have broadened that perspective, with
new scholarship about the on-the-ground realities of the congressional drafting
process—including the essential role that staff plays in that process—and have
argued the relevance of those realities for theory and doctrine.1
Here we go deeper. This Article goes beyond our previous accounts of
partisan committee staff, congressional counsels, and other select staff offices
to introduce the broader concept of what we call the congressional bureaucracy.
The congressional bureaucracy is the collection of approximately a dozen
nonpartisan offices that, while typically unseen by the public and largely
ignored by courts and practicing lawyers, provides the specialized expertise
1 See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725
(2014) (studying drafting practices of congressional counsels and the assumptions they make about
judicial interpretation); Jesse M. Cross, Legislative History in the Modern Congress, 57 HARV. J. LEGIS.
91 (2020); Jesse M. Cross, The Staffer’s Error Doctrine, 56 HARV. J. LEGIS. 83 (2019); Jesse M. Cross,
When Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 453 (2018); Abbe R. Gluck,
Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways that
Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177 (2017) (defending
an approach based on congressional process and calling attention to the role of the Law Revision
Counsel and Congressional Budget Office in drafting statutes) [hereinafter Gluck, Statutory
Interpretation]; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901
(2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell, & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015) (detailing recent deviations from traditional legislative
and processes and their implications for doctrine and theory); Abbe R. Gluck, The “CBO Canon” and
the Debate Over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, BALKINIZATION (July
20,
2012),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html
(introducing concept of CBO canon) [hereinafter Gluck, CBO Canon].
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that helps make congressional lawmaking possible. In the process, the
bureaucracy furthers Congress’s own internal separation of powers and
safeguards the legislative process from executive and interest-group
encroachment.
These institutions internal to Congress use bureaucracy’s traditional
tools—including nonpartisanship and technical expertise—to separate
powers both inside of Congress and external to it. But they do more than
that: the congressional bureaucracy also performs functions that add
important layers to our understanding of the relevant inputs into statutory
text. For one thing, its work destabilizes common views of the boundaries of
the “legislative process” and what a “statute” actually is. Some expert inputs,
like the economic estimates of legislation, are as critical a part of—and
sometimes even more important to—the legislative process and members’
understandings of what bills say as the specific words chosen. Some key
aspects of statutes as the public receives them—such as the ways in which
statutes are organized and ordered, and even what words appear—are
changed, or rearranged, by the congressional bureaucracy: that is, changed by
nonelected, nonpolitical staff with precisely these delegated functions—even
after members vote. Understanding the context in which law is made changes
how we understand law itself.
In the pages that follow, we theorize what it means for Congress to have
this infrastructure—a workforce of nonpartisan, expert, and long-serving
institutional actors and entities without which Congress as we know it could
not function.
We focus primarily on Congress’s nine nonpartisan legislative
institutions:
• The Congressional Research Service (CRS)—the research arm of
Congress that provides in-depth legal and policy analysis of existing
and proposed legislation or other issues;2
• The Offices of the House and Senate Legislative Counsel (Legislative
Counsel)—the nonpartisan staff in each chamber who actually draft
the text of most federal legislation;
• The Office of the Law Revision Counsel (OLRC)—staff who turn
Congress’s various enacted public laws into a U.S. Code re-organized
2 We focus on CRS within the Library of Congress, because its mission to “serve[] the
Congress throughout the legislative process by providing . . . legislative research and analysis,”
makes CRS a consistent presence in the legislative process. About CRS: History and Mission, LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/history.html (last visited April 19, 2020).
However, we note that other parts of the Library of Congress do sometimes provide independent
research for Member offices as well. See, e.g., Law Library, Legal Reports, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-reports.php (providing reports produced by the Law Library)
(last visited April 19, 2020).
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into fifty-three titles—a process that involves rearranging and
reordering statutory sections, cleaning up language, moving enacted
text into statutory notes, and sometimes even adding new statutory
provisions;
• The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)—economists and analysts who
provide influential economic analysis, including estimates of the cost
of all significant legislation;
• The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)—a nonpartisan committee
with staff that assists with all aspects of tax legislation, including
policy analysis, drafting assistance, and all revenue estimates;
• The Offices of the House and Senate Parliamentarians
(Parliamentarians)—the arbiters of congressional procedure in each
chamber who rule on the appropriateness of amendments, resolve
jurisdictional questions among committees, and operate as the
keepers of legislative precedents;
• The Government Accountability Office (GAO)—Congress’s “watchdog”
over the executive branch that conducts audits, performs in-depth
policy research, and informs Congress about the implementation of
its laws.
We selected these nine institutions because they share a generally
nonpartisan nature and common roles of information- and expertiseimparting upon Congress in the context of the legislative process. They also
share surprisingly common origins in a desire to safeguard Congress’s
legislative power from the executive. From 2017 to 2019, we conducted
confidential interviews of more than twenty staffers with key roles in each of
these institutions to complement more than 30 interviews with nonpartisan
staff conducted by one of the authors for an earlier study.3 We also
interviewed twenty partisan staff—congressional staffers who work outside
of the bureaucracy, for members in personal offices or on committees—to
mitigate the risk of interviewee bias and to ensure that our account reflects
how the work of Congress’s bureaucracy actually is perceived on the ground,
including by those outside of it.4
Why does Congress need this bureaucracy? What roles do the
bureaucracy’s offices serve, together and apart? What does the bureaucracy
teach us about how Congress works and about the distinctive features of
modern lawmaking? There are more than 5,000 congressional bureaucrats in
3 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 740 (reporting interviews of twenty-eight staffers in the
Offices of Legislative Counsel as well as several staffers on the Joint Committee on Taxation).
4 To preserve anonymity, we do not refer to interviewees by their institutional affiliation.
Because institutional affiliation, in context, might compromise individual identity, all interviews are
cited as “Staffer Interview.” All quotes are based on extensive notes, reviewed by the authors and
the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. All affiliations are on file with the authors.
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our nine nonpartisan institutions alone. Every drafter in the Offices of
Legislative Counsel is an attorney.5 Ninety percent of staffers at CRS have
graduate degrees, as do most in JCT.6 Some offices, like JCT, interact with
members; some, like OLRC, do not. Some communicate confidentially, like
Legislative Counsel; others are almost entirely transparent, like GAO. Some
give procedural advice that while neutral effectuates significant decisions, like
the Parliamentarians; others offer policy conclusions using defined
methodologies, like JCT. Some work in the field of policy, like CBO; others
do not, like OLRC. Some have come under political fire for a long time, like
CBO; others have come under occasional political scrutiny more recently, like
the Senate Parliamentarian and CRS; still others remain out of the fray, and
largely unknown, like Legislative Counsel and OLRC.
Our findings allow us to intervene in a variety of heretofore unconnected
debates. First, the congressional bureaucracy is a tool of separation of powers.
Classic bureaucracy literature focuses on the tradeoff of control for expertise—
the standard account is that Congress loses power when it delegates to the
executive branch. In contrast, the congressional bureaucracy, as we will
illustrate, was explicitly founded for the opposite reason: so that Congress could
reclaim and safeguard its own powers against an executive branch that was itself
using knowledge and expertise to encroach on the legislative process and
congressional autonomy. For Congress, knowledge was power.
Second, the congressional bureaucracy contributes to the already robust
conversation about why institutions delegate and what bureaucracy typically
looks like. Congress’s bureaucracy shares features with some traditional
agencies, including a nonpartisan staff committed to the long-term mission of
the agency over any particular politics or policy. But unlike many other
5 Career
Opportunities,
OFFICE
OF
THE
LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL,
https://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Careers/Careers.html
[https://perma.cc/AFY2-SPC7]
(stating that a law degree is required in order to work for House Legislative Counsel) (last visited
August
1,
2019);
Careers,
OFFICE
OF
THE
LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL,
https://www.slc.senate.gov/Careers/careers.htm [https://perma.cc/G5CF-P7QH] (stating the same
requirement for Senate Legislative Counsel) (last visited August 8, 2019).
6 See Angela M. Evans, Demand for Masters of Public Policy in Public Service, 27 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 417, 422 (2008) (reporting CRS percentage); Email from Staffer to Abbe
Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. 23, 2020)(on file with authors) (noting that, in JCT, all economists have
doctorates except one with a masters, all accountants have CPA and some have double JD/CPA, and
research assistants are only people without advanced degrees). Similarly, a large share of staffers at
GAO, CBO, MedPAC, and MACPAC also hold advanced degrees. See GAO: WORKING FOR
GOOD GOVERNMENT SINCE 1921, GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 23 (2001) (noting that “GAO
relies on a workforce of highly trained professionals who hold degrees in many academic
disciplines”);
Organization
and
Staffing,
CONG.
BUDGET
OFF.,
https://www.cbo.gov/about/organization-and-staffing (reporting that most of the CBO’s staff
members are “economists or public policy analysts with advanced degrees”) (last visited July 26,
2019); infra notes 324-325 (listing MedPAC and MACPAC staffs and their advanced degrees).
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agencies, Congress’s bureaucracy remains under Congress’s control, is not run
by political appointees, is directly supportive of Congress’s work, and Congress
can ignore many of its inputs if it wishes. We struggled with nomenclature:
“bureaucracy” is not quite perfect. Some internal actors refer to the offices we
study as Congress’s “scaffolding,” or the “institutional staff,” as opposed to the
professional (political) staff—two alternative terms that may make clearer how
Congress’s bureaucracy is part of, and a critical support to, Congress.
Third, the bureaucracy offers something of an antidote to the rampant
cynicism about Congress as an institution. Legal Process titans Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks famously argued that courts should assume “that the
legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably.”7 Modern thinkers about legislation, who laid the basis for today’s
textualists, pushed that optimism aside decades ago for a view of an irrational
and undeliberate Congress that courts could never hope to really understand
and in which the public should not have much faith.8
But despite the recent changes to the modern legislative process, the
congressional bureaucracy still does its work—it just happens at points earlier
in the process and further from the public eye. That work also highlights
aspects of congressional lawmaking that are much less partisan than common
accounts assume. Specifically, the bureaucracy helps Congress achieve a
salutary internal separation of powers, too, even in the modern era of hyperpolarization and party-leader dominance. Congress’s intentional
decentralization of law-producing responsibilities among a collection of
nonpartisan actors prevents any one aspect of the lawmaking process—
whether it is fact finding, number crunching, legislative drafting, auditing, or
parliamentary procedure—from coming under the control of either party, or
any party leader. That today’s hyper-partisan Congress is still comfortable
with these delegations paints an optimistic lining around Congress’s
operations and also reveals some democratic benefits that the congressional
bureaucracy brings.
Cynicism about Congress is at the heart of the fourth and final arena in
which our study intervenes—the enduring disagreement over the proper
approach to statutory interpretation. Our previous work, including the
7 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1415 (1958).
8 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 32 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (claiming that “with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of

construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (reviewing this textualist movement); John F. Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2410 n.81 (2003) (reiterating Max Radin’s argument
against Congress possessing a “coherent ‘specific’ intent,” particularly one that could be reliably
perceived, as a reason for textualism).
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Gluck–Bressman studies of congressional drafting9 and the Gluck–O’Connell
work on modern “unorthodox lawmaking,”10 have provoked new debates
about the relevance of the realities of congressional lawmaking to the
doctrines and theories of legislation and statutory interpretation.11
Detractors’ arguments have centered on the kinds of claims that ushered in
textualism in the first place: claims based on Congress’s irrationality and its
purported inability to act collectively. Those claims are offered as reasons to
eschew a focus on Congress itself in favor of textualist presumptions—
”linguistic conventions”—that detractors assume Congress shares, or at least
accepts, when it drafts.12 But those assumptions are fundamentally empirical
and are largely unsubstantiated.
The structures of congressional lawmaking, including Congress’s
intentional delegations to the bureaucracy, are indeed a form of collective
congressional action—and collective delegation—that produces information
about Congress’s intentions. Congress is also an “it,” not just a “they.”13 When
Congress enacts a law requiring all statutes to be scored for their impact on
the budget, delegates that scoring to a congressional nonpartisan institution,
and enacts statutory text reflecting the score, we can say that Congress
thought the words it was enacting would produce a statute that cost that

9 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note
10 See generally Bressman & Gluck,

1; Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1.
supra note 1; Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect
Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62
(2015); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1; Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 1. Victoria Nourse also
has importantly written on the value of understanding Congress’s own enacted rules. Victoria
Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Operative Legal History by the Rules, 122 YALE
L.J. 70, 92-97 (2012).
11 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079,
1121-1128 (2017) (arguing that the Gluck–Bressman findings hold implications for “canons of
language” but not “canons of law”); Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?,
66 DUKE L.J. 979, 985-86 (2017) (arguing that “the nuances of the legislative process are largely
irrelevant for the purpose of interpretation”); John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1119 (2015) (concluding “the new empiricism does not undermine the intent skepticism”);
John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397, 2429-31 (2017)
(arguing the judiciary’s “institutional role[]” undermines utility of the Gluck–Bressman work for
doctrine).
12 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 51, 61 (2012) (“The canons influence not just how courts approach texts but also
the techniques that legal drafters follow in preparing those texts.”); Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind,
supra note 11, at 1926 (discussing the position that “shared . . . linguistic conventions“ enable “the
relevant linguistic community to convey meaning”).
13 See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON 239 (1992) (arguing against concept of single legislative
intent—Congress as an “it” not a “they”—among 535 legislators).
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amount of money, regardless of the fact that individual members of Congress
may have different reasons for voting for or against the legislation.14
Congressional naysayers, for their part, have not offered any justification
for why this concept of collective congressional intent is any more fictitious
than opting—as textualists do—to deploy interpretive conventions that the
Gluck–Bressman study has shown Congress does not in fact agree with or,
sometimes, even know. Nor do textualists explain why their own refusal to
consider legislative history because it is the work of “staff ” is any different
from their willingness to consider how statutes are organized in the U.S.
Code—another task that we will show is likewise performed by “staff ” after
the statute has passed; or how textualists can argue that a text-focused
approach is more member-focused than staff-focused, when in fact members
themselves always read other documents produced by “staff ” and virtually
never read statutory text. And to say that the public, or a member of
Congress, is any more on notice of the judiciary’s hundred-plus interpretive
presumptions than it would be of which committee drafted a particular
statute, what that statute cost, or whether it was subject to the special
restrictions for budget legislation, is unrealistic and unproven.
This is not to say we think there is no way to justify a textualist approach.
Rather, it is to say that the grounds on which textualism has done so—
democracy, nondelegation, fear of judicial activism—do not hold. Textualism
as currently deployed is too divorced from Congress to be justified on
grounds of legislative supremacy. Nor is textualism passive or objective, as it
claims, but rather puts the role of active interpretation squarely on courts,
which impose their own values and presumptions to interpret text. That those
presumptions have “rule of law” benefits—like linguistic consistency—does
not mean that they are not creations of judicial power or the imposition of
judicial values on legislative language that was not crafted in their shadow.
Such an approach must be justified as judicial activism, even if in benign
form, and not as passive, legislative-supremacy-furthering interpretation.
Studying congressional lawmaking, we believe, also provides low-hanging,
doctrinal fruit that even textualists might accept. Sources like the budget
score, parliamentary rulings on committee jurisdiction, or the special
legislative history Congress uses only for appropriations (and the only
legislative history partly drafted by professional drafters) are examples of
objective outputs that Congress has voted to generate. The congressional
bureaucracy helps us to see this. Even non-textualist judges, who look more
frequently than textualists do to congressional purpose or extra-textual
materials, typically overlook how the objective structures of congressional
14 For a similar point, see Nourse, supra note 10, at 83-85 (arguing the legislative intent debate
is a distraction if one focuses on legislative rules under which Congress as a whole operates).
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lawmaking inform statutory meaning or which materials have the marker of
collective action, expertise, or nonpartisanship..
We have introduced some of Congress’s bureaucratic institutions in other
work—including the Offices of the Legislative Counsel, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), and the Office of the Law Revision Counsel
(OLRC).15 That work has happily invigorated a new branch of the field
focused more broadly on the legislative process, with follow-on articles
emerging to offer descriptive accounts of the work of individual institutions,16
and with courts beginning to recognize how the realities of the legislative
process and the actors within it may affect how courts interpret and adjudicate
statutes.17 Here we move beyond deep description of any one institution and
consider more broadly and as a matter of theory what it means for Congress
to have set itself up this way.18
We also introduce, but in briefer fashion, two additional nonpartisan
institutions—the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and
15 See, e.g., Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1, at 763-65 (discussing CBO); Cross, Legislative
History, supra note 1, at 99-100 (overviewing the nonpartisan offices in Congress); Cross, Staffer’s
Error, supra note 1, at 96-97 (discussing rise of Legislative Counsel’s drafting role); Cross, When
Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text, supra note 1, at 469-85 (discussing Legislative Counsel and
illustrating the use of its drafting manual in statutory interpretation); id. at 503-05 (discussing
CBO); Gluck, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 208 (calling attention to the role of the Law
Revision Counsel and Congressional Budget Office in drafting statutes); Gluck & Bressman, supra
note 1, at 967 (discussing Legislative Counsel); Gluck, CBO Canon, supra note 1 (introducing CBO
canon).
16 At the time of the Gluck–Bressman study, we noted that the political science literature on
“Unorthodox Lawmaking” had not been cited in case law and barely in legal scholarship. Gluck &
Bressman, supra note 1, at 917-18. Since that time, it has been cited in nearly two hundred articles.
Some of this newer and important descriptive work began to emerge at the end of our two-year
study and thus far includes detailed descriptions of two institutions. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Gould,
Law Within Congress, 129 YALE L.J. 1946 (2020) (interview study examining parliamentary precedent
in Congress); Jarrod Shobe, Codification and the Hidden Work of Congress, 67 UCLA L. REV. 640
(2020) (arguing that the failure to examine the statute codification process has left gaps in
understanding and interpreting statutory law). Specific offices also have occasionally drawn
sustained attention. See, e.g., infra note 193 (showing George K. Yin’s series of studies of JCT).
17 See, e.g., Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S.Ct. 767, 783 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“I do not think it is wise for judges to close their eyes to reliable legislative history—
and the realities of how Members of Congress create and enact laws—when it is available.”); Council
for Urological Interests v. Burwell, 790 F.3d 212, 233 (D.C Cir 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting in
part) (citing Gluck–Bressman work to argue it “blinks reality” to ignore that Congress often uses
legislative history, rather than the text, to restrain agencies.”); King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 378
(4th Cir. 2014) (Davis, J., concurring in part) (“Neither the canons of construction nor any empirical
analysis suggests that congressional drafting is a perfectly harmonious, symmetrical, and elegant
endeavor.”); Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.) (citing the GluckBressman study for the proposition that “[L]awmakers, like Shakespeare characters, sometimes
employ overlap or redundancy so as to remove any doubt”).
18 George Yin also has considered multiple nonpartisan congressional offices, in the context of
whether nonpartisan committee staffs could reduce legislative gridlock. See George K. Yin,
Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2287, 2292-93 (2013).
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the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC)—
which were mentioned by multiple interviewees as having important
similarities to the nine institutions we initially set out to study. Indeed,
MedPAC and MACPAC are likewise nonpartisan institutions, legally
structured as distinct legislative agencies, and tasked with providing Congress
with expert information about important health statutes. Another important
example, mentioned frequently by our interviewees but that we do not discuss
in great detail because it no longer exists (some have recently suggested
reviving it), is the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). OTA was a
nonpartisan office that served Congress from 1972 to 199519 and was charged
with using its highly specialized experts to help Congress incorporate
technological and scientific expertise into its crafting of legislative policy.20
All three agencies’ histories substantiate our broader narrative: they were
each founded out of a congressional desire to develop in-house expertise to
preserve autonomy in the face of potential executive branch overreach and
resist interest group encroachment.21 We invoke them as relevant.
We left out of this initial inquiry other institutions that may be
nonpartisan and have their own particular expertise but that do not contribute
to Congress’s legislative work, such as the Office of Senate Legal Counsel and
Office of the General Counsel of the House of Representatives—which
litigate on behalf of Congress—and the Government Printing Office—which
prints official legislative documents.22 Finally, we have mostly left out the
19 See Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-484, 86 Stat. 797 (creating OTA);
see also Legislative Branch Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-53, 109 Stat. 514 (1995)
(slashing OTA funding for fiscal year 1996 to $3.6 million “to carry out the orderly closure” of the
office).
20 OTA was designed to function “as an aid in the identification and consideration of existing
and probable impacts of technological application.” 86 Stat. 797, 797. Recent appropriations debates
about whether to reopen OTA apparently led to the creation of the STAA team within GAO to
serve similar functions. See IDA. A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45755 LEGISLATIVE
BRANCH:
FY2020
APPROPRIATIONS
15-16
(2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45755 [https://perma.cc/8YEE-KN3X]; Our Teams,
GAO https://www.gao.gov/about/careers/our-teams/ [https://perma.cc/WS2F-RRHX] (last visited
May 10, 2020).
21 See infra notes 295 & 304. Congress also utilizes temporary advisory commissions that may
bear similar characteristics, see STRAUS & EGAR, infra note 298, but we do not discuss those here
because we are primarily interested in Congress’s permanent operating structure.
22 We similarly omit numerous other support offices in Congress that are even further removed
from shaping legislation, such as the Architect of the Capitol, the Capitol Police, each chamber’s
Sergeant at Arms, and each chamber’s chaplain. On these offices, see IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43532, OFFICES AND OFFICIALS IN THE SENATE: ROLES AND DUTIES
(2015); IDA. A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33220, SUPPORT OFFICES IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ROLES AND AUTHORITIES (2020). Of these, the strongest case
for inclusion perhaps was for the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate—but despite
their roles in ensuring each chamber’s smooth operation and preservation of documents, they d0 not
shape legislative product with sufficient regularity to ultimately warrant inclusion in this initial
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political staff in Congress—the staffers in members’ individual offices, on
committees, and in leadership offices who do the bulk of constituent and
policy work. The work of political staff is critical to understanding Congress
as an institution and the support that members receive. These staffs are the
key actors tasked with policy development inside Congress, and their role can
magnify (arguably to the detriment of nonpartisan offices) on controversial,
high-visibility legislation.23 However, each of us has detailed their role
elsewhere,24 and they lack some of the defining features of the “bureaucracy”
as we conceptualize it here. In particular, political staff are partisan, and many
are young, nonexpert, and relatively transient. The average tenure of a
political office staffer is three years; the average staff tenure in the nonpartisan
institutions is much longer—for example, the average at CRS and JCT is
about twelve to thirteen years, and in Legislative Counsel, double that.25 Of
course, a different way to look at this is to see Congress as actually having a
double layer of bureaucracy in its political and nonpolitical staff, just of very
different kinds.26
foray. See BRUDNICK, SUPPORT OFFICES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra, at 3
(“[B]ill clerks receive introduced bills and amendments; enrolling clerks prepare the official engrossed
copy of House-passed bills, transmit messages to the Senate regarding approved legislation, and
prepare the official enrolled copy of any House-originated bill or resolution; journal clerks compile
the minutes of proceedings in the House, fulfilling the requirement in Article I, Section V of the
Constitution that ‘each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings’; reading clerks read all of the
bills, resolutions, and amendments before the House; and the tally clerks operate the electronic roll
call voting system.”).
23 On nonpartisan offices potentially receding on “hot” political issues, see Yin, supra note 18,
at 2292-93.
24 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1; Cross, Legislative History, supra note 1; Gluck &
Bressman, supra note 1.
25 See infra notes 437-441 (length of tenure for the institutions); see also Kevin R. Kosar,
Legislative Branch Support Agencies: What They Are, What They Do, and Their Uneasy Position in Our
System of Government, in CONGRESS OVERWHELMED: CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY AND
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM ch. 8, at 2 (Timothy LaPira, Lee Drutman, & Kevin Kosar eds.)
(forthcoming 2020) (on file with authors) (observing that “the [GAO] reports an annual retention
rate of employees of 96 percent (not counting retirements) each of the past six years”). On tenures
of partisan staff, see R. ERIC PETERSEN & SARAH J. ECKMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44682,
STAFF TENURE IN SELECTED POSITIONS IN HOUSE MEMBER OFFICES, 2006–2016, at 7-8
(2016); R. ERIC PETERSEN & SARAH J. ECKMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44684, STAFF
TENURE IN SELECTED POSITIONS IN SENATORS’ OFFICES, 2006–2016, at 7-8 (2016).
26 There has indeed been much written (mostly in political science) about the “delegation” of
subject matter expertise to the various congressional committees. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J.
DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 203 (1997) (describing a
“specialization norm” in which members of Congress historically deferred to committee members
based on expertise developed while serving on a committee); GEORGE GOODWIN, THE LITTLE
LEGISLATURES 45-49 (1970) (explaining the need for subcommittees to enable members of
Congress to specialize further); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of
Congressional Institutions, 19 LEG. STUD. Q. 149, 153 (1994) (recounting the body of scholarship
viewing committees “as specialists who, given the right incentives, would collect and reveal
information that could improve the parent chamber’s decisions”).
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Importantly, we do not challenge Congress’s ability to set itself up this
way. Some academics and judges have argued that reliance on congressional
staff—any staff—impermissibly delegates members’ lawmaking power,27 and
some textualists use such arguments as justification for ignoring the copious
material that Congress produces and relies on alongside enacted text. These
arguments about the illegitimacy of delegation have been quite imprecise.
Among other things, they do not delve into different kinds of staff or the
accountability mechanisms that accompany the various delegations. For
example, political staff is accountable directly to the members and visible to
the public as the key policy personnel, but each member is ultimately
responsible for his or her own votes or decision, like a CEO. The nonpartisan
bureaucracy, by contrast, are expert staff who offer much less visible inputs,
whose duties for Congress are defined ex ante by statute, and who largely
cannot be dismissed by any single member or election outcome.
We are most interested here in that nonpartisan staff and the relatively
autonomous process that Congress winds up for that staff around the
lawmaking process. But both layers of the congressional bureaucracy are the
result of how Congress has chosen to organize itself. This is not illegitimate:
the Constitution gives Congress sole control over its own structures and
procedures.28 And it is Congress itself that has put this whole process in
motion.
In the end, we emerge with a much more holistic view of the lawmaking
process than we had before. As even textualists acknowledge, statutes are not
just words—a concept is meaningless without context. The words Congress
does pass are the result of the lawmaking context—a highly dialogic process
that is triggered by and includes assumptions based on critical inputs from
the bureaucracy, including cost and revenue estimates from CBO and JCT,
procedural rulings from the Parliamentarians, and explanatory materials
written by many of the nonpartisan offices. Members and staff are concerned
with the substance of legislation at the macro level, much more so than the
specific words chosen in the end at the micro level. Arguably, even those
statute-modifying processes that Congress sets up to occur after the vote—
such as OLRC’s work to edit and significantly rearrange the words passed
and the organization in which they originally appeared—are part of the “text”

27 See SCALIA, supra note 8, at 35 (“Congress can no more authorize one committee to ‘fill in
the details’ of a particular law in a binding fashion than it can authorize a committee to enact minor
laws.”). See generally John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673, 677 (1997) (arguing that reliance on legislative history, because it is produced by committee,
“makes it far too attractive for legislators to bypass the constitutionally prescribed process of
bicameralism and presentment”).
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ ", $, 5, 8.
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as Congress itself intends it to be understood, precisely because Congress has
set itself up this way.
So understood, the words on the page, and the snapshot moment of the vote,
are only a small slice of “lawmaking.” Thus seeing the congressional bureaucracy
and its inputs provocatively deconstructs the very concept of a “statute.”
Even interpreters who insist on focusing only on “enacted text” are
getting it wrong when enacted text is viewed in light of the bureaucracy.
Textualists, for example, are interested in where statutes are placed in the
U.S. Code and focused on literal aspects of text such as grammar: but if
textualists understood how OLRC works—making these changes after
enactment for many statutes—textualists might not rely on these textual
techniques. They instead would be looking only to the public laws—the
versions of statutes actually passed by Congress. But those public laws have
a lot of stuff in them that textualist courts typically ignore or even
purposefully discount, including purpose clauses and findings, which
OLRC, in its post-vote organizing work, typically moves out of the Code
text and into statutory notes.
Text is also being manipulated when courts ignore assumptions of
procedural rulings or the CBO or JCT estimates, treat reconciliation laws like
linguistically coherent pieces of legislation, or overlook that Congress’s siloed
workforce develops consistent statutory vocabularies only within subject
matter areas, not across the U.S. Code, and much more. Make no mistake:
when judges—instead of looking to these indications from Congress itself—
resolve ambiguities using their own presumptions about policy or linguistic
consistency, they are bringing in legal values from the outside. That is
justifiable, but not on the “we-are-faithful-agents-to-Congress” terms upon
which it has always been justified.
We aim to tackle both this description deficit and this legitimacy deficit.
Part I introduces the institutions of the congressional bureaucracy, their
functions, and their strikingly common origins in Congress’s desire to reclaim
its own lawmaking power from the executive. Part II analyzes features and
structures that Congress’s bureaucracy shares and does not share with typical
executive branch agencies, including how it separates powers internally. Part
III turns to legislation and statutory interpretation theory, making a positive
case for the relevance of understanding the bureaucracy. We illustrate how
the bureaucracy informs our account of Congress’s rationality and how
changes in the modern lawmaking process—the rise of “unorthodox
lawmaking”—have likewise affected the bureaucracy’s work in ways that
impact how statutes look. Statutes have more errors, are much longer, have
less legislative history, and have a less transparent amendment process. All of
this should be of interest to interpreters of all stripes. Finally, Part IV
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illustrates how understanding the bureaucracy provocatively deconstructs
common understandings of what statutory “text” is. That Part also offers
some initial, concrete doctrinal takeaways for doctrine, including new
canons—and anti-canons—based on the objective outputs of the bureaucracy.
Regardless of whether one cares about the statutory interpretation wars,
statutes comprise the majority of federal law today. But lawyers and judges
remain mostly uninterested in and unknowledgeable about how Congress
works—a curious deficit given how much lawyers, judges, and legal academics
study the structures and decision-making processes of the other key
lawmaking institutions, especially the judiciary and administrative agencies.
Congress’s own lawmaking machinery produces the lion’s share of modern
American law and deserves at least as much attention. And it is time to
relinquish the fictitious bases of prevailing interpretive theories and come up
with something better. Let’s enter the sausage factory.29
I. THE BUREAUCRACY’S INSTITUTIONS: COMMON ORIGINS IN
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND PRESENT-DAY OPERATIONS
This Part introduces the bureaucracy’s institutions and summarizes their
origins, structures and present-day functions. One overarching theme that is
essential to understanding the history and motivations for the bureaucracy,
yet not a story we have found in other bureaucracy literature, is the role of
bureaucracy in the congressional context as a tool to safeguard Congress’s
lawmaking and separate that power from the executive branch.
The notion of knowledge as power is common, and much has been written
about separation of powers in the context of executive branch delegations.30
But Congress’s bureaucracy story is different. Creating a bureaucracy inside
Congress did not pose the same kind of tradeoff between knowledge and
control which external delegation is normally understood to pose.31
Instead, for Congress, bureaucracy was power. Despite their different
functions, Congress’s nonpartisan institutions were each created and molded
for the common, overarching purpose of protecting congressional autonomy.
Each of the bureaucracy’s institutions we study was created or strengthened
during the same three periods—the 1920s, 1940s and 1970s—and the latter
two especially were periods in which Congress was openly concerned that it
29 Robert Pear, If Only Laws Were Like Sausages, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/weekinreview/05pear.html [https://perma.cc/4GTY-X7LN]
(repeating the famous quote from Von Bismarck, “If you like laws and sausages, you should never
watch either one being made.”).
30 See infra Part II (outlining the standard account of bureaucracy developed in the executivebranch context, and discussing its relevance for the congressional bureaucracy).
31 For sources outlining the typical view of this tradeoff in the executive-branch context, see
infra notes 337-349.
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was ceding too much ground to the executive branch. Establishing its own
bureaucracy to draft, research, organize, estimate, and audit legislation was
viewed as key to safeguarding its legislative autonomy. The alternatives—
seeking executive branch or third-party assistance for information-gathering
and drafting help—had already been tried and deemed unacceptable. They
had created a sense inside Congress that it was losing its status as a coequal
branch because it was neither a self-sufficient policymaker nor could it
adequately check an executive whose power continued to expand.32
The 1940s was the first key period. The years leading up to and through
the New Deal had seen an explosion of legislative activity—and a
concomitant explosion in the size of the executive branch—yet Congress’s
own staff had remained relatively small and almost entirely partisan.33 Even
the partisan staffs at the time were not substantive experts; their work usually
was confined to only clerical tasks.34 It was estimated that, in 1941, there were
“not more than two hundred persons [on congressional staffs] who could be
considered legislative professionals.”35 Without in-house expertise, Congress
had to rely on the executive branch for expertise, information, and drafting
assistance.36
32 For an argument that Congress’s use of rulemaking power to repeatedly restructure in ways
that “enhance the chambers’ power vis-à-vis the executive,” JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S
CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 281 (2017), is a
continuation of similar early English parliamentary practices, see id. at 267-301. It is also true that
committees still do try to send some draft legislation to agency staff for technical review.
33 Harrison W. Fox, Jr. & Susan Webb Hammond, The Growth of Congressional Staffs, 32 PROC.
ACAD. POL. SCI. 112, 115-117 (1975) (recounting historical evolution of staffing in different staff
categories); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 822 (2014) (on Legislative Counsel being limited to formatting duties); id.
at 834 (on Congressional Research Service’s narrow original responsibilities). For information on
personal and committee staff levels between 1977 and the present, see R. ERIC PETERSEN & AMBER
HOPE WILHELM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43946 SENATE STAFF LEVELS IN MEMBER,
COMMITTEE, LEADERSHIP, AND OTHER OFFICES, 1977–2016 (2016) (reporting Senate staff levels
by staff category from 1977 through 2016); R. ERIC PETERSEN & AMBER HOPE WILHELM, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43947, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF LEVELS IN MEMBER, COMMITTEE,
LEADERSHIP,
AND
OTHER
OFFICES,
1977–2016
(2016),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43947 (reporting the same for the House of
Representatives).
34 HARRISON W. FOX & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE
INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN LAWMAKING 15 (1977) (explaining that “[s]taffing began in both
Senate and House [in 1885-1946] as clerical assistance”).
35 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY PRESS, HOW CONGRESS WORKS 189 (5th ed. 2013).
36 See GLADYS MARIE KAMMERER, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE STAFFING SINCE 1946,
at 1 (1951) (“The new enlarged and qualified staff [created by the 1946 Act] was to perform such
research and analytical services for all committee members as had never been available to our
national legislators except on loan from executive departments.”); Cross, Staffer’s Error Doctrine,
supra note 1, at 89-93 (describing the “agency-delegation model” of statutory drafting that prevailed
during the period); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative
State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 338 (2013) (“[I]t
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Congress increasingly came to view this executive-branch dependence as
intolerable. In a 1942 floor speech entitled What Is Wrong with Congress,
Representative Everett M. Dirksen voiced these frustrations:
[W]e are constantly fishing with the bureaus and we put on a great quiz
program, and they tell us what they think we ought to know and not a great
deal more. How can the Aegean stables be cleansed unless we are equipped
and staffed to secure basic information? Do you think the legislative branch
of the Government can function independently and properly with the kind
of prestige it ought to enjoy on that kind of a basis? The Congress today, in
my judgment, needs a great, big dose of B, in the form of a staff or an
instrumentality so we can make out a case after gathering information and
rebut cases that are so often presented to us . . . .
What is wrong with Congress? It is not implemented; it is not staffed; it does
not have the weapons with which to do the best kind of job. So I say to you
now: Let us spend a little money on ourselves; let us provide legislative tools
to get the facts, the data, the information, and then control, supervise, and
survey the operations of the Government.37

Dirksen’s calls for legislative action translated into the most notable
reform of the period: the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. In addition
to providing the first authorization for committees to retain professional
political staff,38 the 1946 Act expanded the size and role of Congress’s internal
nonpartisan institutions, as detailed below.39 Explaining the logic of these
1946 reforms, Representative Monroney observed:
Today we are confronted and confounded by the problems of a
$35,000,000,000 government trying to do the job with tools so absolutely
obsolete and antiquated that 435 saints could not possibly do with our present
equipment and organization . . . .
We cannot be coequal; we cannot do this fundamental task of supervision
that the framers of the Constitution had in mind unless the Congress is virile,
strong enough and well equipped enough to handle this magnitude of work
that is dumped on us.
Five hundred and thirty-one men that compose the membership of the
House and Senate are going to have a pretty hard time in handling, in
seems probable that the New Deal and World War II saw the greatest executive-branch dominance
of congressional drafting and deliberations that America has ever witnessed.”).
37 88 CONG. REC. 7696, 7699-7700 (1942) (statement of Rep. Dirksen).
38 FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 14; KAMMERER, supra at 36. Professional aides to
Representatives would not be recognized until 1970. FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 12.
39 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 203-205, 60 Stat. 836.
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supervising, in surveying the work of over 3,000,000 men scattered
throughout the executive department. It is like trying to move a battleship
with a jeep or a model T Ford.40

The committee report for the Act reiterated these goals. As the report
put it:
When [the branches] were created, they were more or less equal. But the
executive branch of the Government has mushroomed into the greatest
governmental bureaucracy not only this country but any other country in the
world has known. The legislative branch of the Government has relatively
stood still.41

Notably, the Administrative Procedure Act was also passed in 1946, the
same year as the Legislative Reorganization Act. As Joseph Postell writes,
although the two acts “advanced different aspects of the solution—increasing
congressional capacity and efficiency versus applying legal constraints on
agencies—they were designed to address the same problem, namely the
inevitable arrival of the modern administrative state.”42
The 1970s brought another wave of reform. During this period, rising
disenchantment with the executive branch (which culminated mid-decade
with the Watergate scandal) brought fresh concerns about congressional
dependence on the executive and a desire for a more democratic and
transparent lawmaking process in Congress. These frustrations generated a
number of laws to augment Congress’s resources. Most notable among these
was the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.43 Describing the motivation
for the Act, numerous members made comments similar to this one, from
Representative Fred Schwengel: “The efficiency and effectiveness of our
operation has decreased to the point where many people consider us to be a
rubberstamp for the Executive.”44 In response to this frustration, the 1970 Act
92 CONG. REC. 10039 (1946) (statement of Rep. Monroney).
S. Rep. No. 79-1400, at 6558 (1946) (report of the Special [Joint] Committee on the
Organization of Congress).
42 Joseph Postell, The Other New Deal Settlement: The Relationship Between the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Legislative Reorganization Act 17 (on file with authors); see also DAVID H.
ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (2000)
(arguing for viewing the LRA and APA as part of a coherent effort in 1946 to make agencies operate
as extensions of Congress); Postell, supra, at 22 (“The debates over the APA and LRA indicate that
Congress, like the Court, was in a sense making its peace with the New Deal, but establishing a
baseline set of principles that would govern how the New Deal would operate in practice.”). Postell
argues, however, that the LRA’s intention to strengthen substantive committees and increase
oversight has been mostly a failure. Postell, supra, at 27.
43 See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, tit. V, Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 (codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 281-282e) (describing the Office of Legislative Counsel).
44 116 CONG. REC. 23914 (1970) (statement of Rep. Schwengel); see also, e.g., 116 CONG. REC.
26031 (1970) (statement of Rep. Waldie) (“The power of the executive branch is awesome today
40
41
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provided Representatives with statutory acknowledgment of their ability to
retain professional partisan staff and made changes to the committee system
to empower the use of expert committee staffers.45 At the nonpartisan level,
it significantly expanded and empowered Congress’s internal bureaucracy.46
Of interest, while these reforms may have returned power to Congress
vis-à-vis the executive branch, they also dispersed power within Congress.
After all, Congress could have built its bureaucracy simply by adding experts
into existing centers of congressional power. It could have added partisan staff
positions to members and committees, for example. It also could have
consolidated research, drafting, accounting, procedural, budget, and revenue
expertise beneath the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader.
Instead, Congress dispersed these roles across a collection of nonpartisan
institutions that, because of their statutory authority and hardwiring into
congressional procedures, often are not easily manipulated or cowed by any
particular power center in Congress. It is difficult to determine to what extent
this decentralization was intentional, but its effect has continued even as
Congress itself dramatically changed and generally became more centralized.
Several interviewees explicitly volunteered—without prompting—this
internal separation of powers benefit, which we shall return to in Part II.
It is also of interest that the history of the congressional bureaucracy is
not a story unique to the American legislature. Historians of parliamentary
bureaucracies sound much the same theme. Parliaments and legislatures in
presidential systems have increasingly come to develop their own internal
bureaucracies and professional staffs, in part because service to legislatures
requires unique skills—including drafting expertise—as well as insulation
from the executive’s political control.47
Studies of parliaments in countries as diverse as Slovenia, India, and
Canada have emphasized the importance of independent parliamentary staff
to “implement[] the principle of autonomy,”48 and to “effectively carry out its
compared to the legislative branch.”); 116 CONG. REC. 24061 (1970) (statement of Rep. Hanna)
(“Mr. Chairman, in the almost 200 years since the Constitution was ratified, the executive branch
of the Government and the court system have undergone radical changes, adapting themselves to
the changing society in which they operate. Unfortunately, very little has been done in this regard
in the third coequal branch of our Government, the Congress.”).
45 Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 301-05, 84 Stat. 1140, 1175-81 (1970); see also FOX & HAMMOND, supra
note 34, at 24.
46 On the 1946 and 1970 Acts as expansions of Congress’s “institutional capacity,” see also
CHAFETZ, supra note 32, at 294-95.
47 DAVID BEETHAM, An Effective Parliament (I): The National Level, in INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION, PARLIAMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A
GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE 115-54 (2006), http://archive.ipu.org/dem-e/guide/contents.htm
[https://perma.cc/YMC9-MJXF] (examining how parliamentary organization contributes to
parliamentary efficacy).
48 Id. at 118-19 (discussing submission by Slovenian parliament to Inter-Parliamentary Union).
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functions within the framework of the separation of powers.”49 In Canada, as
noted by the Canadian parliament (in a submission to the Inter-Parliamentary
Union): “operational independence of the Canadian Parliament is provided
for in the Constitution and by legislation that guarantees that the Senate, the
House of Commons and the Library of Parliament each have access to a nonpartisan professional staff distinct from the public service.”50
We now introduce in detail our nine main institutions. We also briefly
summarize the origins of MedPAC and MACPAC at the end of this Part.
A. Congressional Research Service
“What good does [the Library] do, unless we have senior experts to digest
[information] when legislation is before the committees?”

CRS is often described as Congress’s “think tank.”51 It is directed by
statute “to advise and assist . . . in the analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of
legislative proposals,” to collect and analyze “data having a bearing on
legislation,” and “to prepare and provide information, research, and reference
materials. . . to assist [members and committees] in their legislative and
representative functions.”52
Statutory authority for CRS is provided by the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 194653—but CRS’s origins are much earlier. In 1901,
Wisconsin had been spurred by Charles McCarthy, a University of Wisconsin
librarian, to create a nonpartisan reference bureau for the state legislature,
and other states followed suit.54 Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette added
an appropriations bill amendment to fund a similar congressional bureau in
49 Id. (quoting submission by Indian parliament to Inter-Parliamentary Union). We note that
in parliamentary systems many laws are likely to be introduced (and drafted) by the executive. See
Legislative Drafting, AGORA: PORTAL PARLIAMENTARY DEV. (Nov. 27, 2019), https://agoraparl.org/resources/aoe/parliamentaryinstitution/legislative-drafting
[https://perma.cc/4EQZ6NR2] (on parliamentary systems generally, noting that “it is the executive branch of government
that produces most of the draft laws”); Legislative Drafting Process Guide, FINLEX,
http://lainvalmistelu.finlex.fi/en [https://perma.cc/3DQD-AHAX] (on Finland, stating that
“[l]egislative bills are drafted by the Government”) (last visited Nov. 27, 2019); La Procédure
Legislative
[The
Legislative
Procedure],
SENAT.FR,
http://www.senat.fr/role/fiche/procedure_leg.html [https://perma.cc/94VS-N4AS] (on France) (last
visited Nov. 27, 2019).
50 BEETHAM, supra note 47, at 118-19 (quoting submission by Canadian parliament to InterParliamentary Union). In Canada, the perceptions that the nonpartisan legislative offices had
become politicized contributing to their 2006 closures. See Marcus Moore, The Past, Present and
Future of Law Reform in Canada, 6 THEORY & PRAC. LEGIS. 225, 238-40 (2018).
51 See STEPHEN W. STATHIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS AT 100: THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 25 (2014).
52 2 U.S.C. § 166(d)(1), (4), (5) (2018).
53 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 203, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812.
54 See Yin, supra note 18, at 2292-93.
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1914.55 Pursuant to that funding, the Legislative Reference Service was
established in the Library of Congress in 1914 via administrative order,
enabling the Library to perform the reference functions Congress required.56
In 1946, Congress realized the need to transform and empower LRS.
Again, from Representative Dirksen:
What good does [the Library] do, unless we have senior experts to digest [the
information in the collection] when legislation is before the committees?57

The 1946 Act increased the size and scope of LRS58 and established it as
a separate department in the Library of Congress. These reforms transformed
LRS from a service that handled about 1,100 research requests per year in its
early years59 and roughly 5,000 annual requests in the late 1930s60 to one that
handled 36,000 requests per year by 1950.61
Still, the mid-century LRS primarily provided reference services to
Congress rather than the independent policy analysis that—as federal
programs became increasingly complex—Congress found it needed.62
Consequently, LRS was transformed again by the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970, which remade it into a formidable center for research and policy
analysis—a transformation signaled by its renaming as the “Congressional
Research Service.”63 Explaining the impetus behind the project, the Chair of
the House Rules Committee remarked: “Congress needed, but did not have,
the capacity to evaluate the policy results of its work.”64 In the decade

See id.
For original congressional funding and direction to establish LRS, see Legislative, Executive,
and
Judicial
Fiscal
Year
1915
Appropriations
Act,
June
13,
1914,
https://www.visitthecapitol.gov/exhibitions/artifact/amendment-hr-15279-legislative-executive-andjudicial-fiscal-year-1915 [https://perma.cc/E2SR-6CLX]. On administrative action to create LRS
pursuant to this congressional action, see STATHIS, supra note 51, at 12-13: (“Two days after the bill
was signed by the president, the Librarian of Congress established the Legislative Reference Service
(LRS) by administrative order on July 18, 1914.”); see also Gilbert Gude, Congressional Research
Service: The Research and Information Arm of Congress, 2 GOV’T INFO. Q. 5, 7 (1985) (describing and
providing legislative context for CRS’s initial appropriations and the resulting administrative order).
57 92 CONG. REC. 10049-50 (1946) (statement of Rep. Dirksen).
58 Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 301-05, 84 Stat. 1140, 1175-81 (1970).
59 Gude, supra note 56, at 7.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 STATHIS, supra note 51, at 24-26.
63 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, § 321, 84 Stat. 1181. For renaming
of the Service, see id. at § 321. See also STATHIS, supra note 51, at 25 (describing effect of Act on CRS
and providing history of renaming proposal); Walter Kravitz, The Advent of the Modern Congress: The
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 375, 376 (1990) (describing the newly
renamed Congressional Research Service’s charge to provide “objective, nonpartisan, in-depth
analysis and appraisals to determine the advisability of enacting legislative proposals”).
64 116 CONG. REC. 23902 (1970) (statement of Rep. Colmer).
55
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following the passage of the Act, one CRS publication observes, “CRS staff
more than doubled.”65
Today, CRS has approximately 620 employees.66 Ninety percent of its
analysts have advanced graduate degrees, and analysts have relatively long
tenures, with an average of thirteen years.67 The Director is appointed by the
Librarian of Congress after consultation with the Joint Committee on the
Library—an enduring feature of CRS’s continued organizational location
within the Library of Congress.68 The Director is required by statute to be
appointed without regard to partisan affiliation.69 The Librarian is required
by law to “grant and accord to the Congressional Research Service complete
research independence and the maximum practicable administrative
independence.”70
CRS analysts produce several types of written products. The most wellknown writings are its official CRS Reports, which provide “[c]omprehensive
research and analysis” on major policy issues.71 Committee reports regularly
copy and paste material from these reports.72 CRS also sometimes writes the
important explanatory statement in conference reports—the portion that sets
forth the House and Senate provisions and describes the disposition of those
items by the conference committee. It also writes the bill summaries found
on congress.gov, an annotated version of the Constitution that contains legal
analysis,73 summaries of legal and policy topics,74 congressional distribution
memoranda,75 and blog posts for members and staff.76 In response to requests
from members or their staff, CRS also provides tailored confidential
memoranda and email responses77 as well as in-person and telephone
consultations, staff briefings, policy seminars and workshops, and

STATHIS, supra note 51, at 26.
Email from Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. 27, 2020) (on file with authors).
See id.
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 203(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 166(c)).
69 Id.
70 Id. at § 166(b)(2).
71 MARY B. MAZANEC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 10 (2019); see, e.g., CASSANDRIA
DORTCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10554, POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION OF NATIVE
AMERICANS (2019).
72 Staffer Interview.
73 Constitution
Annotated, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 26, 2017),
https://www.congress.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP6ELKHL].
74 MAZANEC, supra note 71, at 10 (discussing CRS Insights, Legal Sidebars, and In Focus).
75 Id.
76 Staffer Interview.
77 Id.
65
66
67
68
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congressional testimony.78 CRS fielded more than 71,000 research requests in
fiscal year 2019, and virtually every member and standing committee office
consults with it every year.79 CRS’s research may be conducted either in
response to requests from members or committees of Congress, or on issues
proactively selected by CRS as topics of likely interest to Congress (these
latter reports are often referred to internally as “anticipatories” because they
are issued in anticipation of a hot issues for Congress or after CRS receives a
pattern of questions about the same issue). CRS reports that had been
generally accessible to Congress (as opposed to less formal research requests
CRS does for members confidentially) were not allowed to be made publicly
available until 2018 (but they often leaked), when Congress passed a bill
expressly requiring them to be made public.80
CRS told us that it now views its work as providing information to
safeguard congressional autonomy not only from the executive, but also from
outside interest groups. As recently as June 2019, the President of the
Congressional Research Employees Association testified before the
Committee on House Administration that an important role of CRS is to
“help sort through the facts and opinions and provide an unbiased overview”
of the various interest group positions lobbying Congress.81
B. Offices of the Legislative Counsel
“To help draft the bill it was necessary to seek technical assistance from the
executive branch.”

The Offices of the Legislative Counsel are the nonpartisan staff who draft
the bulk of statutory text. They had their origin largely outside of Congress.
In 1911, the Legislative Drafting Research Fund was established at Columbia
University to promote the “scientific study and investigation of legislative
drafting.”82 This included a commitment to “laboratory work” whereby the

MAZANEC, supra note 71, at 8, 17.
Mary B. Mazanec, Director, Congressional Research Service, Statement Before the
Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch Committee on Appropriations U.S. House of
Representatives
(Feb.
27,
2020),
https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110532/witnesses/HHRG-116-AP24-WstateMazanecM-20200227-SD001.pdf
80 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348.
81 Susan Thaul, President, Cong. Research Employees Ass’n, Statement to Committee on
House
Administration
(June
20,
2019),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA00/20190620/109663/HHRG-116-HA00-WstateThaulPhDS-20190620.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7TM-G5XG].
82 Letter from Joseph P. Chamberlain to Nicholas Murray Butler, President, Columbia Univ.
(April 27, 1911). On Chamberlain’s role in starting the fund, see John M. Kernochan, A University
Service to Legislation: Columbia’s Legislative Drafting Research Fund, 16 LA. L. REV. 623, 624 (1956).
78
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Fund would provide drafting work for governments.83 To this end, the Fund
sent Middleton Beaman, a law professor at Columbia University as well as
Library of Congress law librarian, to Congress in 1916.84
By the time of Beaman’s arrival to Congress, various states—spurred on
by the Progressive movement—already had created their own professional
legislative drafting offices.85 Congress had begun to consider adding drafting
offices,86 but all such proposals had failed.87 Beaman, however, found a
receptive audience in the Ways and Means Committee, which was grappling
with the rise of statutory complexity in federal taxation, and he soon became
a trusted drafting resource relied upon throughout the Congress.88
In the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress decided to create a permanent office
modeled on Beaman’s service. A product of the congressional desire for selfsufficiency, the new office resulted partly from the fact that “[t]he Committee
on Ways and Means felt that Congress should not be a mendicant on
Columbia University nor receive favors at its hand, however gladly offered.”89
The 1918 Act dispersed statutory drafting expertise inside Congress,
mandating that the new offices be divided into two separate branches—one
serving each chamber of Congress—largely out of concern that the Senate
would otherwise dominate drafting resources at the House’s expense.90 The
Act also provided that the head of each drafting office was to be appointed
“without reference to political affiliations,” a phrase that would reappear, in
various iterations, in the organic statutes for subsequent nonpartisan
congressional institutions.

83 See Kernochan, supra note 82, at 624-25; see also Frederic P. Lee, The Office of the Legislative
Counsel, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 381, 381 (1929).
84 Lee, supra note 83, at 381, 385.
85 For state-level antecedents, see, for example, WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU,
https://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (on the 1901 founding of the Wisconsin
drafting office); see also 56 CONG. REC. 10524 (1917) (statement of Rep. Greene) (referencing
success of Vermont drafting office).
86 For House and Senate Library Committees considering these proposals between 1911 and
1916, see H.R. 31536, 61st Cong. (1911); H.R. 4703, 62d Cong. (1911); H.R. 12155, 62d Cong. (1911);
S. 8202, 62d Cong. (1913); H. Res. 833, 62d Cong. (1913); S. 1240, 63d Cong.(1913).
87 See Lee, supra note 83, at 381-85; see also Shobe, supra note 16, at 819-20 (recounting initial
congressional reluctance to create drafting office, and Beaman’s ultimate success).
88 See Lee, supra note 83, at 386 (describing Beaman’s origins with the Ways and Means
Committee).
89 59 CONG. REC. 8829 (1920) (statement by Rep. Treadway). The offices officially launched
in 1919, which is when the Revenue Act of 1918 (which created the offices) actually was enacted.
90 Revenue Act of 1918, § 1303(a), Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1057, 1141-2. Originally called the
“Legislative Drafting Service,” the Revenue Act of 1924 renamed it the Office of Legislative
Counsel. Revenue Act of 1924, § 1101, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 353 (1924). On the decision to
create separate branches, see Lee, supra note 83, at 387.
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In 1946, Congress increased appropriations for the offices, allowing for
more hires.91 But in the succeeding decades, Congress largely failed to expand
Legislative Counsel’s capacity to meet the growing drafting needs that
accompanied the ambitious New Deal and Great Society agendas.92 As a
result, executive agency officials stepped into the gap, taking leading roles in
drafting congressional legislation during this period.93 By the time of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Congress had grown frustrated with
this imbalance of power in bill drafting. As a member of the Joint Committee
on the Organization of the Congress put it:
In the past 3½ decades we have seen a persistent—if sometimes sporadic—
accretion of power to the executive branch . . . . [Even in a bill that originated
in Congress,] the irony of the situation is that to help draft [the bill] it was
necessary to seek technical assistance from the executive branch; . . . [This]
reflects executive rather [than] legislative branch oversight, power, allocation
of funds, and precedence.94

State legislatures were even ahead of Congress. Representative Thomas
Rees, for example, explained that, as a member of the California Senate, he
“had a legislative counsel’s office in the California Legislature that had 46
attorneys. I think we have 14 attorneys in the Legislative Counsel Office for
the House of Representatives.”95
The resulting 1970 Reorganization Act created a new charter for the
House Legislative Counsel that was understood to embody a commitment to
increases in funding and resources for both drafting offices.96 Pursuant to that
commitment, Congress in 1972 provided the House office with increased
funding for hires,97 and both offices steadily expanded.98 The House office

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 204, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812.
ARTHUR J. RYNEARSON, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 1976–2003, ORAL HISTORY
INTERVIEWS
30
(2003),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/oral_history/Rynearson_arthur.htm
[https://perma.cc/6929-VYV5].
93 Parrillo, supra note 36, at 339.
94 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, 89th Cong. 15 (1965)
(statement of Rep. Hall).
95 116 CONG. REC. 23922 (1970) (statement of Rep. Rees).
96 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, tit. V, Pub L. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 (codified at 2
U.S.C. 281-282e); see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-236, at 6 (1971) (explaining that 1972 funding increases
“are attributable to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 which authorized . . . expanded
services by the House Legislative Counsel”). The new charter added language that made explicit
the House office’s commitments to impartiality, confidentiality, and Congress-wide service.
Legislative Reorganization Act § 502.
97 H.R. REP. NO. 92-236, at 7 (1971).
98 See Shobe, supra note 16, at 823 (reporting offices’ growth over four-year increments).
91
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has quadrupled in size since 1975, and the Senate office has nearly tripled.99
Today, the House office employs fifty-six attorneys as drafters,100 and the
Senate office thirty-four.101 All drafters are required to be attorneys admitted
to practice.102 Each office is led by a Legislative Counsel who is appointed by
the House Speaker or the Senate President pro tempore, respectively, and
who is required by law to be appointed without regard to partisan
affiliation.103 By tradition, the Legislative Counsel is promoted from within
the office and is one of its longest-tenured members.104
Use of the offices’ drafting services is optional, but members and
committees now use them with respect to nearly every bill, resolution, and
amendment introduced in Congress.105 As the Gluck–Bressman study
emphasized, and our twenty additional interviews of policy staff for this
paper corroborated, members are generally not involved in the actual drafting
of legislation; even senior policy staff do not usually write the words of
statutory text. Instead, partisan staff submit policy decisions and outlines to
Legislative Counsel—often provided in the form of bullet points—that
Legislative Counsel must transform into “clear, concise, and legally-effective
language.”106 After Legislative Counsel drafts such language, there is
99 Compare STAFF OF J. COMM. ON PRINTING, 94TH CONG., OFFICIAL CONG. DIRECTORY
422, 430 (1975), with OFFICERS & OFFICIALS OF THE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 464
(2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDIR-2018-10-29/pdf/CDIR-2018-10-29HOUSECOMMITTEES-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT6X-6RAE] [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL
DIRECTORY] and Staffer Interview.
100 Staffer Interview.
101 OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS OF THE SENATE, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 397 (Oct. 29,
2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDIR-2018-10-29/pdf/CDIR-2018-10-29SENATECOMMITTEES-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2QA-AKWP]
[hereinafter
SENATE
DIRECTORY].
102 See Career Opportunities, OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
https://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Careers/Careers.html
[https://perma.cc/A8Z8-T4FZ] (last visited May 11, 2020); Careers, OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://www.slc.senate.gov/Careers/careers.htm
[https://perma.cc/62FS-STKU] (last visited May 11, 2020). Paralegals also occasionally assemble
drafts considered so formulaic or ministerial that they do not involve significant drafting work.
103 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 282, 272 (2018).
104 Email from Former Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Jan. 26, 2020) (on file with authors).
105 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1, at 740 (quoting staffer interviews that “99% [of statutory
text] is drafted by Legislative Counsel,” and that: “[n]o staffer drafts legislative language. Legislative
Counsel drafts everything.”); see also Amendment Resources, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE
ON
RULES,
https://rules.house.gov/amend/amendment-resources
[https://perma.cc/J8GW-MAEJ] (directing that “[t]he assistance of the Office of the Legislative
Counsel . . . should be sought in drafting [all amendments submitted to the House Committee on
Rules]”).
106 OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://legcounsel.house.gov/# [https://perma.cc/EJH8-ETN7] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019); OFFICE
OF
THE
LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL:
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.slc.senate.gov/
[https://perma.cc/BV9T-LC42] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
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sometimes, but not always, a back-and-forth with staff (especially staff who
are attorneys) to finalize the text.107
In a testament to the shift of inter-branch responsibilities brought about
by the rise of these drafting offices, the executive branch now sometimes
borrows Legislative Counsel’s drafters for major legislative proposals, rather
than vice versa (but policy staff also often consult with agencies while
drafting, especially for technical guidance).108 Legislative Counsel also
provides Congress with a measure of independence from interest groups,
which often offer partisan, lobbyist-drafted legislative text as a roadmap or
starting point for new legislation.109
Going beyond the legislative text, the offices are also brought in to draft
several non-statutory-text documents—a signal of the especially legally and
regulatorily significant import of those documents. These include conference
committee reports, important portions of appropriations bills’ legislative
history,110 special portions of committee reports that show redlines of changes
a bill makes to existing law,111 and certain motions in the House.112 The work
of the offices is wholly confidential.113
C. Office of the Law Revision Counsel
“The bulk of the revision done is done by lawyers in the executive branch.”

Tasked by its organic statute to “develop and keep current an official and
positive codification of the laws of the United States,”114 OLRC functions as
the custodian of the U.S. Code. Before the existence of the Code, private
companies and agencies prepared some compilations of updated federal laws,
Staffer Interviews.
See, e.g., Robert Pear, It Should Be Called the Grossman Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1993, at D10 (crediting the authorship of the Clinton healthcare bill of the 1990s to a Legislative
Counsel attorney).
109 See Shobe, supra note 16, at 848-49 (describing comments from legislative counsel who
observed that lobbyists and law firms have increasingly provided draft text for proposed legislation).
110 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 980; Staffer Interviews.
111 Our Services, OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL: U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, https://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/About_Our_Office/Our_Services.html
[https://perma.cc/YV2V-ANQZ] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019) (describing duties as including portions
of committee reports that show the changes a bill makes to existing law (known within Congress as
“Ramseyers”).)
112 Id. (describing duties as including certain motion text, including some motions to suspend
the rules, motions to recommit, and motions to instruct conferees).
113 2 U.S.C. § 281a (2018) (noting that “the Office [of Legislative Counsel for the House] shall
maintain the attorney-client relationship with respect to all communications between it and any
Member or committee of the House.”); OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL: U.S. SENATE,
supra note 106 (“Members and staff of the Senate can rest assured that communication with the
Office is always confidential.”).
114 Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, H.R. Res. 988, 93d Cong. (1974).
107
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but these collections were not authoritative, and they could contain errors.115
As a result, the only way to determine current law was “slogging through all
of the session laws” of Congress.116 It was not enough to know that a law had
been passed a century ago; one had to search all laws passed since that time
to ensure no amendments had been made in the intervening years. The U.S.
Code was deemed necessary because this research process became
“increasingly cumbersome” as the number of laws exploded.117
By creating the U.S. Code in 1926,118 Congress joined many state
legislatures that had begun to prepare and adopt topically-arranged legal
codes.119 Unlike several such states, however, Congress did not create a
governmental office to maintain its Code.120 Instead, Congress entrusted
management and oversight of the Code to the House Committee on the
Revision of Laws—and it did not provide the Committee with any significant
staff to perform this task.121
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, even as the federal statutory landscape
was expanding, the work of preparing codification bills was assigned to only
two individuals.122 As a result, Congress often outsourced this work to noncongressional actors. With respect to the updating and publishing of the
115 See Mary Whisner, The United States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and Positive Law, 101 L.
LIBR. J. 545, 549-52 (2009) (citing agency and private publications and noting the problem of
errors); Charles J. Zinn, Codification of the Laws, 45 L. LIBR. J. 2, 5-6 (1952) (noting the prevalence
of private publications prior to 1925). This was a problem specifically with enactments after 1873;
prior enactments had been consolidated by the Revised Statutes of the United States, though
Congress did authorize some unofficial updates to it. See Margaret Wood, The Revised Statutes of the
United States: Predecessor to the U.S. Code, IN CUSTODIA LEGIS (July 2, 2015)
https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/07/the-revised-statutes-of-the-united-states-predecessor-to-the-u-scode/ [https://perma.cc/U8TC-T3HG].
116 Whisner, supra note 115, at 550.
117 Id.
118 Act of June 30, 1926, Pub. L. No. 440, ch. 712, 244 Stat. 777.
119 See Dru Stevenson, Costs of Codification, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1129, 1140 (noting that “most
states adopted revisions or codes around that time [of the U.S. Code’s creation] that took similar
form—topical arrangement, sequential numbering, indexing, incorporation of other sections by
reference, and so on”). These state projects also built on a prior wave of state-level codification that
had been catalyzed partly by Field’s Code in New York in 1848, and that by 1894 had led roughly a
quarter of the states to embody some statutes in a code. See id. at 1139.
120 When Congress ultimately moved to create the Office of the Law Revision Counsel, its
primary advocate, Representative William Steiger of Wisconsin, cited the success of such an office
established by Wisconsin in 1909, for example. See Markup of House Resolution, Committee Reform
Amendments of 1974, 93rd Cong. 659 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Markup] (statement of Rep. Steiger)
(remarking that “I have an interest in this obviously, because Wisconsin was the first State, in 1909,
to establish a Law Revision Counsel” and referring to this as the “Wisconsin system”). See also H.R.
REP. NO. 28-728, at 89 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Committee Report] (“State practices vary but most
have a revision capability and employ a small staff located in a revisor of statutes bureau.
121 On the evolution of this committee assignment, see Will Tress, Lost Laws: What We Can’t
Find in the U.S. Code, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 143-45 (2010).
122 See 1974 Committee Report, supra note 120, at 88.
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Code, Congress often relied on services offered by the West Publishing
Company.123 With respect to the preparation of codification bills, most work
was done by executive-branch attorneys, because executive agencies had
more staff.124
The House addressed these concerns about the lack of institutional
capacity for codification as part of its review of its committee structure in
1974.125 The result was a House resolution that, among other reforms,126
created OLRC.127 The committee report echoed the same concerns for the
lack of congressional self-sufficiency that drove the creation of the other
nonpartisan offices, lamenting that: “To assist in the Judiciary Committee’s
codification and revision work the West Publishing Company has, for some
50 years, more or less donated its services to the committee.”128 The report
also documented Congress’s prior dependence on executive-branch
codification resources, noting that: “One title was codified after a large effort
by the Defense Department which put together a team of 52 lawyers . . . and
budgeted roughly $3 million to prepare the bill for the codification of Title
10, Armed Forces.”129 OLRC would enable Congress to perform this work for
itself.
A few months later, Congress passed a bill that declared the provision
creating OLRC to be “permanent law,” rather than just the creature of a
House resolution.130 In so doing, Congress ensured that OLRC could not be
abolished via unilateral action by the House.131
Id. at 88.
See 1974 Markup, supra note 120, at 660 (statement of Rep. Ketcham) (“The bulk of the
revision done [was] done by lawyers in the executive branch.”).
125 See 1974 Committee Report, supra note 120, at 87 (explaining that the production of the
Code had become a “massive task”); id. at 7 (describing the exceedingly “large body of Federal laws”).
The House considered proposals from a bipartisan Select Committee on Committees tasked with
looking at House Rules X and XI. These rules “establish[ed] the standing committees of the House,
define[d] their jurisdictions, and regulate[d] their procedures.” Id. at 3.
126 The 1974 Amendments also undertook a broader restructuring of the responsibilities,
jurisdictions, and resources available to House committees. See generally Committee Reform
Amendments of 1974, H.R. Res. 988, 93d Cong. (1974). For a detailed description of its reforms,
and of their evolution in Congress, see JUDY SCHNEIDER & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, RL31835,
REORGANIZATION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: MODERN REFORM EFFORTS 17-36
(2003) at 17-36.
127 Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, H.R. Res. 988, 93d Cong. § 405 (1974).
128 1974 Committee Report, supra note 120, at 88. Reference is made to the Judiciary
Committee because, in 1946, the House Committee on the Revision of Laws was absorbed into the
House Judiciary Committee as a subcommittee. See Tress, supra note 121, at 144.
129 See 1974 Committee Report, supra note 120, at 89.
130 Pub. L. No. 93-554, 88 Stat. 1771, 1777 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 285c (2018)).
131 Largely to its origin in a House resolution, OLRC still submits its codification bills
specifically to the House Judiciary Committee. See H.R. Res. 988, 93d Cong. § 405(c)(1) (1974)
(requiring submissions of titles to House Judiciary Committee); id. § 405(c)(2), (7) (requiring
submissions of recommendations to House Judiciary Committee).
123
124
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The office currently employs thirteen individuals—a significant increase
over earlier numbers,132 but one dwarfed by increases in many other
congressional offices. OLRC employees are all attorneys.133 They are divided
into two teams, with nine working on classification and four on codification
(a distinction explained below). OLRC is headed by an individual known as
the Law Revision Counsel who must be appointed by the House Speaker
without regard to partisan affiliation.134 The Law Revision Counsel typically
is selected through internal promotions of existing employees.
For its work on the U.S. Code, OLRC now performs several tasks. First,
it performs “codification” work, where it prepares codification bills for
Congress.135 This work requires surveying the myriad already-enacted federal
statutes and determining which statutes fall within general cohesive subjectmatter areas; those subject-matter areas are reflected in the fifty-three titles
of the U.S. Code. OLRC occasionally creates new titles or repurposes old
ones, but most of the subject matter areas were organized by Congress itself
when it adopted the Code in 1926. (The Code was less than 2000 pages long
then; now it is more than 50,000.)
OLRC then takes those statutes apart from the form in which they were
passed and reassembles them—moving and reorganizing sections around to
integrate those statutes into a single, coherent subject-matter title in the
Code.136 OLRC inserts that newly prepared title into a bill, which it presents
to Congress for formal enactment of the title into what is known as “positive
law.” To transform a title of the U.S. Code into positive law, Congress must
pass the codification bill repealing the myriad underlying statutes and
enacting the codification bill itself (and the title contained therein) as the sole
governing law in their place.137 Through its codification work, OLRC
therefore conceptualizes, creates, and organizes a title of the Code.138
132 Compare STAFF OF J. COMM. ON PRINTING, 115TH CONG., OFFICIAL CONG. DIRECTORY
464 (2018) with STAFF OF J. COMM. ON PRINTING, 94TH CONG., OFFICIAL CONG. DIRECTORY
437 (1976) (reporting that the Office employed three attorneys in 1976).
133 See Tress, supra note 121, at 121n.142.
134 Pub. L. No. 93-554, tit. I, ch. III, § 101, 88 Stat. 1777 (1974) (enacting the terms of a House
Resolution, H. Res. 988, 93rd Congress, that established the OLRC) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 285c).
135 See Positive Law Codification, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL,
https://uscode.house.gov/codification/legislation.shtml (last visited May 19, 2020) (“Positive law
codification by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel is the process of preparing and enacting a
codification bill to restate existing law as a positive law title of the United States Code.”)
136 Frequently Asked Questions and Glossary, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL,
https://uscode.house.gov/faq.xhtml (last visited May 19, 2020) (noting that the Code is a
“consolidation and codification by subject matter”).
137 See Positive Law Codification, supra note 135.
138 See 2 U.S.C. 285b(1) (2018) (requiring that the office shall “prepare, and submit to the
Committee on the Judiciary one title at a time, a complete compilation, restatement, and revision
of the general and permanent laws of the United States”).
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In preparing a codification bill, OLRC may make editorial changes to
clarify presumed congressional intent in the prepared title, including
grammatical changes or even the insertion of substantive textual provisions
such as definitions. OLRC’s work to draft codification bills includes a formal
review and comment period whereby the office invites feedback and analysis
on the bills from those with expertise in the relevant area of law, including
administrative agencies, congressional committees, and academics. Congress
has enacted twenty-seven titles of the U.S. Code into positive law, with the
most recent enacted in 2014.139
There are twenty-seven additional subject-matter-cohesive titles of the
U.S. Code that most lawyers perceive as indistinguishable from the enacted
titles (for instance, Title 42 of the U.S. Code, which contains the Civil Rights
Acts, Medicare, and Medicaid). OLRC also conceptualizes and organizes
those titles (most of which were originally organized by Congress in 1926) by
rearranging provisions from enacted statutes (or retaining the work done by
prior codifiers to that end). But those titles have not been formally enacted
as codified law by Congress—that is, Congress has not voted on those OLRC
edits at all—in many instances simply because Congress has not acted on
requests for codification and has little interest in doing so, as we elaborate in
Part II. As a result, those twenty-seven titles do not have the status of positive
law (in other words, the governing law is still the originally-enacted public
laws not the title of the Code).
A key practical effect of the difference between positive and non-positive
titles goes to how a law is properly amended. To amend a law that is part of
the enacted Code, one needs to amend to the Code itself (e.g., “Title 28, United
States Code, is amended . . .”). If instead, Congress accidentally amends with
a public law that says “the Judiciary Act of 1789 is amended,” that amendment
becomes something of a free floating piece of law because it is not “where” it
belongs, as the provisions of the Judiciary Act were formally repealed when
they were codified into the Code. Surprisingly, as we detail in Part IV, such
mistakes in amending are not rare and they create challenges for those trying
to find the most up-to-date versions of the law. To amend to one of the
twenty-seven titles not enacted as positive law, Congress does have to amend
to the underlying non-codified statute (e.g., “The Social Security Act is
amended . . .”), not to the Code, because the Code for those sections is not
enacted law to amend. These distinctions have caused much confusion and
numerous mistakes, as we elaborate in Part IV. The big point for now is how
little most lawyers and judges understand about any of this.
139 See Browse the United States Code, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL,
https://uscode.house.gov/browse.xhtml [https://perma.cc/BD3Q-RXRL] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019)
(titles marked with an asterisk are positive law).
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For all titles, whether or not voted on by Congress, OLRC also performs
“classification” work.140 Here, it prepares and publishes updated versions of
the Code that incorporate recent amendments.141 This includes updating the
official online version of the Code throughout the legislative year, which
OLRC typically does approximately thirty to forty times per year.142 For nonpositive titles, this classification work requires OLRC decisions about where
to locate newly enacted provisions in the Code. This work also can entail
certain edits to statutory text—such as modifying cross-references and
inserting headings in non-positive titles. As non-positive titles grow unwieldy
over time with repeated classifications, OLRC also periodically revisits them
to rearrange them—work that it labels as “editorial reclassification.”143
As noted, OLRC has significant editorial discretion in the performance
of these functions, a fact unknown to most lawyers and courts. In codification
bills, it may alter or even add statutory text in order to correct errors, resolve
ambiguities, and make the Code easier to understand and navigate. In all
aspects of its work, it has significant discretion to omit those provisions from
the Code entirely that it deems not “general and permanent,”144 such as most
parts of appropriations bills. It also has discretion to move full provisions
outside the text of the Code and into the side notes—a determination that
surprisingly often includes some important provisions, like pilot programs,
statutory effective dates, and legislative findings.145 To appreciate the
140 See
About Classification, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL,
https://uscode.house.gov/about_classification.xhtml (last visited May 19, 2020) (“The Office . . .
reviews every provision of every public law to determine whether it should go into the Code, and if
so, where. This process is known as U.S. Code classification.”). The statutory charter only uses the
term “classification” with respect to non-positive titles, but it requires OLRC to perform this
updating work for all titles. See 2 U.S.C. § 285b(4) (2018) (listing a function of the OLRC as “[t]o
classify newly enacted provisions of law to their proper positions in the Code where the titles
involved have not yet been enacted into positive law”).
141 See Frequently Asked Questions and Glossary, supra note 136 (noting “updates are made
throughout a congressional session on an ongoing basis as public laws are enacted. For the print
version of the Code, each title is updated once a year to include all of the laws enacted during the
latest session of Congress”).
142 Email from Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. 28, 2020) (on file with authors).
143 See Editorial Reclassification, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL,
https://uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassification/reclassification.html (last visited May 19, 2020)
(stating that OLRC “must occasionally undertake editorial reclassification projects to reorganize
areas of law that have outgrown their original boundaries, or to eliminate organizational units that
are no longer efficient”). OLRC typically views it as the job of Congress, not OLRC, to further
modify the text of positive law titles, and so OLRC does not make all the same types of edits when
classifying in positive law titles. Instead, OLRC will submit to Congress a bill that, if enacted by
Congress, would implement its proposed edits (such as reorganization of a title). See Email from
Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (on file with authors).
144 2 U.S.C. § 285b(1) (2018).
145 See infra Part IV.B for elaboration; see also About Classification, supra note 140 (“While the
decision to classify a freestanding provision as a section or a statutory note is an editorial judgment,
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significance of this discretion, as we discuss in Part IV, more than half of the
enacted text of the U.S. Code is now in statutory notes—that is, not visible as
inline text in print sources and not readily accessible at all on secondary
electronic sources, even for those who know to look for them.146 These
changes often create situations in which the statute as encountered by the
general public appears different—or at least less complete—from the text that
was enacted.
D. Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
“[T]he Congress has, in the eyes of many, lost the power of the purse to the
Executive Branch.”

In the half-century preceding the creation of CBO, the office that now is
Congress’s economic and budgetary analyst, budgetary power rested heavily
with the executive branch. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 required
the President to submit an annual budget proposal, and so largely entrusted
the President with responsibility for budget planning.147 The 1921 Act also
established the Bureau of the Budget, later renamed the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), which gave the President significant
control of data and analysis relating to the budget.148 In the following decades,
economic analyses of legislative issues, such as cost estimates for bills,
typically were produced by executive agencies.149 Those calculations, it often
was suspected, would vary based on the President’s level of support for the
underlying legislation.150 This era of “presidential dominance” over the
budget process continued unabated throughout the 1960s.151
Congress became increasingly concerned about this allocation of
budgetary power in the 1960s. The Vietnam War and the Great Society
there are certain types of provisions that are normally classified as notes in both positive and nonpositive law titles, such as effective dates, short titles, savings, and statutory construction. Statutory
notes also include provisions that are somewhat less than general or less than permanent, but still
relate to existing Code sections, such as those requiring studies and reports, implementation of
regulations, or the establishment of a task force.”); Email from Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross
(Apr. 28, 2020) (on file with authors) (“Sometimes [placement in a note] is by Code custom. Other
times [OLRC has] no other choice—as when a freestanding provision belongs in a positive law title
based on subject matter.”).
146 On this point, see also Shobe, supra note 16.
147 PHILIP G. JOYCE, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: HONEST NUMBERS,
POWER, AND POLICYMAKING 15 (2011); History, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
https://www.cbo.gov/about/history [https://perma.cc/3ZJS-5QP3] (last visited Aug. 8, 2019).
148 Supra note 147.
149 Olivia B. Waxman, This Is Why the Congressional Budget Office Was Created, TIME (May 24,
2017), http://time.com/4786202/cbo-estimates-history [https://perma.cc/6BA2-E5EF].
150 Id.
151 ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 14 (3rd ed. 2007).
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policies placed new strain on the federal budget, and Congress grew
dissatisfied with executive-branch budgetary tactics that it viewed as
coercive.152 These inter-branch tensions reached a boiling point when, in 1972,
President Nixon threatened to withhold significant appropriations from
certain federal programs that conflicted with his policies.153 These
impoundments, along with a post-Watergate concern among some about the
trustworthiness of OMB,154 led to new congressional interest in reclaiming
its budgetary and economic powers.
In response, Congress formed a joint committee in 1972 that was directed
to develop recommendations “for the purpose of improving congressional
control of budgetary [procedures].”155 Drawing on the template of California’s
Joint Legislative Budget Committee, it recommended the creation of a
nonpartisan joint staff and director to work beneath two new budget
committees, one for each chamber.156 This approach, the committee hoped,
might finally “give Congress its own center of congressional budgetary
operations.”157
A year later, Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which acted upon the joint committee’s
recommendations.158 The conference committee’s explanatory statement
observed: “[T]he Congress has, in the eyes of many, lost the power of the
purse to the Executive Branch.”159 It further stated: “[C]ongressional
enactments [have] permitted the Executive to achieve a great concentration
of financial and policymaking authority . . . . Yet the Congress did little to
improve its own budget capabilities.”160
To reclaim control, the Act established a series of new procedures and
practices—including presidential procedures for impoundments161 and
procedures for the new congressionally driven budget process.162 To manage
the latter process, it also created several new congressional institutions. These
included the new budget committee in each chamber—a division of labor
partly designed to allow for specialized attention to aggregate federal

152 JOYCE, supra note 147, at 15.
153 Id. at 15-16.
154 Waxman, supra note 149.
155 Pub. L. 92-599, § 301(b)(1), 86 Stat. 1324 (1972).
156 H.R. Rep. No. 93–147, at 2-3 (1973).
157 Id.
158 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974).
159 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference
160 Id. at 2.
161 Pub. L. No. 93-344, tit. X.
162 Id. tit. III.

on H.R. 7130, 93rd Cong. 1 (1974).
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spending163 and partly the byproduct of bicameralism traditions in
Congress164—a structure that separated budget power across the two
chambers. It was also partly an effort to navigate and appease existing
committee-level conflicts inside Congress.165 Rather than leave issues of
budgetary expertise and calculation to these new committees, however, the
Act also created the CBO.166
The Act made the CBO a nonpartisan legislative office, not committee
staff as had been proposed.167 Representative Frank Annunzio said that the
CBO would “aid in redressing the imbalance of information which the
executive branch commonly uses to its advantage and our embarrassment.”168
Senator Edmund Muskie similarly commented that the office would “provide
Congress with the kind of information and analyses it needs to work on an
equal footing with the executive branch.”169
In subsequent years, CBO accreted authority, largely by proactively
looking to analyze major legislative proposals and taking a firmly
nonpartisan stance. President Carter’s energy policy was the important first
milestone. As CBO historian Philip Joyce put it, CBO proactively involved
itself by “proposing to do an analysis of the plan, and by generating requests
for this analysis from the committees of jurisdiction.”170 Ultimately, CBO
determined that the Carter estimates of the policy’s intended effects were
163 See Public Law 93-344: Legislative History, Committee on Governmental Operations, United
States Senate, 93rd Cong. 29 (1974) (“The Budget Committee is being created to guide the Congress
in . . .tasks that no other standing committee now performs . . ..By performing effectively the new
fiscal policy and priority-setting functions that no other legislative committee now performs it
should enable other committees . . .to work with greater focus and effect.”).
164 See id. at 30 (“Congress needs the legislative mechanism to make fiscal policy, and
legislation under the Constitution is the product of a bicameral system. Thus each House needs a
Budget Committee to formulate and prepare its fiscal policy decisions, legislating such decisions in
the same manner as all other such decisions.”).
165 See ALAN J. ABRAMSON, BROKEN PURSE STRINGS: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING
1974 TO 1988, at 11-13 (1988) (providing context on conflict between appropriations and
authorizing committees).
166 Pub. L. No. 93-344, tit. II.
167 Id. at §201.
168 Public Law 93-344: Legislative History, supra note 163 at 1964.
169 Id. at 2000; see also CHAFETZ, supra note 32, at 63; JOYCE, supra note 148, at 6 (describing
how the creation of the CBO was “[p]art of [an] effort. . . to provide Congress with analytical
capacity independent of the executive branch”). Interestingly enough, the creation of OMB in the
first place was in part the reverse story: the President trying to reclaim budget authority from
Congress. See JOHN BURKE, THE INSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY 11 (1992) (describing how the 1939
changes to the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), the predecessor of the OMB, involved “an attempt to
channel departmental relations with Congress through the White House and to tailor departmental
needs to the president’s programmatic goals”).
170 Phillip G. Joyce, The CBO at Middle Age, BROOKINGS (Feb. 11, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PJ_WorkingPaper9_Feb11_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BS3Q-5UEM].
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overly generous.171 Despite the controversy generated by this conclusion,
CBO’s critique of President Carter’s plan helped establish the office’s
independence, especially because the entire federal government, including
CBO, was headed by Democrats.172 CBO continued to display this
independence from majority leadership with controversial forecasts relating
to President Reagan’s budget policy173—particularly in projecting a deficit
when Reagan promised his budget would balance174—as well as unfavorable
forecasts that contributed to the failure of President Clinton’s proposed
health reform legislation in 1994.175
The creation of the office angered some members by drawing power
away from the very influential committees with control over the budget,
including House Ways & Means and Senate Finance. CBO similarly has
maintained independence from the budget committees of Congress. One of
the most important early CBO directors, Dr. Alice Rivlin, openly embraced
this internal separation of powers function for the office, famously stating:
“[T]he CBO was not set up to work solely for the budget committees. I
work for the whole Congress and have responsibilities to all committees and
indeed to all members.”176
Today, CBO has approximately 250 employees, which it reports are
“mostly economists or public policy analysts with advanced degrees,” and a
few attorneys.177 The office is headed by a Director who is jointly appointed
by the House Speaker and Senate President pro tempore (with
recommendations from the Budget Committees) and who legally must be
appointed without regard to political affiliation.178 In practice, the House and

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN’S BUDGET
REVISIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982 (1981) (“[T]he CBO estimates of the economic effects of the
Administration’s budget proposals are subject to a large margin of error.”).
174 Joyce, supra note 170. at 7.
175 See Paul Starr, What Happened to Health Care Reform?, AM. PROSPECT (1995),
https://prospect.org/article/what-happened-health-care-reform
[https://perma.cc/N9CA-VBG5]
(describing the “considerable political impact” of the CBO’s decision not to “count much savings
from competition in its estimate of the future costs of any [healthcare] proposal”).
176 Congressional Budget Office Oversight: Hearing before S. Comm. on the Budget, 94th Cong. 4
(1975). In practice, we were told, CBO when busy has to prioritize the requests of leadership and
the main financial committees. Staffer Interviews.
177 Organization
and
Staffing,
CONG.
BUDGET
OFFICE,
https://www.cbo.gov/about/organization-and-staffing [https://perma.cc/N5E3-C9VJ] (last visited
May 11, 2020). The Office also employs lawyers, information technology specialists, editors, and
others.
178 2 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2018). The Director serves for a fixed term of four years, although the
Director can be removed earlier by a resolution in either chamber. 2 U.S.C. § 601(a)(3)–(4) (2018).
171
172
173
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Senate Budget Committees have alternated in recommending candidates for
the position, and the Committees’ recommendations have been followed.179
The office provides analyses, reports, and studies designed to inform
Congress about the fiscal impacts of policies, legislative proposals, and
enacted law.180 Its analyses include: (1) a cost estimate for nearly every bill
that is approved by a committee;181 (2) ten-year and thirty-year forecasts of
the budgetary and economic outcomes anticipated to result under
continuation of current law; (3) economic analysis of the President’s budget;
(4) examination of the options to reduce the federal deficit; and (5) analysis
of the economic impacts of federal mandates upon state, local, and tribal
governments and the private sector, as required by the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995.182 CBO often proactively assists legislative staff in
designing legislation that will not exceed desired expenditure levels.183 The
office performs these functions particularly with respect to spending
legislation (i.e., non-tax legislation), due to the complementary role played
by JCT for tax bills.184
Congress also has hardwired use of the office’s cost estimates into the
routine legislative process, with rules and laws requiring committee-reported
legislation to be cost-estimated (and for committee reports to publish those
estimates).185 In most instances, Congress also has required that legislation
meet certain budgetary goals—and while most of these rules provide the
Budget Committees with the option to determine their own cost estimates,
use of CBO estimates occasionally is mandated, and even when they are not,
congressional convention dictates the use of CBO estimates regardless of

179 MEGAN S. LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31880, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE: APPOINTMENT AND TENURE OF THE DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2019).
180 See generally JOYCE, supra note 147, at 22; Joyce, supra note 170, at 10-23 (discussing CBO
scores, which provide fiscal estimates for proposed legislation, and baseline projections, which
provide such analyses for enacted law).
181 These are provided for any committee except the appropriations committees, see 2 U.S.C.
§ 653 (2018) (noting that “to the extent practicable,” cost estimates shall be provided to “any
committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate (except the Committee on Appropriations
of each House)”), but CBO still works very closely with appropriators, including providing
substantial analyses of appropriations bills. See Staffer Interview.
182 Pub. L. 104-4, § 424, 109 Stat. 55 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 658c (2018)); Products, CONG.
BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/about/products [https://perma.cc/Z2M6-SG3S] (last visited
Aug. 1, 2019).
183 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1, at 764 (reporting interviews with current and former CBO
staff).
184 See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
185 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, § 308(a), Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297; RULES
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule XIII.3(c)(3).
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such specification.186 As a result, the “CBO score”—the estimated cost of a
bill—often plays a pivotal role in a bill’s success or failure.187
CBO publishes its formal cost estimates and analytic reports,188 materials
outlining its underlying data and analytical methods,189 comparisons of its
projections with a variety of sources,190 and chart books, slide decks, and
infographics about the budget and the economy to make its projections more
accessible.191 Any preliminary analyses CBO conducts at the behest of
members or committees to assist in the development of legislation are
confidential.192
E. Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)
“Congress ought not to be dependent absolutely on what may be reported to
it by the officials and people engaged in the administration side alone.”

Created in 1926, the JCT emerged in part from the enactment of the
Sixteenth Amendment which, by providing legislative authority to impose an
income tax, created a growing need for expertise in taxation. More concretely,
however, it also emerged from a personal feud between congressional and
executive actors. As George K. Yin, who has written extensively on JCT, has

186 The House’s PAYGO rule requires use of a CBO-calculated baseline to measure a bill’s
impact on the deficit. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule
XXI(10)(a)(2). See also Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8 (2010) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §933(c)(2)(B)
(2018)) (specifying CBO role in statutory PAYGO rule). Otherwise, chamber budget rules typically
provide the budget committees with discretion to determine compliance with budgetary rules, and
convention alone dictates use of CBO estimates. See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, § 312; RULES
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule XXI; H.R. Con. Res. 71, § 4106, 115th
Cong. (2017); See also infra note 245 (on reconciliation process and the Byrd rule); Ellen P. Aprill &
Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 105
(2018)(explaining JCT and CBO role in Byrd rulings); CBO’s Role in Budget Resolutions, CONG.
BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51379 (last visited May 15, 2020) (describing CBO
role for budget resolutions).
187 See, e.g., Robert King, Following GOP Criticism, CBO Revamps Insurance Coverage Estimates,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(Sept.
21,
2018),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/healthcare/following-gop-criticism-cbo-revampsinsurance-coverage-estimates [https://perma.cc/SD84-4BVY] (describing how the repeal of the
ACA died in part due to “the CBO’s high estimates of coverage losses.”).
188 Processes,
CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/about/processes#release
[https://perma.cc/LZ6H-64FF] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
189 Transparency,
CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/about/transparency
[https://perma.cc/R4KM-B97B] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Processes, supra note 188. If these relate to publicly available legislative proposals, they will
be made available only to members of Congress; if not, they will remain wholly confidential. Id.
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chronicled,193 Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon proposed in 1924 to reduce
surtax rates and Senator James Couzens responded with well-publicized
critiques of the proposal. This dispute turned personal and culminated in a
Senate investigation into the Bureau of Internal Revenue.194 As Yin observes,
the investigation awoke Congress to broader concerns about the drafting and
implementation of tax policy.195
In the Finance Committee’s hearing on the Couzens investigation,
Senator Andrieus Jones lamented, with respect to tax oversight: “[T]he
Congress ought not to be dependent absolutely on what may be reported to
it by the officials and people engaged in the administration side alone.”196
Arguing that the committee should have experts of its own, Jones said: “I am
not an expert engineer; I am not an expert auditor; nor have I the time to do
the work myself.”197
With respect to drafting “recommendations for legislation,” Jones added:
“[Congress] has had to rely solely upon recommendations which came from
the Secretary of the Treasury. I submit that that is not a proper basis for the
framing of legislation. You see only one side of it.” To avoid “becom[ing] mere
rubber stamps” of the Bureau, Jones concluded: “We want an agency under
our jurisdiction so we know what is going on.”198
This desire for congressional autonomy from executive-branch tax
analysis translated into the committee’s proposal for a “Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation,” which was enacted into law by the Revenue Act

193 Yin, a former head of the JCT, has profiled the Committee and its staff in a number of
excellent articles. See George K. Yin, Crafting Structural Tax Legislation in a Highly Polarized Congress,
81 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 241, 251-54 (2018); George K. Yin, How Codification of the Tax Statutes
and the Emergence of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Helped Change the Nature of the
Legislative Process, 71 TAX L. REV. 723, 725-26 (2018); George K. Yin, James Couzens, Andrew Mellon,
the “Greatest Tax Suit in the History of the World,” and the Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and
Its Staff, 66 TAX L. REV. 787 (2013)George K. Yin, The Joint Committee on Taxation and
Codification of the Tax Laws (Feb. 2016) (unpublished draft), https://uschs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/USCHS-History-Role-Joint-Committee-Taxation-Yin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XK36-J2DS].
194 Yin, James Couzens, supra note 193, at 814-838 (describing the escalating feud that
included Mellon perhaps accessing Couzens’s confidential tax information for purposes of attacking
him, Couzens proposing a Senate investigation that threatened to examine Mellon’s management of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Bureau officials attempting to coerce Couzens into paying $10
million in alleged back taxes).
195 Id. at 838-42 (explaining that “[d]espite its controversial origins, the Couzens investigation
ended up playing an important role in defining the need for and functions of the JCT”).
196 Id. at 848 (citing Revenue Act of 1926: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 69th Cong. 21314 (1926)).
197 Id. (same). See also Michael A. Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative
History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 829-30 (1991) (noting the role of
tax law complexity in giving rise to JCT).
198 Yin, James Couzens, supra note 193, at 849.
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of 1926.199 The resulting institution, the JCT and its staff, quickly became
essential to Congress’s tax process and remains so today. There is no “tax
committee” in Congress; instead, JCT provides the tax expertise for the
House Ways & Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, as
well as any other committee working on tax-related issues in Congress. As
one commentator remarked, its Chief at times has exerted “more influence
[on tax legislation] than the President, the Secretary of State, the assistant
secretary in charge of taxation, [and] the chairmen of the tax-writing
committees in Congress—separately or combined.”200 The JCT staff now
assists Congress at every step of the tax-related legislative process. It
contributes legal, policy, behavioral, administrative, and economic analysis
with respect to tax legislation.
Unlike most committee staff—but like the other offices of the
congressional bureaucracy—JCT’s nonpartisan staff serves both chambers of
Congress and aids all members and committees.201 For example, JCT staff
works with members and committees to develop tax policies and then
collaborates with Legislative Counsel to translate these policies into statutory
text.202 It also supports the committees at markups, floor debates, and
committee meetings, and drafts the legislative history for tax bills.203 It
prepares summaries of the bill and its proposed amendments at each stage of
the legislative process, provides hearing testimony and produces “hearing
pamphlets” that summarize and analyze potential reforms,204 and describes
the proposals before the committee at markup.205
If the legislation reaches either chamber floor, JCT staff provides an
official revenue estimate for the legislation—a function analogous to CBO’s
role on spending legislation.206 At conference committee, the staff drafts the
Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 1203, 44 Stat. 9.
Compare E.W. Kenworthy, Colin F. Stan: A Study in Anonymous Power, in ADVENTURES IN
PUBLIC SERVICE 107-08 (Delia & Ferdinand Kuhn eds., 1964) with Michael A. Livingston, What’s
Blue and White and Not Quite as Good as a Committee Report: General Explanations and the Role of
“Subsequent” Legislative History, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 91 (1994) (criticizing extent of JCT power).
201 About Us—Overview, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/aboutus/overview.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
202 Staffer Interview.
203 Joint Committee Role in the Tax Legislative Process, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
https://www.jct.gov/about-us/role-of-jct.html [https://perma.cc/VA2D-DVJM] (last visited August
1, 2019).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended by the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985 (commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), Pub L. No.
116-94, § 201(f); Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 308, 88 Stat. 297. These
JCT estimates are calculated by reference to the CBO revenue baseline. Although the cost estimates
in committee reports for tax bills may nominally be attributed to CBO, they are produced in practice
by JCT staff. Staffer Interview.
199
200
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markup document, conference report, and revenue table.207 At various points
in the legislative process, JCT also prepares distributional analyses of tax
provisions,208 generates macroeconomic analysis of tax bills, and analyzes
these bills’ impact on GDP, unemployment rates, and the budget.209 It also
ghostwrites committee reports for Ways and Means, Finance and other
committees insofar as they relate to tax. JCT also supports the Senate Foreign
Relations committee on treaties.
Outside the legislative process, JCT staff also conducts oversight
functions, including ensuring that the IRS implements federal tax legislation
in compliance with congressional intent.210 JCT almost never holds hearings
of its own but, rather, works with partisan staff on other committees. Certain
aspects of policy work, we were told, “are viewed by other staff as JCT
stuff . . . . You will hear, ‘this is for Joint Tax. Joint Tax will go through
it.’ . . . They talk with us about their policy. We put together bullet-point
specs of the bill, then JCT and Legislative Counsel writes the bill.”211
JCT staff also publishes the influential “Blue Book,” a document “written
for the tax bar” and widely used by it, that provides explanations of the tax
legislation enacted by each Congress.212 It also annually produces a
description of the revenue provisions in the President’s most recent budget
proposal,213 a tax expenditures budget enumerating spending through tax

About Us—Overview, supra note 201; see also Staffer Interview.
JOINT COMM. TAXATION, JCX-1-05, OVERVIEW OF REVENUE ESTIMATING
PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGIES USED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION 4 (2005).
209 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule XIII.8(b)-(c)
(outlining the provision on “estimates of major legislation”); Rule XIII.3(h), id. at 26-27 (requiring
JCT-prepared tax complexity analysis); Publications on Tax Expenditures, JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=5 [https://perma.cc/D2JBFYSG] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019) (containing reports on Tax Expenditures); Staffer Interview
(discussing provision of distributional analyses, budgetary analysis, and assessments of impact on
GDP and unemployment).
210 See I.R.C. §§ 8021–8023 (2018). This oversight work includes monitoring the IRS and
Treasury for compliance with congressional intent, consulting with these agencies to explain such
intent, reviewing unusually large tax refunds, collaborating with GAO to conduct studies of IRS
implementation, and conducting specific reviews at the request of Members. Id. To this end, the
Joint Committee has authority to hold hearings, issue subpoenas, and take testimony under oath.
See id.
211 Staffer Interview.
212 Staffer Interview. In the development of the Blue Book, JCT staff consult with Treasury,
the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and the IRS. Staffer
Interview.
213 Description of the President’s Budget Proposals, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=7
[https://perma.cc/3JBA-P6L2]
(last
visited Aug. 1, 2019).
207
208
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subsidies,214 and an annual overview of expiring tax provisions, among other
materials.215
These published materials notwithstanding, JCT staff interacts with
members and staff confidentially.216 Much like CBO, JCT staff will develop
revenue estimates for early tax proposals, and it will collaborate with
members to assist them in developing bills to reach members’ revenue goals.
As part of its routine work, the staff receives approximately 6,000 to 7,000
requests from members each year, the majority of which are requests for
revenue estimates, and all of which are confidential unless released by the
member.217 As JCT staff put it, “revenue estimates are part of our routine
work because revenue estimates are bound up in design of provisions;
members care about budgetary effects. It’s part of the policy design.”218
Under its statutory authorization (now located in the Internal Revenue
Code),219 JCT can appoint the Chief of Staff and additional staff.220 In
practice, the Chief of Staff is selected alternately by the chair of the House
or Senate committee with jurisdiction over tax issues (with the other chair
assenting), and the Chief of Staff selects all additional committee staff.221
Currently, JCT has sixty-nine staff members, and while its organic statute
does not mandate that hiring of staff (or Chief of Staff) be conducted in a
nonpartisan manner, in practice the JCT explicitly seeks “nonpartisan legal
professionals” and economists when hiring.222
214 Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 273 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) (2018)) (requiring CBO use of JCT
estimates for revenue effects); Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act Of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-344, § 301(e)(2)(E), 88 Stat. 297 (requiring tax expenditures budget); see also JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-55-19, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2019-2023 at 2, n. 4 (2019) (explaining JCT production of tax expenditures for CBO
publication).
215 See
Expiring
Provisions,
JOINT
COMM.
ON
TAXATION,
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=10 [https://perma.cc/WJG8-PQHY] (last
visited Aug. 1, 2019) (containing publications of Expiring Provisions).
216 See Staffer Interview (“[W]e treat all our work for members as confidential . . . .”).
217 Joint Committee Revenue Estimation Process, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
https://www.jct.gov/about-us/revenue-estimating.html [https://perma.cc/4LGN-MFLB] (last
visited Aug. 1, 2019).
218 Staffer Interview.
219 26 U.S.C. § 8001, et seq. (2018).
220 Id. at § 8004.
221 John M. Samuels, The Joint Committee Staff—From the Outside Looking In 5
(unpublished manuscript) (Feb. 2016) (on file with authors) (explaining that the “Chief of Staff is
selected by the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation,” which rotates between the Chairmen
of House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, and that the “Chief of Staff is an
experienced and highly respected tax lawyer or economist and is responsible for hiring and managing
the rest of the JCT Staff ”).
222 See About Us, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html
[https://perma.cc/YMX7-KF4M] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019) (describing itself as a nonpartisan
committee); Current Staff, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/current-
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F. Offices of the Parliamentarians
“We are the procedural navigators. Our knowledge isn’t replicated
anywhere else.”

The Parliamentarians’ Offices are each chamber’s “keeper of the
precedents”; they have responsibility for collecting, maintaining, and
knowing volumes of congressional procedural history.223 Even prior to the
creation of the Parliamentarians’ Offices, Congress relied on nonpartisan
experts for procedural guidance. Throughout the nineteenth century,
chamber clerks and messengers assisted members with floor procedures and
provide point-of-order clarifications.224 The work of these informal advisors,
combined with the procedural knowledge of the members themselves, was
sufficient for many decades to “keep some semblance of uniformity” in each
chamber, as one Parliamentarian has put it.225
By the 1920s, however, the emergent committee system had channeled
members away from the chamber floors, particularly in the House, and thus
reduced their familiarity with their own procedures.226 The new institution
of Parliamentarians’ Offices—created by the House in 1927 and by in the
Senate in 1935—was to compensate for the diminution in member procedural
knowledge and save members from having to master procedural rules.227
Freeing up members to focus more on substantive policymaking, it was
thought, would empower Congress to better resist executive encroachments

staff.html [https://perma.cc/5LA8-555P] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019) (providing a list of current staff
members);
Jobs
at
JCT,
JOINT
COMM.
ON
TAXATION,
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1173 [https://perma.cc/7NPE-MA89]
(last visited Aug. 1, 2019); Staffer Interview (discussing the importance of candidates not touting
partisan background).
223 Staffer Interview.
224 See James I. Wallner, Parliamentary Rule: The U.S. Senate Parliamentarian and Institutional
Constraints on Legislator Behavior, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 380, 388 (2014) (“The clerk advised the presiding
officer and individual members on parliamentary questions using compilations such as Gilfry’s
Precedents to assist them in this effort.”); Parliamentarians of the House, OFFICE OF THE HOUSE
HISTORIAN, https://history.house.gov/People/Office/Parliamentarians/ [https://perma.cc/242K5YUZ] (last visited May 12, 2020) (describing the history of the Parliamentarians of the House); see
also FLOYD M. RIDDICK, SENATE PARLIAMENTARIAN 1947-1974, ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS 6162
(1978),
http://senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Riddick_interview_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J4SD-4LUG] (noting that “in the 1800’s some clerk tried to keep the presiding
officer advised as to the practices and precedents of the Senate”).
225 See RIDDICK, supra note 224, at 62.
226 See Gould, supra note 16, at 1964 (“The proliferation of committees meant that legislators
began to spend less time on the floor, and, consequently, they developed less individual knowledge
of parliamentary procedure.”); Staffer Interviews.
227 Gould, supra note 16, at 1964 (noting years of creation and that offices were created in
response to Members ”develop[ing] less individual knowledge of parliamentary procedure” than in
prior years).
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into such policymaking.228 Moreover, members wanted a professional
parliamentarian to play an internal separating powers role—namely, to curb
the increasing consolidation of procedural power in both chambers, as was
occurring under Speaker Joseph “Boss” Cannon in the House229 and under
Vice President John Nance Garner in the Senate.230
The initial use of the Parliamentarians’ Offices to disperse power within
Congress has continued to shape the offices’ work. For instance, the
Parliamentarians’ adjudicatory function is separated from the legislative
leadership; they will issue rulings that accord with chamber precedent even
if at odds with leadership preferences. A distinct Parliamentarian’s Office for
each chamber, accomplished in their separate establishment and continuing
into the present, further disperses power in Congress. This separation is
largely the product of an internal form of separation of powers mandated by
the Constitution. Article I, Section 5 provides that “Each House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”231 As a result, each chamber has
amassed a distinct body of rules and precedents.
But the two Parliamentarians’ Offices exist upon different legal
foundations. The House Parliamentarian’s Office is statutorily authorized by
the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for 1978.232 By contrast, the Senate
Parliamentarian’s Office has never been given separate statutory
authorization; instead it operates as a chamber appointment under the
authority of the Secretary of the Senate, technically sitting beneath the
Secretary.233 As a result, while federal statute provides that the House
228 See Michael S. Lynch & Anthony J. Madonna, Procedural Uncertainty, the
Parliamentarian, and Questions of Order in the United States Senate 11-12 (unpublished
manuscript),
http://spia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/ajmadonn/Parliamentarian.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SNY-5Y8A] (arguing that the long-term gains from avoiding inter-party
procedural conflict were worth “sacrific[ing] the short-term partisan gains resulting from a favorable
ruling”). For the argument that procedural and precedential sophistication itself helps buttress
legislative power against executive encroachments, see CHAFETZ, supra note 32, at 271.
229 Gould, supra note 16, at 1963; see also CHAFETZ, supra note 32, at 288; DAVID C. KING,
TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 87 (1997).
230 See Timothy Noah, Romancing the Parliamentarian, SLATE (Sept. 2, 2009, 7:10 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/09/romancing-alan-frumin-the-senateparliamentarian.html [https://perma.cc/MK4C-2EVK] (noting that the Senate parliamentarian was
“created in 1935 in revolt against John Nance Garner”).
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
232 Pub. L. No. 95-94 §115, 91 Stat. 653, 668 (1977) (providing that “House Resolution 502,
Ninety-fifth Congress, relating to the establishment and administration of the Office of the
Parliamentarian, shall be the permanent law with respect thereto”).
233 2 U.S.C. § 6531, et seq. (2018); see also VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS20544, THE OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIAN IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 2 (2018)
(explaining that “[o]rganizationally, the office of the Senate Parliamentarian is within the office of
the Secretary of the Senate”); UNITED STATES SENATE, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/secretary_senate.htm (last visited
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Parliamentarian will be appointed by the House Speaker and chosen “without
reference to political affiliations,” no comparable statute provides for the
method of selecting the Senate Parliamentarian.234 In practice, however, both
chambers have selected Parliamentarians via internal promotions of existing
employees—the last three new Senate Parliamentarians, for example, each
began the job with an average of over a dozen years’ work experience in the
office before assuming its leadership.235 The selection of the Senate
Parliamentarian typically is made by the Senate Majority Leader.236 Although
the Senate Parliamentarian has occasionally been removed for politicallymotivated reasons,237 each successor has resisted partisan pressure,238 and the
Senate Parliamentarian has in recent years survived partisan turnover.239
As the smallest of Congress’s nonpartisan institutions, the Senate office
currently employs just two attorneys and one clerk, and the House office
employs six attorneys and two clerks. The House office maintains one
subsidiary office, the Office of Compilation of Precedents.240 Both offices
publish a number of materials related to chamber rules and precedents.241
The Parliamentarians make procedural recommendations on
consequential matters. First, they make committee referral decisions for each
May 12, 2020) (explaining that “[a]mong other Senate floor staff who report to the secretary are the
parliamentarian”).
234 2 U.S.C. § 287a (2018).
235 See Gould, supra note 16, at 2006; see also Brian Palmer, So, You Want to Be a Parliamentarian?,
SLATE (Mar. 18, 2010), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/03/how-to-become-the-senateparliamentarian.html (detailing the role and the selection of the Parliamentarian and providing work
histories of various Parliamentarians).
236 See ANDREA C. HATCHER, MAJORITY LEADERSHIP IN THE U.S. SENATE 32 (2010)
(outlining Majority Leader’s selection of Parliamentarian and other Senate office heads).
237 See id. (describing the change of Parliamentarians that accompanied changes of party
control in 1981, 1987, and 1995, and a change of Parliamentarian in 2001 at the behest of Majority
Leader Lott that did not accompany partisan turnover and resulted from political frustrations with
Parliamentarian rulings). See also Gould, supra note 16, at 2006; further discussing these removals);
Kate Tummarello, Senate Will See First Female Parliamentarian, ROLL CALL (Jan. 30, 2012, 6:33 PM),
https://www.rollcall.com/2012/01/30/senate-will-see-first-female-parliamentarian/ (discussing the
change of Parliamentarians by Lott).
238 See STUART ALTMAN & DAVID SHACTMAN, POWER, POLITICS, AND UNIVERSAL
HEALTH CARE 317-20 (2011) (describing Parliamentarians installed after removal subsequently
issuing rulings frustrating the installing majority).
239 See Gould, supra note 16, at 1997 n.233-34 (discussing Parliamentarians’ survival of party
turnover); id. at 42-43 (same).
240 See Parliamentarian
of the House, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/officers-and-organizations/parliamentarian-of-thehouse [https://perma.cc/7G58-ZYCR] (last visited Aug. 8, 2019) (noting that the Office of
Compilation of Precedents is a subsidiary of the Office of the Parliamentarian).
241 The House Office publishes the House Rules and Manual; House Practice; Precedents of the
U.S. House of Representatives; and How Our Laws Are Made. Id. The Senate Office periodically
publishes Standing Rules of the Senate, and it also publishes Riddick’s Senate Procedure. See
HEITSHUSEN, supra note 233, at 1.
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introduced bill—referrals that determine the allocation of power across
congressional committees (and often a bill’s chance of success). Committee
referrals are high stakes and often hotly contested decisions within
Congress.242 The offices handle approximately ten thousand referrals over the
course of each Congress.243
Second, the House Parliamentarian makes important determinations on
the “germaneness” (and hence allowability) of proposed amendments to bills.
Under the germaneness rule, an amendment must address the same subject
as the matter being amended. While the rule itself is a single sentence, it has
generated “thousands of precedents.”244
Third, because budget reconciliation bills cannot be filibustered in the
Senate, they are an increasingly popular mode of legislating in times of intense
partisan gridlock. The Senate Parliamentarian has the authority through
application of the so-called “Byrd rule” to determine which bills comply with
six important budgetary rules that must be met to satisfy the conditions for
reconciliation.245 Analogous fast-track procedures existing in current law also
are providing fertile new battlegrounds for procedural battles.246
To advise Congress on the application of these and other rules, the offices
perform both public and private functions. In their public-facing role,
members of the office will advise the presiding officer of a chamber on the
correct responses to procedural issues that arise in real-time on the chamber

242 See generally KING, supra note 229 (explaining how jurisdictional areas for committees are
created and changed in Congress); Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1, at 728, 748; Staffer Interview.
243 See Gould, supra note 16, at 1969 (noting that the parliamentarians’ offices “process all of
the new bills that are introduced, totaling roughly ten thousand in each Congress”).
244 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule XVI(7); see also
CHARLES W. JOHNSON, JOHN V. SULLIVAN & THOMAS J.WICKHAM, JR., HOUSE PRACTICE 543–
602 (2017) (discussing how the germaneness rule “has been interpreted through thousands of
precedents since its adoption”); Staffer Interview.
245 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2018). A provision is defined as “extraneous” if it:
a) does not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
b) produces an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues that does not follow the reconciliation
instructions in the budget resolution;
c) is not in the jurisdiction of the committee that reported the provision;
d) produces changes in outlays or revenues that are merely incidental to the non-budgetary
components of the provision;
e) increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the period specified in the budget resolution;
f) recommends changes to Social Security.
246 See Gould, supra note 16, at 1961 nn.45-47; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 1544–1546 (2018) (describing
special procedures for the War Powers Resolution); IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE
POLICY (2015) (explaining how Congress has granted the President fast-track authority with trade
agreements).
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floor.247 In private, they also deliver advice through consultations with
members and their staffs in advance of a bill’s consideration on the floor.
Procedural recommendations by the Parliamentarians’ Offices carry no
inherent, binding authority over members. Chamber rules bestow the
presiding officer in each chamber with the power to make procedural
rulings—and custom alone dictates that, in making these rulings, the
presiding officer follow the recommendations of the relevant
Parliamentarian’s Office.248 Nonetheless, these recommendations are almost
always followed by the presiding officer—and the presiding officer’s ruling,
in turn, is almost never appealed or overturned by a chamber majority,
especially in the House.249 (A notable, modern exception has occurred in the
context of the “nuclear option,” which we further detail in the notes250 and in
Part II).
G. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
“The committees of Congress have no way of getting down to the actual
facts . . . we have no check at all.”

247 See HEITSHUSEN, supra note 233, at 1 (noting that the parliamentarians may “convey their
advice verbally to the presiding Representative or Senator—for example, when that Member needs
to respond to a parliamentary inquiry or rule on a point of order”).
248 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule I(5) (providing that
“[t]he Speaker shall decide all questions of order, subject to appeal by a Member, Delegate, or
Resident Commissioner”); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule
XII(2) (discussing the procedures for receiving and referring bills, resolutions, and other matters);
FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 101-28,
at 989 (Alan S. Frumin, ed., rev. ed. 1992).
249 See Email from Former Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Jan. 26, 2020) (on file with
authors); see also Gould, supra note 16, at 1976 n.125, 2000.
250 The “nuclear option” is a method to require only a simple majority for the Senate to act.
The procedural obstacle to this is Senate Rule XXII, which requires a two-thirds vote to modify
chamber rules. Under the “nuclear option,” a complex series of procedural maneuvers can allow
Senators to raise a point of order that reinterprets the rule as requiring only a bare majority for some
or all such matters, and to raise it on a question (viz., a cloture motion) that, because non-debatable,
itself requires only a simple majority. Through a ruling of the chair supporting this point of order,
or a Senate vote to overturn a ruling of the chair, this reinterpretation is then upheld as binding
precedent, even if in plain contradiction of the rule it ostensibly interprets. See VALERIE
HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44819, SENATE PROCEEDINGS ESTABLISHING
MAJORITY CLOTURE FOR SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS: IN BRIEF 1 (2017) (explaining that
the “‘nuclear option’ . . . require[s] actions arguably at variances with established principles
underlying Senate procedure”); Li Zhou, Senate Republicans Have Officially Gone “Nuclear” in Order
to Confirm More Trump Judges, VOX (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/2/18286991/senaterepublicans-nuclear-option-rules [https://perma.cc/AL5X-Z87L] (detailing how Senate Republicans
have gone “nuclear” and changed Senate rules so they can confirm Trump nominees more
expeditiously).
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GAO is the “congressional watchdog.”251 It is easily the largest of the
nonpartisan institutions, with a whopping 3,000 employees (once as many as
15,000!) spread across its Washington, D.C. headquarters and eleven field
offices.252
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, responsibility for the
auditing and oversight of federal expenditures belonged to the Comptroller
of the Treasury. In the debate over the legislation that ultimately would create
GAO, the bill’s sponsor, Representative James W. Good, shared a story
highlighting his concern for the Comptroller’s executive-branch dependence:
[T]he President desired to use a certain appropriation for a given purpose,
and was told by his Comptroller of the Treasury, who happened to be a little
independent of this system, that he could not do it. But the President insisted
and finally said, “I must have that fund, and if I can not change the opinion
of my comptroller, I can change my comptroller.” With less independence all
comptrollers, no matter to which political party they owe allegiance, have
been forced to face the same practical situation.253

In 1920, Congress passed a bill to create a new office to address the
Comptroller’s independence and relocate the auditing and oversight
functions from the executive branch. President Wilson vetoed it, claiming the
bill’s provisions allowing Congress to remove the new Comptroller General
through concurrent resolution or to impeach were unconstitutional. But
members continued to voice displeasure with the Comptroller’s relationship
to the executive. Representative Good again explained:
We believe that the Committee on Appropriations and the committees on
expenditures and on revenue that are investigating matters under their
jurisdiction should have at all times something more than an ex parte
statement with regard to expenditures. . . . Every bureau chief who is worth
anything wants his department to grow . . . . So year after year they come and
ask for new activities and additional money to perform those activities, and
most frequently Congress and the committees of Congress have no way of
getting down to the actual facts, except as we dig them out from an unwilling
witness, a witness naturally unwilling because he wants the money, and in his
attempt to get the money will cover up all the defects of his office, all the

251 About GAO: Overview, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, https://www.gao.gov/about/
[https://perma.cc/PA3B-DA6E] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
252 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-1SP, SERVING THE CONGRESS AND
THE NATION: STRATEGIC PLAN 2018-2023 12 (2018), (noting that GAO is comprised of
approximately 3,000 employees).
253 67 CONG. REC. 982 (May 3, 1921) (statement of Rep. Good).
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shortcomings of his organization, simply to get the appropriation for his
department. We have no check at all upon this method.254

With the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Congress proposed a
“General Accounting Office” to address these concerns. The statute charged
the office to “investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters
relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds” and to
“make such investigations and reports as shall be ordered by either House of
Congress or by any committee of either House having jurisdiction over
revenue, appropriations, or expenditures.”255 The Act allowed for removal of
the Comptroller by joint resolution or impeachment.256
Describing this proposed office, Representative Jo Byrns remarked: “The
[proposed] comptroller general is the representative of Congress. He does
not represent the Executive in any sense of the word, and the whole idea of
the Budget Committee was to make him absolutely and completely
independent of the Executive.”257 Representative Simeon Fess similarly
explained: “This bill removes from the spending department the right to
audit its own books . . . .”258 And the House committee report for the Act
expressly discussed the office’s role in the separation of powers, observing
that:
The Executive having the power to initiate the budget, certainly an
independent audit is necessary to insure at all times a businesslike execution
of the budget. . . . The creation of this office will, it is seen, serve as a check,
not only on useless expenditures but will keep the bureau more keenly alive
to a rigid performance of its duties and obligations.259

Nonetheless, to secure the signature of the new President, Warren G.
Harding, the bill made compromises. GAO would also have some
independence from Congress; its head, the Comptroller General, would be
appointed by the President (with Senate advice and consent).260 GAO’s
creation ultimately came as part of a larger set of tradeoffs with the executive
Id.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13 § 312, 42 Stat. 20.
This removal power would become central to the Court’s conclusion in Bowsher v. Synar
that GAO belonged to the legislative branch. See 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (“The critical factor lies
in the provisions of the statute defining the Comptroller General’s office relating to removability.”).
257 67 CONG. REC. 1081 (May 5, 1921) (statement of Rep. Byrns).
258 67 CONG. REC. 977 (May 3, 1921) (statement of Rep. Fess).
259 NATIONAL BUDGET SYSTEM: REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TO ACCOMPANY H. R. 30, at 7-8 (1921).
260 See ROGER R. TRASK, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/OP-3-HP, GAO HISTORY:
1921-1991, at 3 (1991) (“The congressional debate led to a consensus that the functions of the
Comptroller General were semijudicial and that his independence, like that of judicial officials,
should be assured.”).
254
255
256
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over power, including over the budget. The bill creating GAO also required
the President to submit an annual budget proposal (thereby entrusting
budgetary planning to the President) and established the Bureau of the
Budget, later renamed the Office of Management and Budget (thereby
entrusting budgetary analysis to the President).261 As one historian wrote,
“Many congressmen, probably most, viewed the independent audit as the
‘quid pro quo’ for instituting an executive budget.”262
GAO’s early work focused mostly on clerical review of “vouchers”—forms
used by executive branch officials to document expenditure details.263 By the
1940s, however, GAO supervised the creation and holistic auditing of
accounting systems in administrative agencies.264 Congress also reasserted its
control over the office, declaring it officially part of the legislative branch in
1945265 and giving it additional powers to oversee executive branch
implementation of the budget.266 In 1946, GAO’s workforce consisted of
nearly 15,000 employees.267
By the 1970s, Congress had more than tripled GAO’s budget and, in the
1970 Legislative Reorganization Act, mandated that it carry out full-fledged
“program evaluation.”268 The office transitioned from hiring only accountants
to hiring scientists, policy specialists, and technical experts to aid in its
modern mission of monitoring the substance and effectiveness (rather than
just the accounting) of executive programs.269 The 1990s’ Republican
See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
FREDERICK C. MOSHER, THE GAO: THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 49 (1979).
263 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO: WORKING FOR GOOD
GOVERNMENT
SINCE
1921,
at
2
(2001),
https://www.gao.gov/pdfs/about/GAO%20Working%20for%20Good%20Government%20Since%20
1921.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ45-YBBK].
264 See MOSHER, supra note 262, at 121-22 (noting that “GAO established offices within the
various agencies to carry on what were then called comprehensive audits”).
265 Reorganization Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 263, § 7, 59 Stat. 613 (asserting that “the
Comptroller General of the United States [and] the General Accounting Office . . . are a part of the
legislative branch of the Government”); see also MOSHER, supra note 262, at 104-05 (discussing that
in enacting the Reorganization Act of 1945, “Congress not only exempted the Comptroller General
and the GAO from presidential authority but also described them as ‘a part of the legislative branch
of the government’”).
266 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 206, 60 Stat. 812, 837
(authorizing and directing GAO to conduct “expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive
branch . . . to determine whether public funds have been economically and efficiently administered
and expended”).
267 See id. at 124 (highlighting that “GAO had reached a peak of almost 15,000 in 1946”).
268 MOSHER, supra note 262, at 176.
269 See GAO: WORKING FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT SINCE 1921, supra note 263 at 18 (“In the
1970s, GAO started recruiting physical scientists, social scientists, computer professionals, and
experts in such fields as health care, public policy, and information management.”). The GrammRudman-Hollings Act, passed in 1985, additionally gave the Comptroller authority to bind the
261
262

2020]

The Congressional Bureaucracy

1591

Revolution significantly pared back GAO’s budget and personnel,
inaugurating its transition away from work initiated by GAO itself—and
instead mostly toward congressionally initiated projects.270 However, GAO
remains the largest nonpartisan congressional institution.271
Present-day GAO oversees and evaluates federal programs and federal
expenditures,272 and undertakes traditional financial audits to ensure that
agencies are spending funds in an efficient manner.273 A broader range of
investigations also fall within the office’s ambit, including examining
redundancies in federal programs and possible illegalities.274 GAO issues
legal decisions addressing issues of appropriations law—i.e., the body of laws
governing agencies’ use of and accountability for public funds.275 The
majority of GAO’s studies, investigations, and legal decisions now result from
specific congressional requests, although it retains latitude to undertake

President to reduce federal spending for deficit-reduction purposes, but the Supreme Court struck
down this arrangement in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
270 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Auditing Politics or Political Auditing (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley
Pub.
Law
Research,
Paper
No.
964656,
2007)
(manuscript
at
6),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=964656 (finding that, in the mid-1980s, GAO
“shifted from mostly self-initiated work to congressionally driven work”); Paul Glastris & Haley
Sweetland Edwards, The Big Lobotomy, WASH. MONTHLY (Summer 2014),
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaug-2014/the-big-lobotomy/ ((discussing GAO
budget cuts). See also Walker v. Cheney, 230 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002) (challenging GAO’s
authority to issue demand letters of executive agencies); Walker v. Cheney: District Court Decision and
Related Statutory and Constitutional Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2004) (explaining role of Walker
regarding GAO’s continued demand letter authority); T. J. Halstead, “The Law: Walker v. Cheney”:
Legal Insulation of the Vice President from GAO Investigations, 33 PRES. STUD. Q. 635 (2003) (same).
271 See BROOKINGS, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS tbl.5-8, 18 (2019) (listing the number
of GAO employees at almost 3,000 while listing the Congressional Budget Office and Congressional
Research Service as having 235 and 609, respectively). For staff numbers of all the nonpartisan
congressional offices, see infra Table 1.
272 Today, its primary work is conducting of “performance audits,” whereby the Office
examines whether government programs are meeting their objectives. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF.,
GAO
AT
A
GLANCE
(2019),
https://www.gao.gov/pdfs/about/gao_at_a_glance_2019_english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQ84MARX] (noting that “GAO examines how taxpayer dollars are spent”); see also Gene L. Dodaro,
The Work of the U.S. Government Accountability Office on Contemporary Issues, 26 RES. ACCT. REG. 132,
138 (2014) (noting that “[m]ost” GAO work is “performance audits in which we are trying to improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of federal programs and activities”).
273 See ALISSA M. DOLAN, ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RL30240,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 82 (2014) (stating one of GAO’s goals is “auditing agency
operations to determine whether federal funds are being spent efficiently and effectively”).
274 See id. (reporting GAO’s goals of identifying “opportunities to address duplication, overlap,
waste or inefficiencies in the use of public funds” and “investigating allegations of illegal and
improper activities”).
275 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-1064SP, PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES
FOR LEGAL DECISIONS AND OPINIONS (2006) (outlining procedures and practices for legal
decisions and opinions of the Comptroller General).
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audits, investigations, and legal decisions at its own behest.276 A recent,
prominent example—at the center of efforts to impeach President Trump—
was GAO’s determination that OMB violated the Impoundment Control Act
when it withheld Ukrainian military aid that had been appropriated by
Congress. The decision stated: “GAO’s role under the ICA—to provide
information and legal analysis to Congress as it performs oversight of
executive activity—is essential to ensuring respect for and allegiance to
Congress’ constitutional power of the purse.”277
GAO also submits policy recommendations for legislative action to
Congress.278 These proposals can include recommendations that Congress
enter into entirely new areas of legislation.279 The congressional solicitation
of these recommendations is not simply pro forma—Congress regularly acts
on GAO’s recommendations. In 2018, for example, Congress adopted GAO’s
recommendations to direct the Veterans Health Administration to research
overmedication, update the Department of Defense’s prescription drug
buying programs, and develop “performance metrics” on border security for
the Department of Homeland Security.280
The head of GAO is still known as the Comptroller General and is still
appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation,281 now after
a congressional commission recommends a list of at least three possible
candidates to the President.282 Although it is unclear whether the President
is required to choose a name from the provided list, all three Comptrollers
General selected since the institution of this process have been so selected.283
276 See 31 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2018) (requiring the Comptroller General to evaluate government
programs “on the initiative of the Comptroller General”); Staffer Interview (stating that, today, 95%
of work is done at request of committee chairs and ranking members). In fiscal year 2018, GAO
received requests from 90% of the standing committees. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO19-403T, FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET REQUEST 27 (2019) (reporting standing committee
percentage of requests).
277 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-331564, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET—
WITHHOLDING OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE 9 (2020).
278 Reports & Testimonies: Recommendations Database, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
https://www.gao.gov/reports-testimonies/recommendations-database/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2020)
(collecting recommendations GAO makes to Congress).
279 See Staffer Interview (noting that “sometimes [GAO] recommend[s] Congress to step into
a completely new area”).
280 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-1SP, GAO PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2018, at 2-3 (2018) (listing GAO recommendations that Congress
adopted).
281 31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1) (2018).
282 Id. at (2)–(3).
283 See FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30349, GAO: GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AND GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 21 (2008) (“On the two
occasions since the 1980 enactment when a vacancy in the office of Comptroller General arose,
Presidents Reagan in 1981 and Clinton in 1998 each selected a nominee from the initial congressional
list.”); About GAO: Comptroller General: Biography, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
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The Comptroller General is still considered a legislative office because only
Congress can remove it,284 and the person heading this position serves a nonrenewable term of fifteen years.
GAO’s main work products are detailed reports, which typically range
from 10 to 100 pages in length.285 The office also issues a “high-risk list,” which
notes federal programs that GAO believes are susceptible to significant
financial loss.286 Among other things, it also publishes its “Red Book,” an
influential guide to appropriations law and rulings cited numerous times by
the federal courts, including this past term by the Supreme Court.287 With
respect to its analyses and methodology, the office’s work is structured by
transparency. GAO publishes nearly all of its reports and studies for public
consumption—even if members of Congress would prefer the reports to be
suppressed.288
GAO carries out a variety of additional responsibilities less immediately
tied to the legislative process. Each year, it adjudicates thousands of bid
protests—challenges to awards or solicitations of government contracts.289
Per the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, the Comptroller General notifies
Congress, the President, and the Office of Personnel Management if an acting
official has served longer than the 210-day allowance without official
appointment and confirmation.290 Congress also periodically requests GAO
https://www.gao.gov/about/comptroller-general/biography/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2020) (current
Comptroller selected in 2010 from congressional list).
284 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727-729 (1986) (holding it to be a legislative office due
to removal power).
285 For a list of publicly available GAO reports, see Reports & Testimonies: Overview,
GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
https://www.gao.gov/reports-testimonies/
[https://perma.cc/L9AR-VW7E] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
286 See Staffer Interview (noting GAO’s issuance of “high-risk list, where [it] identif[ies]
programs where they think Congress is at risk of high loss”).
287 Its official name is Principles of Federal Appropriations Law. The Red Book, GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/legal/red-book/overview [https://perma.cc/EDB9C6K5] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019). The Supreme Court has cited the Red Book at least five times.
See, e.g., Maine Community Health Options v. United States, No. 18-1023, Slip. Op. at 4-5,—U.S.
– (Apr, 27, 2020)(extensively citing Red Book throughout in dispute about appropriations, in
addition to CBO interpretation); Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1, at 751 n.75.
288 See Staffer Interview (noting that most of the work of GAO is available to public). The
only thing a member requesting GAO work can do is put a 30-day hold on the report. The only
notable exceptions to this practice of transparency arise in the contexts of investigations and audits
of intelligence community. Id.
289 Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive Guide, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE at 1, 4 (May
2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/691596.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8UM-DK97] (providing an
overview of the bid protests); see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-510SP, BID
PROTESTS AT GAO: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE, at 1 (2018) (noting that in the 2018 fiscal year, GAO
received 2,474 bid protests).
290 See GAO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2018, supra note 280, at 47
(stating that the Federal Vacancies Reform Act “requires the Comptroller General to report to the
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views (in the form of legal opinions) assessing whether the Congressional
Review Act applies to certain agency actions.291
In fiscal year 2018, GAO “received 786 requests for work from the
standing committees of the Congress, . . . issued 633 reports[,] and made
1,650 recommendations.” 292 Senior GAO officials testified ninety-eight times
before forty-eight separate committees or subcommittees. According to
GAO, agencies implemented seventy-seven percent of GAO’s
recommendations in fiscal year 2018 (an increase from seventy-three percent
in fiscal year 2016).293
GAO staff, in interviews, repeatedly volunteered that the office’s primary
role continues to be safeguarding “Congress’s constitutional prerogatives.”294
H. MedPAC and MACPAC
“Each of them are incredibly necessary, so that you take the decision-making
and put it in the hands of professionals and take it out of the hands of
Congress and the lobbyists.”

MedPAC and MACPAC likewise had their origins in congressional
distrust of executive-branch administration. Like JCT, MedPAC and
MACPAC stand out as nonpartisan institutions designed to support
Congress in areas of particular policy and financial import in which the
executive had become dominant. In this sense, they perform a specialized
version of the kind of work that GAO also sometimes performs in other
subject-matter areas.
But the history of MedPAC and MACPAC also illustrates a more modern
story of interest group encroachment as another, and growing, threat to
congressional autonomy that the congressional bureaucracy may guard
against. In the early 1980s, Congress grew distrustful of the Health Care
Financing Administration (the predecessor to the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services that administered these federal health care programs in

Congress, the President, and the Office of Personnel Management if the Comptroller General
determines that an acting official is serving longer than the 210-day period”).
291 See id. at 46 (“GAO is also sometimes asked to provide opinions on Congressional Review
Act (CRA)-related issues . . . .”; see, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-330190, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE—APPLICABILITY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S APRIL 2018 MEMORANDUM (2018) (assessing whether a GAO
memorandum is “subject to review under CRA”).
292 GAO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2018, supra note 280, at 5.
293 See Id. at 22 (“We fell short of our target of 80 percent for past recommendations
implemented by 3 percentage points, at 77 percent . . . .”).
294 Staffer Interview.
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the executive branch).295 This distrust moved Congress to create two
Medicare advisory commissions. The first, the Prospective Payment
Assessment Commission (ProPAC), was created in 1983 to advise Congress
on Medicare payment policies for hospitals.296 The second, the Physician
Payment Review Commission (PPRC), was created in 1986 to assist Congress
on Medicare payment policies for physicians.297 In the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, Congress merged these advisory commissions into MedPAC—an
entity that retained the label of “commission” but that, unlike most
congressional commissions, had no statutory expiration date.298 Building on
the model provided by MedPAC, Congress established MACPAC in the
Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009299 and
provided it with funding (and expand its mandate) under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.300
Lobbyists were also a cause for concern. Describing the impetus behind
the creation of MedPAC, CRS chronicled: “Congress [by creating MedPAC]
was able to obtain its own source of objective expertise on Medicare payment
policy and buffer members of Congress from pressures from interest

295 See HOLLY STOCKDALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40915, AN OVERVIEW OF
PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OR BOARD IN MEDICARE 5 (2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40915 [https://perma.cc/UDT9-3U5Z] (noting
that the two advisory commissions that would be merged to form MedPAC “were established, at
least in part, because Congress had become increasingly distrustful of the executive branch and
HCFA” and operated to “buffer members of Congress from pressures from interest groups”).
296 See Social Security Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65 (creating
the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission).
297 See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9305,
100 Stat. 82 (creating the Physician Payment Review Commission); see also Thomas R. Oliver,
Analysis, Advice, and Congressional Leadership: The Physician Payment Review Commission and the Politics
of Medicare, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 113, 142-152 (1993) (detailing PPRC establishment, role
in 1989 Medicare reform, and role in providing congressional autonomy from executive).
298 On MedPAC as merging of ProPAC and PPRC, see Balanced Budget Act, Pub. L. 105–33,
§ 5022(c), 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (stating that “[t]he MedPAC shall be responsible for the preparation
and submission of reports required by law to be submitted . . . by the ProPAC and the PPRC, and,
for this purpose, any reference in law to either such Commission is deemed, after the appointment
of the MedPAC, to refer to the MedPAC”). On congressional advisory commissions, see JACOB R.
STRAUS & WILLIAM T. EGAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40076, CONGRESSIONAL
COMMISSIONS: OVERVIEW AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 3 (2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40076
[https://perma.cc/V8S4-TKMJ]
(“Congressional commissions are established to perform specific duties, with statutory termination
dates linked to task completion.”).
299 Pub. L. No. 111-3, § 1900(a), 123 Stat. 8.
300 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2801, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The creation of MedPAC is viewed by
some to have been more bipartisan in nature than the creation of MACPAC, see Staffer Interview,
since MACPAC’s creation was a function of the extension of the Children’s Health Program and
the enactment of the ACA, both “basically a partisan exercise.” Id. But the Commission has evolved
to be viewed as more bipartisan since. Id.
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groups.”301 The chair of the Finance Committee’s Subcommittee on Health
Care, Senator Jay Rockefeller, said: “Each of [MedPAC and MACPAC] are
incredibly necessary, so that you take the decision-making and put it in the
hands of professionals and take it out of the hands of Congress and the
lobbyists.”302 The commissions continue to provide a counterweight to
lobbyists; partisan congressional staffers view MACPAC as a resource to help
them get “outside the lobbyist bubble,” for example, providing “an objective
take” that can inform the staffers of whether interest group information is
accurate.303
Interestingly, several of the interviewees who staff the older nonpartisan
institutions likewise mentioned interest groups as a common modern
problem for them too. We were told that, if not for their offices, lobbyists
would have more power. One former member of the Legislative Counsel’s
office recounted that office’s efforts to resist pressure from partisan staff to
simply incorporate legislative language drafted by lobbyists rather than draft
its own version of the text. As noted earlier, the now-defunct independent
technology agency, OTA, was founded at least in part for the same
reasons304—interest group influence had become a more pressing problem for
congressional autonomy over time.
301 STOCKDALE, supra note 295; see also Oliver, supra note 297, at 149 (noting that “the
commission’s own research and analysis made it possible to test the empirical claims of the interest
groups with greater rigor” and that the “expertise of the PPRC commissioners and staff diminished
the informational power of lobbyists”).
302 John Reichard, Make Way for MacPAC, the New Kid on Washington’s Health Policy Block,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(Aug.
2,
2010),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-article/make-way-macpac-new-kidwashingtons-health-policy-block [https://perma.cc/8EDR-DF96]; cf. ANDREW B. WHITFORD &
GARY MILLER, ABOVE POLITICS: BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT
65-66 (2016) (describing their “credible commitment” theory which outlines the conditions under
which it is logical for political actors to visibly and convincingly delegate power to a bureaucracy
insulated from the political actors’ influence).
303 Staffer Interview.
304 See Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-484, § 2(c), 86 Stat. 797; see also
CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005) (“In OTA’s absence, however, the
new Republican majority in Congress freely called upon its own favorable scientific ‘experts’ and
relied upon analyses prepared by lobbyists and ideologically committed think tanks . . . .”);
Katherine Tully-McManus, House Members Call for Office of Technology Assessment Revival, ROLL
CALL (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/house-members-call-officetechnology-assessment-revival [https://perma.cc/VCZ5-CSME] (noting House members
complaining about Congress’s use of “non-governmental groups that are often advocating a position
on technological issues, rather than an unbiased perspective”). On the OTA and executive branch
encroachment, see Tully-McManus, supra (referring to House members complaining about
Congress’s use of executive branch experts); Kim Zetter, Of Course Congress Is Clueless About Tech—
It Killed Its Tutor, WIRED (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/office-technologyassessment-congress-clueless-tech-killed-tutor [https://perma.cc/77UM-E6TJ] (stating that
“Congress’ need for the OTA is more glaring in light of the fact that the White House recently
engaged two lauded technical experts to advise the executive branch”).
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MedPAC and MACPAC continue to advise Congress on the federal
health programs within their purview.305 Like GAO, each commission also
makes policy recommendations to Congress relating to the health care
programs it monitors.306 These policy recommendations are made by the body
of commissioners itself (as opposed to by its permanent professional staff),
and also may be shared with executive agencies or states.307 The permanent
staff also operates as a continual informational resource for Congress,
producing explanations of federal programs (like CRS) and of real-world
implementation experience (which may be based on data they proactively
collect, like GAO).308 The professional staffs also provide Congress with
technical feedback on policy ideas or proposed statutes (like JCT).309 Unlike
the commissioners themselves, the permanent staff does not advance its own
policy recommendations in the performance of its functions.310
Like GAO, MedPAC and MACPAC also emphasize transparency.311 Both
are required by statute to make their reports publicly available.312 Both also
meet in public, provide opportunity for public comment at their meetings,
and publish transcripts of their meetings.313 As with Congress’s other internal
agencies, however, more informal technical feedback provided to
congressional staffers is confidential—to the point that even commissioners
have access only to aggregate data regarding the extent and nature of the
feedback that professional staff provides to congressional members and
staff.314 Unlike GAO, the work that the Commissions perform in response to
congressional requests does not dominate their workload; much of the
305 RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE
SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 140 (2008) (noting that MedPAC counsels Congress in
determining Medicare’s payment levels); MACPAC, https://www.macpac.gov/about-macpac/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2020) (MACPAC “provides policy and data analysis and makes recommendations to
Congress, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the states on
a wide array of issues affecting Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program”)
306 Social Security Act §§ 1805(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-6; id. § 1900(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396-1.
307 Staffer Interview.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 While the members of MedPAC and MACPAC are appointed by the Comptroller General,
they retain important autonomy from GAO: they exist under their own statutory authorizations,
Social Security Act §§ 1805(c) & 1900(c), and while their funds must be requested in the same
manner as those of GAO, §§ 1805(f)(1) & 1900(f)(1), they are appropriated separately, id.
312 Social Security Act §§ 1900(b)(7), 1805(b)(5).
313 Public Meetings, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/-public-meetings-/january-2020public-meeting [https://perma.cc/8PQT-EULD] (last visited May 2, 2020); Public Meetings,
MACPAC, https://www.macpac.gov/meetings/ [https://perma.cc/Z9QZ-3US9] (last visited May 2,
2020).
314 Staffer Interview.
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Commissions’ work continues to be self-initiated and proactive, anticipating
issues that will be salient to Congress.315
MedPAC and MACPAC each submit two annual reports to Congress
reviewing the federal health programs.316 If the Secretary of Health and
Human Services submits a report to Congress, the commissions must submit
written comments on the report to the relevant congressional committees,317
and MACPAC also is statutorily encouraged to submit reports to committees
commenting on agency regulations.318 MACPAC also produces MACStats,
which compiles data on the Medicaid program, annotated versions of the
Medicaid and CHIP statutes, and a variety of issue briefs and fact sheets.
Beyond submitting reports, the commissions communicate with Congress in
various ways, including through testimony, briefings, and informal staffer
conversations.319
The two commissions share the same organizational structure. Each
consists of seventeen commissioners who are appointed by the Comptroller
General. These commissioners must be drawn from a representative mix of
individuals and professions involved with the applicable federal health
programs.320 This structure was meant to bring a variety of perspectives to
Congress that it might otherwise lack.321 The commissioners serve three-year
terms, and their appointments are staggered.322 The Comptroller General
also designates the Chair and Vice Chair of each commission.323
In addition to the commissioners, MedPAC has a permanent staff of
thirty individuals, including nineteen policy analysts;324 MACPAC has a
permanent staff of twenty-nine employees, including fifteen analysts.325
Id.
See Social Security Act §§ 1805(b)(1)(C), 1805(b)(1)(D), 1900(b)(1)(C), 1900(b)(1)(D); see
also id. at §1805(b)(2) (describing dimensions to be reviewed by MedPAC); id. at §1900(b)(2) (same
for MACPAC); About MedPAC, MEDPAC http://www.medpac.gov/-about-medpac[https://perma.cc/5BFT-DVFZ] (last visited May 3, 2020) (describing these as “the primary outlet
for Commission recommendations”). MedPAC’s reports review various statutorily-identified
dimensions of the Medicare program, Social Security Act § 1805(b)(1)(C), and “contain[] an
examination of the issues affecting” the program, id. at § 1805(b)(1)(D).
317 Social Security Act §§ 1805(b)(3), 1900(b)(5).
318 Id. at § 1900(b)(5)(b).
319 About MedPAC, supra note 316.
320 Social Security Act §§ 1805(c)(1)-(2)(A), 1900(c)(1)-(2)(A).
321 Staffer Interview.
322 Social Security Act §§ 1805(c)(3)(A), 1900(c)(3)(A).
323 Id. at §§ 1805(c)(5), 1900(c)(5); Staffer Interview.
324 See Commission Staff, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/-about-medpac-/commissionstaff [https://perma.cc/NSV9-KWJ3] (last visited May 3, 2020) (listing the names of MedPAC
Commission Staff).
325 See Commission Staff, MACPAC, https://www.macpac.gov/about-macpac/commissionstaff/ [https://perma.cc/FN7H-SHCN] (last visited May 3, 2020) (listing the names of MACPAC
Commission Staff).
315
316
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As a point of contrast, the entire full-time staff of the Senate Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee specializing in healthcare is seven
staffers and three fellows.326 All analysts in MedPAC and MACPAC have
advanced degrees.327
Table 1: Basic Overview
Office
Function
House
Legislative
Counsel
Senate
Legislative
Counsel

Law Revision
Counsel

Year
Created

Organic Statute

Number of
Employees

Office
Division

Legislative
Drafting

1918

Legislative
Reorganization
Act of 1970

56

By subject
matter

Legislative
Drafting

1918

Revenue Act
of 1918

34

By subject
matter

1974

Act of
December 27,
1974

13

1915;
1946

Legislative
Reorganization
Act of 1946;
Legislative
Reorganization
Act of 1970

~620

~250

65

Managing
&
Organizing
U.S. Code

Congressional
Research
Service

Legal &
Policy
Research

Congressional
Budget Office

Economic
&
Budgetary
Analysis

1974

Congressional
Budget and
Impoundment
Control Act of
1974

Joint Committee
on Taxation

Tax
Analysis

1926

Section 8001 et
seq., Internal

By task
(codification
bills vs.
updating
titles)
By subject
matter
(including
American
Law
Divisions for
legal and
constitutional
analysis)
By mode of
economic
analysis or
subject
matter
By mode of
economic
analysis or

326 The seven includes someone on detail from FDA. The full-time fellows are paid for by
outside organizations.
327 See supra notes 324-325 (listing degrees of analysts).
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Revenue Code
of 1986

1927

Legislative
Branch
Appropriation
Act of 1978

13

Senate
Procedure

1935

No statutory
authorization

3

Auditing &
Oversight

1921

31 U.S.C. 701,
et seq.

~3,000

House
Parliamentarian

House
Procedure

Senate
Parliamentarian
Government
Accountability
Office

subject
matter
One
subsidiary
office (Office
of
Compilation
of
Precedents)
No internal
divisions
By field
office, task,
and subject
matter

II. THE BUREAUCRACY’S FEATURES AND FUNCTIONS
Bureaucracy as a subject of study has captured the interest of theorists of
government and law for decades. But that literature has focused primarily on
executive branch agencies, not legislative agencies, and the legal arena has
been dominated by leading scholars of administrative law and the
presidency.328 We briefly lay out the standard account of the bureaucracy,
what it looks like, and classic tradeoffs it entails. We then detail how the
congressional bureaucracy intervenes in that account and, in substantial ways,
diverges from it.
A. The Standard Account
The congressional bureaucracy substantiates the mainstream account in
part, but also offers some important divergences. Max Weber’s classic
analysis of the bureaucracy describes the ideal-typical bureaucracy as
containing a number of key elements, including specialization and training,
hierarchical relations of authority and compensation, ideological
impartiality, and continuous fulfillment of duties by fully committed

328 For leading examples from the administrative law literature, see generally Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Bureaucracy at The Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841 (2014); Parrillo, supra note 36. For
an early classic study of the presidential bureaucracy, see generally Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). For more recent work, see generally Josh Chafetz,
Constitutional Maturity, or Reading Weber in the Age of Trump, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 17 (2019).
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employees.329 Weber’s bureaucracies were staffed by appointed specialists
with legal protections against arbitrary dismissal who received a regular
salary, and who were expected to subordinate their personal or political
goals to institutional ends.330
“Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination
through knowledge,”331 he wrote, while emphasizing that “the question is
always who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery.”332 Because in the
ideal form the work of the bureaucracy is wholly rational, “dehumanized,” and
thereby “eliminat[es] . . . all purely personal, irrational, and emotional
elements,”333 it requires additional leadership to steer it toward larger moral
goals—what Weber labels “charismatic” leadership.334 The political and the
bureaucratic, as modern government experts have argued, are in a relationship
of “conditional cooperation”; both need one another and the top does not have
complete control over the bottom.335 Debates over the need to preserve
bureaucratic autonomy have been a key focus of modern scholars.336
Other work on bureaucracy has roots in rational choice theory, which has
considered why Congress creates an executive branch bureaucracy and how it
structures it.337 That work focuses mostly on Congress’s own deficiencies as
the reason why Congress turns to agencies—including limited time,338 lack of
329 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 955-58 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978) (1922) (describing the characteristics of modern bureaucracy).
330 Id. at 960-63.
331 Id. at 225.
332 Id. at 224.
333 MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 216 (H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds., 1946).
334 See id. at 245-53 (Weber outlining his “sociology of charismatic authority”).
335 HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE POLITICS, 193-94, 232-35
(1977) (defining conditional cooperation); see also Chafetz, supra note 328, at 24 (“[P]olitics without
bureaucratic pushback is no better [for Weber]. The politician can articulate ends, but she cannot
effectuate them on her own, which is why modern governance ‘demands’ a bureaucratic element.”).
336 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 328 at 35 (arguing for the need to preserve bureaucratic
autonomy); Kagan, supra note 328 at 2331-383 (arguing for greater presidential intervention in the
bureaucracy).
337 In characterizing this work as belonging to the domain of rational choice theory, we follow
Terry Moe’s excellent overview of this literature. See Terry M. Moe, Delegation, Control, and the Study
of Public Bureaucracy, 10 FORUM 1, 3-10 (tracing the origin and evolution of the use of rational choice
theory in works on the theory of bureaucracy).
338 See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Political Control of
the Bureaucracy, in 3 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 50-51 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) (noting the “delegation dilemma” whereby “leaders have limited time and
information, and so cannot take informed actions to solve every problem” and therefore “employ
others to work for them”); Jonathan Bendor, Amihai Glazer & Thomas Hammond, Theories of
Delegation, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 235, 258 (2001) (noting models which propose that “[d]elegation
occurs in these contexts because the boss lacks the time or expertise to carry out [the] search”), Craig
Volden, Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States, 18 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 187, 191
(2002) (citing scholarship on the hypothesis that “[l]egislators will delegate to bureaucrats when
they do not have the time or ability to specify every detail of their legislative goals”).
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expertise,339 and desire to avoid accountability.340 The story is almost always
one of Congress relinquishing policy control in the hope of receiving some
countervailing benefit, 341 such as increased efficiency (and other time-related
benefits),342 high-quality output (resulting, for example, from enhanced
institutional memory343 or managerial experience344), greater political leeway
to pursue additional policy achievement,345 or a convenient scapegoat that
Congress can hide behind to avoid political blame for difficult decisions.346 A

339 See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 78
(1999) (discussing delegation decisions as a weighing of costs where “the necessary information to
make well-formed policy may be costly to obtain” for legislatures that lack expertise); JOHN D.
HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? 2 (2002) (discussing the “well-known
tension” politicians face in delegating to bureaucrats whose interests may differ but who “have
knowledge and expertise that politicians lack”); Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise:
Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 62 (1995) (arguing
that Congress chooses to delegate when the benefits of agency expertise in an area outweigh other
potential costs). But see GEORGE A. KRAUSE, A TWO WAY STREET: THE INSTITUTIONAL
DYNAMICS OF THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 61 (1999) (noting that some have
questioned whether information asymmetries always favor agents over principals).
340 See Morris Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Form, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46-47 (1982)
(identifying the transfer of accountability as a key motivation for delegation); Alberto Alesina &
Guido Tabellini, Why Do Politicians Delegate? 19 (NBER Working Paper No. 11531, 2005),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w11531 (same).
341 See Moe, supra note 337 at 15-16 (observing theme in scholarship of the “trade-off between
expertise and political control”). But see Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation
Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (2015) (arguing that agency delegation
allows some individual legislators to enhance their power and control).
342 See JAMES W. FESLER & DONALD F. KETTL, THE POLITICS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 318 (1991) (identifying the competing goals of democratic rule and bureaucratic
efficiency); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT
GOVERN? 271 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds. 1989) (arguing that delegation improves
policymaking expertise and economy of resources). This view goes back at least to Weber’s Theory
of Social and Economic Organization. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 337 (trans. A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons, 1964) (“[T]he purely bureaucratic
type of administrative organization . . . is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining
the highest degree of efficiency . . . .”).
343 See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 218 (4th ed. 1997)
(“[O]rganizations, to a far greater extent than individuals, need artificial “memories.”).
344 See David Lewis, The Personnel Process in the Modern Presidency, 42 PRES. STUD. Q. 577, 589
(2012) (arguing that career officials have more experience in managing particular agencies and public
sector organizations generally).
345 See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 339. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of
Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000) (contrasting the policy achievements that bureaucracy enables
in presidential versus parliamentary systems).
346 See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR. & STEVEN J. BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY
57 (2004) (identifying delegation of airline security as one area in which Congress has avoided blame
for potential catastrophic outcomes); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL.
371, 386-87 (1986) (explaining how legislators can craft delegation to shift blame to agencies for
future unpopular decisions); see also EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 339, at 22-23 (discussing
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different kind of benefit identified by scholars both past and present is the
potential for a strong bureaucracy not only to check excessive presidential
power, but also to serve as a bulwark against undue corporate influence.347
But the most touted benefit is expertise.348 Expertise gained from the
bureaucracy, the theory goes, outweighs the loss of political control.349
With respect to control, scholars emphasize Congress’s ex post tools, such
as oversight power,350 as well as ex ante means, such as initial decisions about
the structure of the bureaucracy that can orient it toward Congress’s political
preferences or otherwise “stack the deck” in favor of Congress’s preferred
outcomes.351 Some scholars have argued that the absence of active
congressional oversight is actually a beneficial sign that more efficient control
mechanisms are in use, not that bureaucracy has been left adrift.352
More recent administrative law scholarship has also looked to separation
of powers.353 Neomi Rao critiques administrative delegation as undermining
the various forms of “blame shifting” and “shifting responsibility” between the legislative and
executive branches).
347 See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10-46 (1938) (defending agencylevel bureaucratic autonomy as a tool to counteract executive and corporate power); see also Adrian
Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2469 (2017) (“Conditional on the failure
of the original Constitution to provide an adequate counterbalance to corporate power, [Landis
believed that] concentrated administrative power that also counterbalances swelling executive power
is the attainable second-best.”).
348 See Moe, supra note 337, at 28 (“At the heart of these delegation models is the agency’s
advantage in expertise.”).
349 Id. at 15-16 (noting that in trying “to strike the right balance between control and expertise[,
i]t is clear . . . that total political control is an extreme solution that is usually not desirable”).
350 See generally JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (2001); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (focusing on how
ex post congressional oversight can deter executive branch overreach). See also Moe, supra note 337,
at 8 (“The early theory of congressional dominance was a theory of ex post control.”).
351 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L., ECON. & ORG., 243, 261 (1987) (discussing how, “by
controlling the details of procedures and participation, political actors stack the deck in favor of
constituents who are the intended beneficiaries of the bargain struck by the coalition”); Bawn, supra
note 339 at 62 (describing how Congress chooses procedures in order to effect their substantive
policy preferences). These procedures often are thought to be designed specifically in the effort to
insulate the bureaucracy from presidential influence, as that influence is assumed to undermine
continued congressional control. See ABERBACH, supra note 350; Terry M. Moe & Michael Caldwell,
The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary
Systems, 150 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 171, 192 (1994) (suggesting that certain
outcomes are “program[med]” into congressional choices about agency structure).
352 See WHITFORD & MILLER, supra note 302, at 42 (2016) (summarizing this contribution).
353 See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1939, 1942-61 (2011) (summarizing this scholarship); see also Harold H. Bruff, The Incompatibility
Principle, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 225-26 (2007) (same); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2000) (remarking on “lively debate” among
separation of power scholars and surveying the literature).
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separation of powers, in part because she concludes that Congress is unable
to adequately police its delegations.354 Neal Katyal and Gillian Metzger have
argued for a strong internal separation of powers within the executive branch
itself—across and within agencies—to provide the kind of check on executive
power that they worry Congress can no longer provide.355
Much of this work points to arguments that, instead of formal constitutional
structures, or a strong Congress, or even Supreme Court doctrine, subconstitutional strategies can and should be used to achieve the same checks and
balances.356 Almost all of this literature, however, identifies those subconstitutional strategies, including how powers are internally separated, as
located in the structure and operations inside the executive branch.357

354 See, e.g., Rao, supra note 341, at 1488-1492 (arguing that Congress lacks the ability to police
delegations due to factors such as regulatory speed, and that individual legislator incentives make
Congress structurally unable to conduct policing).
355 See Neal K. Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006) (arguing that “[w]ithout that checking function,
presidential administration can become an engine of concentrated power”); Gillian E. Metzger, The
Interdependent Relationship between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 457
(2009) (same).
356 Cf. Bruce Ackerman, Good-bye, Montesquieu, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 128,
131 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010) (noting, while focusing on executivebranch actors, that “[a]lthough the traditional tripartite formula fails to capture distinctive modes
of operation, these new and functionally independent units are playing an increasingly important
role in modern government”); Ackerman, supra note 345 (arguing that executive-branch bureaucracy
advances the values of functional specialization and of shielding law implementation from
politics);Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE
L.J. 346, 391 (2016) (noting that there is a “complex ecosystem of intrabranch and entirely external
actors not traditionally accounted for in the separation-of-powers literature”); Daryl J. Levinson &
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2376-80 (2006)
(“Instead of empowering the opposition party to oversee or check the majority party
under unified government (or in addition to doing so), constitutional engineering might focus on
insulating the administrative bureaucracy more fully from the partisan pressures of unified govern
ment. One way to ensure that government is never fully unified is to protect this
branch from falling into the hands of the majority party—by keeping it independent of both
parties.”). See also WHITFORD & MILLER, supra note 302, at 27 (“[W]hen legislative goals are
themselves destructive, then bureaucratic defiance . . . may actually prove to be a useful version of
a Madisonian ‘check.’”); LANDIS, supra note 347 at 46 (“If the doctrine of the separation of power
implies division, it also implies balance, and balance calls for equality. The creation of administrative
power may be the means for the preservation of that balance . . . .”).
357 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 355 at 428 (observing that “the focus of internal separation of
powers scholarship is overwhelmingly on the Executive Branch”). For more examples of this
executive branch scholarship, see Katyal, supra note 355 at 2318; Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional
Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 227, 229 (2016) (“[Traditional accounts] don’t capture the multidimensional nature of
administrative control in which the constitutional branches (the old separation of powers) and the
administrative rivals (the new separation of powers) all compete with one another to influence
administrative governance.”); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence:
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post 9-11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1689 (2006) (“[T]he
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B. How the Congressional Bureaucracy Intervenes in This Account
The congressional bureaucracy, in many ways, reflects Weber’s description
of what an ideal bureaucracy looks like. Congress’ internal institutions, too,
share a fierce commitment to objectivity and nonpartisanship; are each
marked by their particular form of highly specialized knowledge; have longserving staff who, on the whole, are more educated and older than Congress’s
political staff; share a commitment to the long-term interests of Congress as
an institution rather than the political question of the day; and respect
Congress’s rules and jurisdictional limits about the scope and extent of their
powers. This comment from one of the longest serving counsels in Legislative
Counsel captures the mood: “For Congress . . . it has been the curious
marriage of the cool rationality that these auxiliary legislative institutions add
(both from appearance as well as from reality) to the heat of raw politics that
produces a stronger, more durable democratic system.”358
Congress’s bureaucracy also aligns with the classic account that a
paramount role for the bureaucracy should be the provision of technical and
subject-specific expertise. Much has been written about how Congress uses
delegations to executive agencies to avoid blame.359 We extend those insights
now to the legislative-branch bureaucracy. Members use the bureaucracy’s
expertise as a sword as well as a shield, including to shift blame. 360 One
interviewee explained: “There is a lot of value to having a memo on CRS
letterhead in support of a position” because it “can be used as leverage over
other members or the public.”361

most effective [national intelligence] structure probably would have redundant components as well
as components that coordinate and centralize certain efforts.”).”
358 Email from Former Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Jan. 26, 2020) (on file with authors).
359 See; GORMLEY & BALLA, supra note 346, at 57 (noting that “[b]y placing responsibility for
aviation security in the hands of DOT, Congress has distanced itself from culpability should there
be a catastrophic breakdown in the system.”);DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 13-19 (1993)
(arguing that delegation undermines democracy, liberty, and protection of the public by allowing
legislators to shift blame to agencies); Gluck et al., supra note 1, at 1841; Kenneth R. Mayer, Closing
Military Bases Finally: Solving Collective Action Dilemmas Through Delegation, 20 LEG. STUD. Q. 393
(1995); Weaver, supra note 346, at 386-87 (“Independent regulatory commissions are delegated
responsibility for many of the most sensitive economic conflicts that pit one firm or industry’s
interests directly against others (e.g., mergers, rate-making).”); Morris Fiorina, Group Concentration
and the Delegation of Legislative Authority (Social Science Working Paper 112, California Institute of
Technology, 1982) (manuscript at 19), https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81967/ (explaining that
delegation allows for blame avoidance by creating “political daylight between the legislators and
those who feel the incidence of legislative actions”).
360 See Staffer Interview (“Members find us useful—and that’s kind of the key. Sometimes we
can be useful and they can hide behind us.”).
361 Staffer Interview.
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But there are some critical differences from the Weberian model. One
is the lack of political leadership at the top of any of our bureaucratic
institutions; as detailed in Part I, the heads of these institutions generally
are appointed without regard to partisan affiliation. In many of the offices,
the head is promoted from within and is a long-term staffer.362 One
explanation for this structural difference is likely that these agencies are
internal, not external, to Congress. The political leadership that we typically
associate with the executive branch agency head is replicated in the
congressional bureaucracy instead by members and their political staffs
themselves; they decide how to utilize the information the bureaucracy
provides. Further, removal power of the office heads often remains with
political actors: three serve at the pleasure of the House,363 one is removable
by a resolution in either chamber,364 one by joint resolution for certain
specified reasons or impeachment,365 and four lack specification of any
removal power or protections.366
Importantly, the offices of Congress’s bureaucracy are not all the same.
Like the executive branch literature emphasizes, Congress’s internal agencies,
too, are a “they,” not an “it.”367 Some are policy experts, some are not. Some
expertise they provide is confidential, some is public. Some offer their
expertise before legislation is enacted, others’ expertise comes in ex-post.
Some expertise is only suggestive and can be discarded by members at will;
others’ is more constraining. Some nonpartisan offices in Congress have
become the subject of political attention and, with visibility, criticism; others
have escaped attention almost entirely. Members and staff interact directly
with some offices; for others, they never see them and may not even know
they exist. Each of these differences contributes to how Congress controls its
own bureaucracy.
These descriptions illuminate two additional important distinctions
from executive agencies at the outset: First, much of the congressional
bureaucracy’s work is not binding on Congress. In practice, the
congressional bureaucracy’s work-product is enormously influential—the
budget score or a revenue estimate for legislation are good examples—and
Congress is generally required to obtain those numbers. But Congress does
362 Cf. HECLO, supra note 335 (noting that in executive branch paradigm agency heads
typically are imported from without).
363 2 U.S.C. § 282 (2018) (House Legislative Counsel); 2 U.S.C. § 285(c) (2018) (OLRC); 2
U.S.C. 287(a) (House Parliamentarian).
364 2 U.S.C. § 601(a)(4) (2018) (CBO).
365 31 U.S.C. § 732a(a)(1) (2018) (GAO).
366 Senate Legislative Counsel, Senate Parliamentarian, CRS, and JCT.
367 See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1036 (2011) (“Even casual observers of the administrative state recognize that agencies, like
nearly all large organizations, are not unitary actors. They are fractured internally.”).
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not necessarily have to act on the information. For instance, Congress can
disregard the score and legislate outside of its financial targets. Congress
can ignore research or drafted legislative language or decide not to act on a
GAO audit, although the transparency and visibility of the congressional
bureaucracy work-product on the ground makes at least some of it hard to
ignore. Additionally, a good portion of Congress’s bureaucratic work is not
substantive (in the classic sense of devising policy for Congress), but rather
involves the execution of policy ideas—whether converting them into
legislative text, scoring their financial impact, referring them to the proper
committees, organizing them in the U.S. Code, or providing research on
their implications.
This may be another reason that the congressional bureaucracy has not
been the same source of public and academic angst as its executive
counterparts. While there are exceptions—CBO numbers had a large impact
on several failed efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act,368 and the
Parliamentarian’s rulings generally constrained what the Senate could and
could not do by reconciliation without filibuster369—the bureaucracy has
generally seemed unthreatening to Congress.
In fact, the very comfort that Congress takes in its bureaucratic structure
offers another important theoretical contribution. Congress uses its own
internal structures, and especially its bureaucracy, to separate powers inside
of it and not just external to it. Members voluntarily cede power from
themselves, or their own party, by winding up the congressional bureaucracy
and setting it in motion. The congressional bureaucracy’s continued
existence itself—because Congress can always abolish it—strongly suggests
that Congress values the dispersal of power that its nonpartisan institutions
accomplish.
As we noted in the introduction, because of these differences, the term
“bureaucracy” is not quite perfect. Congress’s “scaffolding” is another term
we heard; or the “institutional staff,” as opposed to the professional (political)
staff. We also considered Congress’s “Underbelly”—to connote an important
support that is largely unseen. That term seemed too pejorative, given the
bureaucracy’s value.
We begin the discussion below with the internal separation of powers
point and for the remainder of the Part detail the different functions and

368 See Dylan Matthews, The Republican War on the CBO, VOX (July 19, 2017, 9:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/19/15967224/congressional-budget-office-cbo-warexplained [https://perma.cc/P9UY-KBAF] (detailing how CBO estimates “heavily affected
congressional debates over the legislation” to repeal the Affordable Care Act, angering Republicans).
369 For a discussion of the “nuclear option” that provides workarounds of the typical methods
of enforcing Parliamentarian determinations, see supra note 250.
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constraints of our bureaucratic institutions. There are many different ways to
provide nonpartisan legislative support.
1. Internal Separation of Powers
Part I of this article offered a new account of how the congressional
bureaucracy contributes to the modern story of sub-constitutional separation
of powers. The congressional bureaucracy adds a legislative component to
that story that has been mostly overlooked. Congress’s decisions to
restructure itself via nonpartisan offices in the 1940s and 1970s were primarily
motivated by its desire to check executive power and reassert itself in the
lawmaking, budget, tax, and oversight processes. Its establishment of more
subject-matter oriented independent agencies like MedPAC, MACPAC, and
OTA came later, but likewise were responses to threats of usurpation that
arose from Congress’s perceived inability to effectively oversee the activities
of parallel executive branch agencies (and later, lobbyists).370
The congressional bureaucracy also deserves a place in the modern
account of internal separation of powers. To the limited extent that scholars
have remarked on how Congress decentralizes power internally, they have
understandably focused on Congress’s outward-facing structures of which
members are a part and how Congress disperses power among those
members, such as committee organization, minority and majority leadership,
bicameralism, and legislative veto gates.371
But Congress’s internal institutions disperse lawmaking power within
Congress even more, by removing swaths of it from members and political
staff entirely. Simultaneously, the congressional bureaucracy prevents that
power from being centralized in any single political office. Critically, in a
context in which the president is not a threat, Congress is willing to set up ex
ante processes that take power away from one kind of congressional actor or
another in the interest of something greater.

370 See supra note 21 (detailing the separation-of-power origins of MedPAC, MACPAC,
and OTA).
371 See,
e.g.,
Senate
Committees,
UNITED
STATES
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm
[https://perma.cc/X2V5-Y7QA] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019) (“Committee membership enables
members to develop specialized knowledge of the matters under their jurisdiction.”); see also
CHAFETZ, supra note 32, at 285 (explaining how rise of standing committees “naturally tended
toward a certain diffusion of power” especially when party leaders did not control appointments);
M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
603, 651 (2001) (“State power is diffused among an enormous, and diverse, array of decisionmakers
who populate what we call the branches. Within Congress: a house committee chair; a ranking
member of a Senate committee; and the deputy whip in the Senate or the majority leader in the
House.”); Metzger, supra note 355 (noting committees and parties achieve dispersion of power).
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Consider the alternatives. Congress could have built its bureaucracy
simply by adding experts into existing centers of congressional power. As
several of our interviewees have noted, this could have been accomplished by
adding expert staff positions to the leadership staff, committee staff, or other
partisan staffunder members’ direct control. Congress could have divided
these positions between different staffs for majority and minority, with each
side providing its own competing estimates, drafts, statutory reorganizations, and so on. Or it could have consolidated research, drafting,
accounting, procedural, budget, and revenue expertise under the Speaker of
the House and the Senate Majority Leader.
Instead, Congress dispersed these expert staffers across a collection of
nonpartisan institutions whose mission is to serve the institution as a whole,
including both parties—and that, because of their statutory authority and
hardwiring into congressional procedures, cannot be removed by any one
faction in Congress and often are not easily manipulated. In so doing,
Congress decentralizes power within itself and removes a piece of the
legislative process from partisan politics. As one high-level staffer put it: “We
do not want to have the collection of power where everyone functions under
a single secretary general.”372
By way of comparison, Whitford and Miller’s “credible commitment”
theory posits that, in the executive branch, “[d]elegation to a (relatively
neutral) professionalized bureaucracy serves as a natural conflict-resolution
mechanism” when legislators are not certain in advance their first-choice
policy outcome will always prevail. Delegation “is the natural form of
compromise between competing political perspectives.”373 They further posit
that bureaucrats “have no discretion when politicians are united. It is only
when politicians are divided into conflicting factions that bureaucrats find a
zone of independent authority.”374
The congressional bureaucracy fits the Whitford and Miller account, but
only to a point. Congress does commit ex ante to processes (such as revenue
and cost scoring), procedural rules, rules on committee jurisdiction, and
impartial legislative drafters and codifiers that may not always give members
their first-best policy outcomes, but at least ensure nonpartisan arbiters. But
this happens regardless of whether one party is in control or when the
Congress is bitterly divided. That kind of trust in the congressional
bureaucracy is what makes this story different from the typical executive
branch story. Epstein and O’Halloran’s oft-cited work on delegation likewise
argues that a congressional majority is less likely to delegate to an executive
372
373
374

Staffer Interview.
WHITFORD & MILLER, supra note at 302, at 102.
Id. at 102.
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branch under a different party’s control.375 But there is little evidence that
utilization of the congressional bureaucracy changes depending on the
composition of the government.376
For another comparison, Jon Michaels posits an administrative
(executive) state safeguarded by the division of power “among three sets of
rivals” that are legally authorized to contribute to administrative
policymaking: namely, “politically appointed agency leaders . . . politically
insulated career civil servants . . . and the broader public.”377 The
congressional bureaucracy does not perfectly fit Michaels’s view either. The
congressional bureaucracy, as the next section details, so steadfastly insists on
nonpartisanship and displays such a total lack of interest in aggregating power
that it is hard to describe it, in Michaels’s terms, as a “counterweight.”378 That
said, its institutions do in a sense function like Michaels’s “heterogeneous
institutional” agencies—operating alongside the political staff (what we may
think of as a partisan bureaucracy), members, and interest groups all aiming
to inform legislation.379
Indeed, several of our interviewees emphasized that in the absence of
these internal congressional institutions, power would inure even further to
partisan politics and interest groups. The bureaucracy is a counterweight to
hyper-partisanship. It provides some optimism that Congress—even during
the modern period of increasing centralization and partisanship—still
preserves aspects of its process at the institutional and nonpartisan level. That
is, Congress has chosen not to fully center power over the design, writing and
analysis of legislation, in the hands of any one party or senior member.
Recall from our historical account in Part I that one motivating force for
the creation of the Offices of the Parliamentarians was to curb the internal
consolidation of procedural power under the House Speaker Joseph “Boss”
Cannon.380 On the Senate side, the parallel motivation was concern regarding
the centralized procedural control of Vice President John Nance Garner.381
375 See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 339, at 157 (“[N]on-executive actors . . . receive
a greater percentage of delegations during divided government.”).
376 See Russell D. Renka, Party Control of the Presidency and Congress 1933–2010, http://cstlcla.semo.edu/rdrenka/ui320-75/presandcongress.asp [https://perma.cc/6XZM-UX9S] (last visited
Feb. 20, 2020) (providing statistics regarding party control of the presidency and Congress between
1933 and 2010).
377 See Michaels, supra note 357, at 234 (describing the division of power among the three
groups).
378 Id. at 262.
379 Id. at 235.
380 Gould, supra note 16, at 1963; see also KING, supra note 229, at 87 (1997) (“This revolt
[against Speaker Cannon] is pivotal in the institutionalization of the parliamentarian as an
institutional guardian.”).
381 See Noah, supra note 230 (discussing John Nance Garner’s influence on the creation of the
Senate Parliamentarian office).
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We have already noted how the creation of CBO initially threatened some
members of Congress by pulling power away from the then-influential
finance-related committees and how CBO’s Alice Rivlin openly embraced
this internal separation of powers function for the new office.382 The 1970s
expansion of Legislative Counsel was similarly aimed at democratizing
drafting resources in Congress—an attempt described to us by one longtime
staffer as “a movement of the Watergate class to gain more power” that gave
rise to “things like the establishment of subcommittees to take power away
from committee chairmen and increased support staff to help individual
members” and not just committee chairs and leadership.383 The expanded
funds dedicated to Legislative Counsel (as initially made in furtherance of
the House office’s new 1970 charter) provided more drafting resources for
individual members and committees alike.384
GAO also has received similar attention, even beyond its role in the
landmark separation-of-powers case of Bowsher v. Synar. Studies have
chronicled the role that GAO has played in preserving the balance of power
between political parties,385 between Congress and the executive branch,386
and between itself and partisan congressional actors.387
The political (partisan) staffers we interviewed for this study corroborated
these points regarding the decentralization of internal power and elaborated
on them. They emphasized that GAO was valued inside Congress for giving
equal attention to the work of the majority and minority parties. Many
opportunities and resources in Congress are allocated according to party
Congressional Budget Office Oversight, Hearing before S. Comm. on the Budget, 94th Cong, 10
(1976); supra note 176 and accompanying text.
383 Staffer Interview.
384 Legislative Branch Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations for the House of Representatives, 93rd Cong. 1003-07 (1974) (testimony of
Ward M. Hussey).
385 See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 356, at 2370-71 (observing that minority parties use GAO
to protect their prerogatives in times of unified government).
386 See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 207 (1982) (telling story of dual creation
of OMB and GAO that focuses on these institutions arising from separation-of-powers tradeoffs
between the branches); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 356, at 2370-71 (citing Anne Margaret Joseph,
Political Appointees and Auditors of Politics: Essays on Oversight of the American Bureaucracy, at
209-10 (May 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the Harvard
University John F. Kennedy School of Government Library)) (reporting that Congress uses GAO
to protect its institutional prerogatives against the executive branch in times of unified government);
see also FREDERICK C. MOSHER, A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE AND THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 2-3
(1984) (comparing GAO and the Office of Management and Budget to highlight that these agencies
“are the most striking yet institutional expressions of the separation between the executive and
legislative powers in the national government”).
387 See O’Connell, supra note 270 (manuscript at 5-6) (noting that GAO is affected by the
legislature’s party affiliation and faces “political constraints”).
382
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control and/or seniority. But when it comes to GAO, one party does not
receive more GAO attention simply because it is in power. It has been found
that minority parties have leveraged this power to protect their prerogatives
even in times of unified government.388
We were also told by partisan staff that the Parliamentarians and
Legislative Counsel help to preserve minority party power by assisting with
drafting motions (a resource provided equally to both parties, on all sides
of an issue), and by making sure the minority understands its power and
uses it properly.
In a different vein, another set of staffers emphasized that CRS was a
particularly “democratic” bureaucracy: whereas CBO, or even Legislative
Counsel, must prioritize the work of committee chairs and leadership
(equally across the two parties) when Congress is particularly busy, CRS has
the obligation to answer every call with equal attention. For a junior member
of Congress, particularly in the House, CRS can serve as a critical research
arm for that member’s office that enhances her power and lawmaking ability.
MedPAC and MACPAC can serve a similar function for junior members.389
B. Different Types and Structures of Congressional Bureaucratic Expertise
There are many ways to be nonpartisan bureaucrats. In structuring its
bureaucracy, Congress demanded specialization and nonpartisanship of all of
its bureaucratic institutions. But Congress differentiated across the
institutions in other aspects, making tradeoffs across structural elements.
Should a nonpartisan agency’s work be authoritative or permissive?
Confidential or transparent? Policy neutral or offering a conclusion? At what
point in the legislative process should the bureaucracy be engaged? At least
some of these tradeoffs are relevant to considerations about the structures of
executive branch agencies as well. And the tradeoffs contribute to theories of
oversight. One way Congress can control its bureaucracy is if it does not have
to use its inputs and assessments. Other offices in the congressional
bureaucracy have mandatory inputs but are governed by transparency rules
that allow Congress to police that work. Congress also votes on statutes after
most (but not all) of the congressional bureaucratic input. That is of course
another significant control. The rest of this Part highlights the key tradeoffs
and features of Congress’s bureaucracy.

388
389

See id. (citing Anne Margaret Joseph, supra note 386, at 209-10).
Staffer Interview.
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1. Nonpartisanship
“You would never go down this road if you had a partisan bone in your body.”

All nine of the bureaucracy offices emphasized nonpartisanship as the
defining characteristic of their work. One interviewee described
nonpartisanship as the “core of their legitimacy.”390 Two heads of offices told
us that nonpartisanship is what makes their offices “valuable” to Congress.391
And a deputy head of one of the offices remarked:
The nonpartisan nature of the work infuses every conversation we have here
every day, so both sides of the aisle know no matter who calls us first to ask
the question we give the same answer. It is so ingrained in everything we do
here every day. Nonpartisan is the core of what we are.392

This nonpartisanship is anchored in a patchwork of legal requirements.
Six of the institutions (out of nine, with single-chamber offices counted
individually) have statutory requirements that their office head be appointed
without regard to political affiliation.393 Six have statutory requirements that
their staffs be so appointed.394 Statutory rules for eight provide a role for
political actors in the appointment of office heads, but CRS’s statute requires
the head be appointed by a non-elected actor, the Librarian of Congress.395
Similarly, while statutory rules detail a potential role for political actors in
staff hiring for five of the institutions, they explicitly omit such a role for
three such institutions (and are silent for one).396 GAO also pointed toward
Staffer Interview.
Staffer Interview.
Staffer Interview.
The six that do are: Senate Legislative Counsel; House Legislative Counsel; OLRC; CRS;
CBO; House Parliamentarians. Those that do not are: JCT; Senate Parliamentarians; and GAO.
For the relevant statutory provisions, see supra Part I. In practice, these statutory rules have not
uniformly protected against appointments being perceived, on rare occasion, as politically
motivated. See JOYCE, supra note 147, at 38-42 (describing the widespread perception that CBO
Directors appointed in 1995 and 1999 were selected partly for partisan reasons, and the partisan
disappointment when those Directors maintained the office’s nonpartisan independence from
partisan goals).
394 They are: House Legislative Counsel; OLRC; CBO; House Parliamentarians; CRS; GAO
(must hire based on merit and fitness).
395 Those appointed by House Speaker: House Legislative Counsel; Senate Legislative
Counsel; House Parliamentarians. Appointed by Speaker Pro Tempore: Senate Legislative Counsel.
Appointed by House Speaker and Senate President pro tempore, with recommendations from
Budget Committee: CBO. Appointed by President, with Senate confirmation, after congressional
submission of recommendations: GAO. Appointed by Joint Committee: JCT.
396 Those with statutorily defined roles for political actor: Senate Legislative Counsel (subject
to President pro tempore approval); House Legislative Counsel (subject to Speaker approval); Law
Revision Counsel (with approval of Speaker); JCT (power to hire lodged in Joint Committee);
House Parliamentarian (with Speaker approval). Those without a role: CBO (power vested in CBO
Director); CRS (power vested in Librarian of Congress, upon Director’s recommendation); GAO
390
391
392
393

1614

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1541

the absence of political appointees below the Comptroller General, for
example, as a feature that contributed to GAO’s nonpartisan culture.397
Culture and mission commitment also contribute. All of the bureaucratic
institutions reported that, despite statutory requirements or lack thereof, they
hire and promote on a nonpartisan basis. The Senate Office of the Legislative
Counsel is typical. It lacks statutory protections for nonpartisanship in staff
hiring, yet it reports on its website that “[n]o change in personnel of the
Office has resulted from any change in political control of the Senate.”398
Prior research has found that JCT,399 GAO,400 and the Senate
Parliamentarian’s Office401—each of which lacks statutory protections for
nonpartisanship in the selection of office heads—nonetheless all appoint
leadership and hire without regard to partisanship, and some nonpartisan
congressional offices also explicitly avoid hiring individuals who have
previously done partisan work.402 Self-selection also happens on the
employee side at the hiring stage, as the positions typically lack appeal for
individuals with strong partisan inclinations. As one staffer in a

(power in Comptroller, or in Inspector General for Inspector General staff). Statute is silent for
Senate Parliamentarian’s Office.
397 Cf. Staffer Interview (describing the nonpartisan nature of GAO). Anne Joseph O’Connell
has modeled the empirical incentives for and reality of nonpartisanship among GAO employees. See
O’Connell, supra note 270.
398 Careers,
OFFICE
OF
THE
LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL,
https://www.slc.senate.gov/Careers/careers.htm [https://perma.cc/G5CF-P7QH] (last visited Aug.
8, 2019).
399 Notably, even though JCT staff are nested within a committee, all sources agree that they
are “assiduously nonpartisan.” Victor Fleischer, The State of America’s Tax Institutions, 81 J. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 21-22 (2018); see also Yin, Tax Legislation, supra note 193, at 265 (reporting that
“JCT staff is increasingly viewed like staff of a legislative support organization (such as CBO, CRS,
and GAO) rather than committee staff ”); Yin, supra note 18, at 2298 (“Unlike most committee
staffs . . . the JCT staff is not affiliated with any party and is not separated into majority and
minority party staff members.”).
400 While the President (a political actor) appoints the Comptroller General, early heads of
GAO made it clear that their watchdog role was apolitical, and that norm persists today. See ROGER
R. TRASK, DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 49-65 (1st ed. 1996) (emphasizing the
independence of the first Comptroller General, John R. McCarl, despite the political nature of his
appointment to the position).
401 Gould, supra note 16, at 2006 (“[A]lthough removals of the parliamentarian have at times
been partisan in nature, appointments have always been promotions from within the office or
restorations to office of past parliamentarians, rather than installations of an outside party loyalist.”).
402 See, e.g., Careers, supra note 398 (“Since the Office provides technical legal services on a
nonpolitical and confidential basis, and must be impartial in appearance as well as in fact, active
public participation in political matters is regarded as a disqualification for appointment or
retention.”); Staffer Interview (“We are nonpartisan. In hiring, if someone says ‘I’d like to work
for you because I worked on so-and-so’s campaign and really want to advance these ideas,’ we
reject that application.”).
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Parliamentarian’s Office remarked: “You would never go down this road if
you had a partisan bone in your body.”403
Office culture further cultivates the view that the primary allegiance is to
the institution of Congress as a whole. We see similar descriptions in the
general bureaucracy literature.404 The head of one office said:
There could be three senators in my office arguing about something, but there
is always a fourth entity [in that meeting] and [that is the Congress as] an
institution. You are trying to be the guardian or steward of its unseen needs
and traditions . . . [t]rying to take a long view, when most [people] coming
in are just trying to get something done for today.405

In fact, we were told that this steadfast commitment to nonpartisanship
is what saved the offices of the House Legislative Counsel and
Parliamentarian in 1995, when Speaker Newt Gingrich and the new
Republican majority revamped many other congressional operations. One
longtime former nonpartisan staffer said:
I attribute this to (1) the institutions being neutral and having worked with,
and in support of, the minority in the House as well as the majority—[we]
had personally worked extensively with Gingrich and other political
generals—less so with their newly enlisted and drunk with power troops; and
(2) the leadership observation that the revolution reflected in the 1994
election would be incapable of carrying out their mandate without the
professional resources of the legislative quartermaster corps who had the
logistics to actually produce legislation.406

This commitment to neutrality was not sufficient to protect all
nonpartisan offices—some offices had their budgets or functions reduced at

Staffer Interview.
See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy
Tasks, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 426, 434 (2008) (noting that bureaucrats focus more on long term
consequences of policies because they are often “appointed for longer than electoral cycles, precisely
to avoid short-termist policies” and because “they care about their professional reputation in the
eyes of their peers”).
405 Staffer Interview.
406 Email from Former Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Jan. 26, 2020) (on file with authors).
403
404
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this time,407 and OTA was eliminated.408 For OTA, a combination of factors
overwhelmed the institution-preserving function of neutrality—including
Gingrich’s desire to centralize power,409 growing anti-science sentiments
among some Republican factions,410 a desire for a highly-visible display of
slashing the federal government,411 and lingering resentment over OTA
assessments of the “Star Wars” program.412 For Legislative Counsel and the
Parliamentarian, however, prior displays of neutrality proved vital to the
cultivation of this support—and, consequently, to their survival both in that
political transition, and into the current hyper-polarized and increasingly
centralized environment. This supports George Yin’s suggestion that, in at
least some instances, the neutral stance of the bureaucracy is key to preserving
its power and influence.413
2. Specialization and Long Tenure
“A real cadre of people with institutional loyalty and knowledge . . . .”

407 See R. ERIC PETERSEN AND IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33724,
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES RELATED TO A CHANGE IN MAJORITY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (2006) (“[T]he incoming majority in the last weeks of 1994 reportedly informed
managers of several House administrative and support offices that they were dismissed.”); Yin, Tax
Legislation, supra note 193, at 261-65 (discussing increased role of partisan staff in tax policy
development, at expense of JCT, beginning in early 1990s); Glastris & Edwards, supra note 270
(describing Gingrich successfully eliminating OTA and cutting staff in other congressional service
agencies, including GAO and CRS); supra note 270 & accompanying text (discussing shift in GAO
work).
408 On OTA’s strategy of neutrality, see BRUCE A. BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN
CONGRESS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 40-71 (1996).
Building on Bimber’s study, George Yin has noted that OTA’s neutrality was complicated: the office’s
founding structure arguably did not promote nonpartisanship, thereby requiring a later pivot to a
“strategy of neutrality” that, while more successful in establishing the office’s nonpartisanship,
limited its influence. See Yin, supra note 18, at 2299-2300 & 2311-2315.
409 See Chris Mooney, Requiem for an Office, 61 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 40, 44 (2005)
(documenting that some attributed OTA’s closure to Gingrich not wanting a voice within Congress
that might contradict his own); see also Bruce Bartlett, Gingrich and the Destruction of Congressional
Expertise,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
29,
2011,
6:00
AM),
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/gingrich-and-the-destruction-of-congressionalexpertise/ (“Mr. Gingrich’s real purpose was to centralize power in the speaker’s office, which was
staffed with young right-wing zealots who followed his orders without question.”).
410 See Mooney, supra note 409, at 45 (discussing the linkage between OTA closure and “the
science politicizing bonanza of the Gingrich Congress”).
411 See id. at 44 (explaining how “the new Congress wanted to prove its willingness to make
budget cuts in its own house,” and citing Representative Amo Houghton saying that “they were just
looking for sort of symbolic targets”).
412 See id. at 43 (explaining the dispute over Star Wars assessments that led some to describe
OTA’s closing as “Reagan’s revenge”).
413 Yin, supra note 18, at 2311-2312.

2020]

The Congressional Bureaucracy

1617

Specialization is another commonly touted bureaucratic feature in
general.414 And the congressional bureaucracy’s institutions are likewise
marked by a very high degree of it. The bureaucracy was created precisely
because Congress was desperately in need of that expertise. Today, the
institutions’ size gives the offices of the congressional bureaucracy capacity
for heightened specialization: GAO has more than 3,000 employees,415 CRS
around 620,416 CBO 250,417 Legislative Counsel more than 90,418 and JCT
65.419 By contrast, the partisan committee with the largest staff in the House
is the Appropriations Committee with 119 employees;420 in the Senate it also
is the Appropriations Committee, with 133 employees.421 The average size of
committee staff in both chambers is about 58.422
This capacity enables impressive output. GAO has produced thousands
of sophisticated analyses on topics from energy (2,593 reports) to health care
(5,105) to space policy (920).423 GAO was directed to conduct over forty
studies just by the Dodd-Frank Act, for example.424 CRS estimates that every
year it fields over 60,000 informational queries from members on “whatever

414 See LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
6 (1st ed., 1926) (noting that “[t]he problems which crowd upon legislative bodies today are often
. . . technical questions which the layman can handle only by utilizing the services of the expert,”
which drives government to incorporate subject-matter experts); see also JAMES W. FESLER &
DONALD F. KETTL, THE POLITICS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 16 (1991) (arguing that
congressional staff follow “internalized guides to conduct,” including an awareness of the sensitivity
associated with their role in government, agency loyalty, and professional responsibility) (citing
MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196-244 (eds. H.H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 1946)).
415 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-1SP, SERVING THE CONGRESS AND THE
NATION 12 (2018) (noting that “GAO is composed of roughly 3,000 employees possessing academic
degrees in various fields”).
416 Email from Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. 27, 2020) (on file with authors).
417 See
Organization
and
Staffing,
CONG.
BUDGET
OFF.,
https://www.cbo.gov/about/organization-and-staffing [https://perma.cc/4F5Z-VSWD] (last visited
May 10, 2020) (“CBO has about 250 staff members . . . .”).
418 See OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS OF THE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY (2018)
[hereinafter
HOUSE DIRECTORY],
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDIR-2018-1029/pdf/CDIR-2018-10-29-HOUSECOMMITTEES-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MN8-DEK5]
(listing the names of officers and officials of the House; SENATE DIRECTORY, supra note 101 (listing
the names of officers and officials of the Senate).
419 Email from Staffer to Authors (on file with authors).
420 See PETERSEN & WILHELM, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF LEVELS, supra note
33, at 13.
421 See PETERSEN & WILHELM, SENATE STAFF LEVELS, supra note 33, at 9.
422 Id.
423 See
Reports
and
Testimonies,
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF.,
https://www.gao.gov/docsearch/topic.php [https://perma.cc/RK55-5Z3R] (last visited July 30, 2019)
(listing various GAO reports and testimonies by topic).
424 See Dodaro, supra note 272, at 133 (noting that “the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act alone required GAO to conduct more than 40 studies”).

1618

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1541

is hot” at the moment.425 In 2018, CBO produced 947 formal cost estimates,
responded to thousands of informational requests, and provided almost 150
scorekeeping estimates for appropriations bills.426 JCT emphasized that the
committee staff it supports has much smaller staff than JCT itself. The Ways
and Means Committee staff, for example, has only five people providing
services for all of the members on all of their issues. JCT in contrast has fortythree legislative congressional staff, including seventeen attorneys. They said:
“For example, we have one person who does nothing but cross-border issues.
The Ways and Means [staffer on that issue] has many other issues [to handle]
as well.”427
Legislative Counsel divides drafters into teams that focus on specific
subject areas.428 CBO is organized into nine divisions that are oriented
around particular modes of analysis or subject matter.429 CRS partitions its
analysts into six research divisions, as well as four research support offices.430
JCT divides its staff into interdisciplinary teams. GAO, in addition to having
several internal management divisions, boasts fourteen “mission teams” that
each have a special area of policy expertise.431 Even OLRC, one of the
smallest nonpartisan offices, divides its workforce into a codification team and
a U.S. Code-updating team. 432
Most of the congressional bureaucracy requires employees to hold
advanced degrees in specific fields. The Parliamentarians, Legislative
Counsel, and OLRC all are staffed by attorneys.433 GAO’s employees have
(often advanced) academic degrees in fields including accounting, law,
Staffer Interview.
CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE’S WORK IN 2018: A
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-03/55044CBOsWork2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/794L-YF4N] (providing an overview of the CBO’s work
in 2018).
427 Staffer Interview.
428 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1, at 746-47;
429 See Organization and Staffing, supra note 417 (listing the various divisions: budget;
financial; health, retirement, and long-term analysis; macroeconomic; management, business, and
information services; microeconomic; national security; and tax).
430 MAZANEC, supra note 71, at app. 91-93.
431 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 415, at 13 (describing teams’
competencies as including defense capabilities and management, healthcare, and natural resources
and environment).
432 Staffer Interview.
433 See HOUSE DIRECTORY, supra note 418 (listing counsels in Legislative Counsel offices and
OLRC); Statement Before the House Subcommittee on Legislative Branch Appropriations Regarding Fiscal
Year 2020 Appropriations, 116th Cong. 7 (2019) (statement of E. Wade Ballou, Jr., Legislative Counsel)
(reporting that House office was staffed in 2019 by 49 attorneys, and a support staff of 11 individuals);
MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20856, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL: SENATE 1 (2008) (reporting that Senate office was staffed in 2008 by 30 attorneys along
with a support staff, Legislative Counsel, and Deputy Legislative Counsel); Gould, supra note 16, at
1989 (noting that “[t]he parliamentarians are trained as attorneys”); Staffer Interview.
425
426
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engineering, economics, and social and physical sciences.434 JCT staff includes
attorneys, economists, and experts in accounting and tax analysis.435 At CRS,
ninety percent of staffers have graduate degrees in law, policy, or other fields
of expertise.436
Long tenure is another feature that the congressional bureaucracy shares
with other common bureaucratic career staff.437 In CRS, for example, current
employees have spent an average of thirteen years there, with several working
for CRS for over fifty years.438 Legislative Counsel and GAO employees are
of similar longevity.439 OLRC employees noted that: “[G]enerally, we’ve been
here a long time . . . . [So] there is a real cadre of people with institutional
loyalty and knowledge . . . . who interact with each other informally to get
stuff done . . . .”440 JCT staff commented that their “expertise is longer, we’ve
seen stuff before. Our tenure is longer.”441
As in Weber’s paradigm, each institution respects its own jurisdictional
boundaries and the expertise and terrain of others. JCT staff, for example,
emphasized that they pride themselves on “good tax policy” and that they
relatedly have a commitment to working with their field-specific counterparts
in the executive branch—the nonpartisan Treasury staff.442 These JCT staff
comments were typical of those we heard from others: “Our comparative
expertise is we have greater specialization . . . . We have 15 lawyers plus
accountants and we can specialize. Legislative Counsel brings drafting
expertise. . . . Political staff brings a closer understanding of policy and
434 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 415, at 12 (noting that many of GAO
employees hold degrees in listed fields).
435 See About Us—Overview, supra note 201 (“The Joint Committee operates with an
experienced professional staff of Ph.D economists, attorneys, and accountants . . . .”).
436 Evans, supra note 6, at 422 (“Ninety percent of CRS staff hold master’s, law, or doctoral
degrees.”).
437 The median tenure of federal employees is over eight years. Employee Tenure Summary,
BUREAU LABOR STATS. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm
[https://perma.cc/3V4M-GK8T]. This has positive consequences for policymaking. See supra Part I
(discussing bureaucratic staff ’s nonpartisan character).
438 See Email from Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. 27, 2020) (on file with authors)
(discussing the average length of tenure for CRS staff members).
439 See Shobe, supra note 33, at 823-25 (reporting “almost all attorneys staying with the
[Legislative Counsel] offices for more than twenty-five years”); GAO AT A GLANCE, supra note 272
(noting that the Comptroller serves a “15-year term—one of the longest in government” and that
GAO’s “workforce consists of career employees”).
440 Staffer Interview.
441 Id.
442 Id. We cannot resist here introducing the idea of what we might call “picket fence
administrative law”—the cooperative relationships between nonpartisan bureaucrats across branches
that seems to parallel the concept of “picket fence federalism” in the political science literature. Cf.
TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 80 (1967 (describing government as like “like a
picket fence” in that it keeps “lines of authority, the concerns and interests, the flow of the money,
and the direction of programs” in line, but does not bring them together).
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members’ preferences.”443 The staff in a Parliamentarian’s Office told us: “We
are the procedural navigators. Our knowledge isn’t replicated anywhere
else.”444 A GAO interviewee added: “We have a multidisciplin[ary]
workforce. Most of [our] workforce have advanced degrees [and] have
specialties that aren’t represented with staff. [B]ecause we don’t have to
respond to the political process, we can make plans and look at programs in a
very orderly fashion.”445
This high degree of specialization stands in contrast to the political policy
staff and members themselves. Interviewees emphasized that Congress is now
experiencing a greater “churning” of partisan congressional staff and that
“new folks” are coming in who “need to get up to speed.”446 The relative youth
of that staff was also emphasized, as was their transient nature.447
Interviewees also told us that political staff “doesn’t have time” to cultivate
expertise or specialized knowledge, and that “members are coming from more
nontraditional [i.e., non-legal or policy] backgrounds . . . with different types
of expertise” and that may change “how we need to get them up to speed.”448
Staff who work directly for members are generally less expert than committee
staff, and House member staffs tend to be less experienced than Senate
member staffs.449
Through the combination of nonpartisanship and specialization, these
offices foster a perception in Congress that they are valuable and trustworthy.
In a recent survey of partisan congressional staff, Kevin Kosar gathered staffer
impressions regarding the frequency of use and reliability of different
congressional support actors in budget and healthcare policy.450 Kosar found
that staffers ranked each nonpartisan office included in the survey (GAO,
CRS, and CBO) as more trustworthy across all topics (significantly so with a
minor exception451) than each of: professional committee staff, bureaucratic
Staffer Interview. There are now 17 lawyers.
Staffer Interview.
Id.
Id.
Many members’ political staff are “young, right out of college . . . .” Bressman & Gluck,
supra note 1, at 756. The average age of congressional staff is around 30. See Jennifer M. Jensen,
Explaining Congressional Staff Members’ Decisions to Leave the Hill, 38 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 39,
44 tbl.1 (2011); see also Cross, Legislative History, supra note 1 (parsing these staffer differences).
448 Staffer Interview.
449 Staffer Interviews; see also Cross, Legislative History, supra note 1 (parsing these staffer
differences).
450 Kosar, supra note 25, at 12.
451 Professional committee staff ranked very close to CBO—professional staff received a mean
score for trustworthiness (on a scale from zero to three) that was .01 higher than the score for CBO
for budget whereas CBO’s mean score was .02 higher for healthcare—but CBO still scored much
more highly than all of the other actors, and CRS and GBO both beat professional committee staff
on both budget and healthcare by large margin Id.
443
444
445
446
447
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agencies, party leadership, members similar to one’s own boss, caucuses, the
administration, and state delegation members452; CBO and CRS were also
reported to be the most frequently used support actors along with
professional committee staff.453
3. Nonpartisan Is Not Necessarily Position-Neutral or Non Substantive
There are different ways to be nonpartisan and to use specialized
expertise. For starters, there is a difference between being nonpartisan and
being position-neutral, although almost nothing the congressional
bureaucracy does is devoid of substance.
With respect to those institutions that do not reach policy conclusions:
OLRC, and to some extent Legislative Counsel and the Parliamentarians, do
not take substantive positions on one side of a question or another, but the
Parliamentarians will give members advice about procedural matters and how
to structure bills to bring them within (or keep them out of) a particular
committee’s jurisdiction. Their decisions have an important impact on the
ultimate shape of legislation. Legislative Counsel will not judge the merits of
any statute but will express views about the best way to phrase language or
provisions that should be added.
Unlike the executive branch bureaucracy, the congressional bureaucracy
performs its tasks for both the majority party and the party not in control.
Legislative Counsel, for instance, may have views about how to write clear
language, use cross references, and so on, but those views will be consistently
applied between the majority and minority draft legislation. They will work
on whatever policy, we were told, “no matter how despicable,” that members
ask them to draft. It is common for a single Legislative Counsel drafter to
help members of both parties draft opposing legislation on the same policy
question, often simultaneously. JCT staff told us “all the time, we advise
members of opposite parties about the same issue.”454
Similarly, OLRC’s mission is the same regardless of whose law OLRC is
working on. As one interviewee described the office’s role: “[It] doesn’t matter
to us whether a policy is liberal or conservative, wise or stupid. We are looking
for clarity of expression and that’s it.”455
In contrast, those congressional bureaucrats that are nonpartisan, but
more policy focused, do issue conclusions about legislative proposals that may
be preferred by one side or another. In many cases, these are conclusions
about whether the proposals comport with rules or goals that, again, Congress
452
453
454
455

Id.
Id. at 13.
Staffer Interview.
Id.
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has articulated for itself ex ante. CBO and JCT issue conclusions about the
fiscal impact of proposed legislation—conclusions that are used, among other
things, to determine if legislation comports with Congress’s stated fiscal
goals. CBO, as noted, established its independence early by issuing estimates
at odds with the policy goals of Congress and an Administration from the
CBO director’s own party. CRS likewise told us:
We are not the decision maker. We can draw pros and cons and arrive at
conclusions, but we don’t advocate. . . . We are an objective organization. We
don’t tell members what the best option is and what they should vote for.
That’s not our job. But it is not uncommon for us to come to a rather firm
conclusion . . . . We have to present the minority position in order to fully
inform members about any given issue.456

George Yin also has recounted a now-famous battle inside CRS over the
drawing of policy conclusions.457 There, a CRS analyst had published an
academic article critical of government decisionmaking that led to the Iraq
war, leading the CRS Director to caution against taking “public positions”
related to an analyst’s research in outside publications.458 In a response, the
analyst suggested the Director’s stance could have a chilling effect, preventing
analysts from drawing conclusions even in CRS publications (which typically
draw conclusions when appropriate).459 The Congressional Research
Employees Association also weighed in, releasing a statement in support of
the analyst.460 (CRS staff we interviewed, however, disputed that CRS
management had ever discouraged drawing conclusions and pointed to recent
instances of CRS taking controversial stances.)461
This dispute reveals the competing conceptions of nonpartisanship that
the congressional bureaucracy navigates. On the one hand, the analyst had
expressed the opinion that, if not permitted to draw policy conclusions, the
utility of his expertise would be greatly diminished. As Yin notes, the dispute
Id.
See Yin, supra note 18, at 2316-19.
See Louis Fisher, Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 389
(2003) (analyst article); DANIEL P. MULHOLLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DIRECTOR’S
STATEMENT, OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES: PRESERVING OBJECTIVITY AND NON-PARTISANSHIP 2
(2004) (Director statement).
459 Memorandum from Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist, Cong. Research Serv., to Daniel P.
Mulhollan, Dir., Cong. Research Serv. 2 (Jan. 31, 2004), http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/fisher013104.pdf.
460 POSITION STATEMENT, CONGR. RESEARCH EMPS. ASS’N, OUTSIDE WRITING,
LECTURING
ACTIVITIES
BY
CRS
STAFF:
OBJECTIVITY
3–4
(2004),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/crea051204.pdf.
461 Staffer Interview. For an example of CRS taking and defending a controversial stance, see
supra note 484 and accompanying text (discussing CRS report receiving public criticism from Sen.
Grassley and others).
456
457
458
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thereby highlighted the risk that neutrality, when understood as a reluctance
to draw conclusions, can pose to the benefits offered by expertise. On the
other hand, CREA forcefully defended analysts issuing policy conclusions
when derived from “generally accepted methodologies of analysis and
scholarship.”462 In so doing, it offered a competing vision where policy
conclusions are nonpartisan when anchored in neutral, expert methodologies.
These institutions—and Congress in utilizing them—do consistently rely
on their established methodologies to claim an objective legitimacy even in
the face of side-taking. Parliamentarians operate based on the principle of
precedent, and publish their precedents, but render decisions applying
precedents that will favor one side or the other. JCT, GAO, CBO, and CRS
issue analyses that may cut in favor of one position, but all of them forcefully
emphasize the same principle of relying upon a consistent, published, and
justified methodology as critical to their objectivity and nonpartisan
credibility—a Weberian focus on rationalization that they argue lends
neutrality or objectivity even to conclusions that some members might not
wish to receive. As one interviewee remarked:
I’ve always seen a tendency to ascribe advice that is not what they wanted to
some political motive. I think the only way we can combat that is [to] be
available to go over that with them and use precedents and so on to show
them that we have history of doing things this way.463

Congress has had hearings on JCT and CBO’s methodologies by way of
oversight.464 As JCT staff told us:
What does nonpartisan mean? This is why there’s lots of pressure on
modeling and transparency. Some members are disturbed that the way they
think the world’s going to work doesn’t square with our estimates, so [we say

Id.
See Staffer Interview. See generally Gould, supra note 16.
Republicans have criticized these offices’ reluctance to calculate important cost estimates
through “dynamic scoring,” a process whereby cost estimates incorporate the macroeconomic effects
of a bill. See Wendy Edelberg, Dynamic Scoring at CBO, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Oct. 21, 2015),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50919. Republicans long argued that this policy led to unduly
harsh assessments of tax cuts. See JOYCE, supra note 147, at 69; Jonathan Weisman, House Republicans
Change Rules on Calculating Economic Impact of Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/07/business/house-republicans-change-rules-on-calculatingeconomic-impact-of-bills.html. In 2015, these criticisms culminated in the 114th Congress mandating
that dynamic scoring be used in certain instances. S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong., § 3112 (2015). Until
that time, CBO and JCT had resisted political pressure on this matter, even after a change of
leadership at CBO in 1995 and 1999 that many Republicans assumed would bring more receptive
administrations. JOYCE, supra note 147, at 69; id. at 78.
462
463
464
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to them,] here are our methods and our evidence for why we are lining up a
certain way.465

4. Policy Versus Procedure
Within Congress, the political staffs (those who work for members,
committees, and leadership) undoubtedly are the primary specialists in policy
development. As noted, however, some offices in the congressional
bureaucracy explicitly provide critical policy development work for Congress.
Congress tends to control those institutions’ policy work by making the
members’ use of it optional. Others primarily play a procedural role—
assisting a policy idea on its journey toward legislative enactment—but even
procedural work can have policy implications.
CRS and GAO (and MedPAC and MACPAC) provide the most direct
substantive policy support. Those offices independently (i.e., without specific
congressional solicitation) may produce policy reports that Congress can use
as it wishes.466 GAO has documented that many of its reports have played a
mobilizing role in the ideation of legislation.467 JCT staff, while more reactive
than proactive, also supply the bulk of tax policy expertise to staffers across
various committees—especially Senate Finance and House Ways and
Means—working on tax issues.468
Some straddle the policy–procedure divide. Legislative Counsel, for
instance, is tasked only with taking members’ policy ideas and “translat[ing]
those ideas into statutory language and legalese.”469 In practice, however, the
offices’ deep knowledge of statutory regimes—and their institutional memory
of past congressional successes and failures—often leads political actors to
seek out input on how best to address policy concerns.
OLRC occupies a similar position. Its assigned task is to capture the
already-enacted intent of Congress, not to develop new policy ideas.
Nonetheless, it still engages in something that bleeds into policy when it
reconceptualizes (indeed its authorizing legislation uses the word
“restatement”) separately enacted pubic laws as belonging together under a
new single title of the U.S. Code.470 So, too, OLRC makes significant policyStaffer Interview.
See Reports & Testimonies: Recommendations Database, supra note 278 (listing GAO’s pending
recommendations); see also Staffer Interview (noting Comptroller authority to initiate
investigations); id. (noting CRS authority to initiate research into “general congressional interests,”
whether current or anticipated).
467 See GAO AT A GLANCE supra note 272 (stating that GAO work has helped “shape[]
legislation”).
468 See supra notes 201–211 (reviewing JCT’s key role in federal tax policy).
469 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1; see also Staffer Interview.
470 2 U.S.C. § 285(b)(1) (2018).
465
466
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implicating determinations when it decides which parts of a statute will be
inserted into the main text of the U.S. Code versus those parts that will be
relegated to largely-invisible side notes (a function of OLRC, surprising and
unknown to many, that we detail below471). These editorial and conceptual
functions are critical to shaping how legislation reads and is understood by
the public after enactment, but they do not reflect the underlying policy
decisions leading up to enactment.
The Parliamentarians’ Offices engage mostly in procedure. While the
work of these offices has high-stakes policy implications, they are almost
never enlisted to assist in policy development, except insofar as they advise
staff who to draft around procedural hurdles.
5. Confidential Versus Transparent: “The Atmosphere Has Changed”
Not all expertise-giving is apparent to the public. As we discuss in Part
III, massive changes in how Congress operates—most importantly,
departures from the regular-order, textbook process of lawmaking—have
pushed much of the expertise-giving by the congressional bureaucracy earlier
in the process and made it generally less visible. But here we wish to highlight
another distinction that is a familiar tradeoff in administrative law: some
expertise that these institutions develop is intended to be confidential, while
some is not.
Each approach comes with its own risks. Confidential expertise can be
manipulated (another way Congress can control its bureaucracy) and used to
shift blame. Transparent expertise can get politicized.
Congress has written specific confidentiality obligations into the organic
statutes of CRS, House Legislative Counsel, and the CBO,472 but private
consultations with all of the nonpartisan offices that we studied are totally
confidential—a practice that, for many offices, extends even to when members
commission reports.473 Members can use information they commission if
helpful, but never release it if harmful to their position.474 Staffers from all
these agencies told us that members “find us useful. They can hide behind us
See infra Section IV.B.
2 U.S.C. § 166(i) (2018); 2 U.S.C. § 281a (2018); 2 U.S.C. § 603(d) (2018).
See Staffer Interview (noting that if members and staff “request that something is
confidential, it’s automatically confidential”); id. (emphasizing that private consultations remain
private).
474 See Staffer Interviews; see also Lisa Rein, Trying to Crack Open Congress’s Confidential Think
Tank After a Century of Secrecy, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2015, 6:56 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/10/29/a-confidential-arm-of-congressgets-more-secretive/ (“For 101 years, the Congressional Research Service has conducted studies for
members of the Senate and House, and the findings have remained confidential unless the
lawmakers release the research themselves.”).
471
472
473
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sometimes or use us to delay. They can tell constituents they submitted a
question and haven’t heard back.”475 And: “Yes, they can request [information]
and choose to release or not if it comports with their political purposes. If
they hear something from us they don’t like, we won’t tell anyone we spoke
to them.”476
Even when official public input is ultimately the goal, members and staff
frequently first consult informally—and confidentially—with all parts of the
congressional bureaucracy. They routinely ask CBO about projections, or the
Parliamentarians about jurisdictional and procedural questions, before
seeking formal, public opinions from those entities.477 We were repeatedly
told that this dialogic process of informal and typically confidential expertisegiving and subsequent legislation-changing—whether to get the bill to a
particular budget number or to tweak the subject matter for a particular
committee referral—greatly impacts what is ultimately written into the
statute’s text. So does the substantive feedback that the offices may provide
in confidential consultations, such as when MedPAC or MACPAC provide
commentary on early legislative proposals or drafts.478
GAO operates under a stronger default norm of transparency agreed to
ex ante with Congress. Most of GAO’s work happens in public, although
GAO does informally consult with members in private. GAO emphasized the
transparency of its actions as a core feature of its credibility.479 Notably,
legislative reforms in recent years have called for more transparency in the
various nonpartisan congressional institutions, with respect to both their
processes and their work products.480 But our interviews suggest some
caution may be warranted. In recent years, the CBO has found that
publication of its cost estimates has dragged the office into the partisan fray.481
Staffer Interview.
Id.
Staffer Interviews; see also Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1, at 764 (discussing CBO’s
consultative role); Gould, supra note 16, at 2007-08 (discussing Parliamentarians’ advisory role).
478 Staffer Interviews.
479 See id.; see also supra notes 311-313 (noting the similar transparency emphasis for MedPAC
and MACPAC).
480 See, e.g., Aprill & Hemel, supra note 186 at 133–35 (calling for greater transparency in Senate
Parliamentarian rulings on the Byrd rule); Rebecca M. Kysar, Tax Law and the Eroding Budget Process,
81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 92–93 (2018) (discussing a proposed “CBO Show Your Work Act”
and endorsing a similar approach to JCT); Shobe, supra note 16 (arguing for greater transparency in
Law Revision Counsel methods); Stephanie Akin, Critics Pan Plan to Publish Congressional Research,
ROLL CALL (July 16, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/critics-pan-plan-publishreports-congress-house-think-tank [https://perma.cc/GZ44-WRAN] (describing Congress’s recent
imposition of a requirement for CRS to publish its reports, as well as criticisms that CRS is not
making a sufficient number of reports available).
481 See Alan Rappeport, C.B.O. Head, Who Prizes Nonpartisanship, Finds Work Under Attack, N.Y.
TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/us/politics/cbo-congressional-budget475
476
477
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For example, CBO drew major heat after its influential Affordable Care Act
forecasts.482 CRS also has come under political pressure for conclusions it
draws in published materials, such as a 2019 CRS report about the economic
effects from the 2017 tax reform legislation483—a report met with partisan
criticism from political commentators, the Treasury Department, and the
Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Chuck Grassley.484
Parliamentarians also have come under media and political scrutiny
precisely at moments when high-stakes, procedural rulings became public.485
On rare occasions, the Senate has even fired the Parliamentarian, including
in the wake of controversial rulings.486 More recently, some members have
office.html [https://perma.cc/GZ44-WRAN] (noting that the CBO and its “facts and data have
increasingly come under assault by politics”).
482 See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Real Arithmetic of Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES
(March
20,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/opinion/21holtz-eakin.html
[https://perma.cc/J7KJ-3HU3] (providing conservative criticism of the CBO calculations); Robert
Pear, House Committee Approves Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/us/politics/17cbo.html
[https://perma.cc/2B9D-HRKT]
(noting progressive criticism of the CBO calculations). For a more recent round of criticism directed
at CBO during the Republican attempt to repeal and replace the ACA, see Dylan Matthews, The
Republican War on the CBO, VOX (July 19, 2017, 9:00AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/7/19/15967224/congressional-budget-office-cbo-war-explained
[https://perma.cc/P9UY-KBAF] (explaining criticism and attacks of the Congressional Budget
Office by Republicans).
483 JANE G. GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45736, THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE 2017 TAX REVISION: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS (2019)
(analyzing the effects of P.L. 115-97 in 2018).
484 See Naomi Jagoda, Grassley Raises Concerns About Objectivity of Report Critical of GOP Tax
Law’s Effects, THE HILL (June 22, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/449824-grassley-raisesconcerns-about-objectivity-of-report-critical-of-gop-tax-laws (reporting Grassley criticisms);
Naomi Jagoda, Treasury Pushes Back at Report Critical of Trump Tax Law’s Effects, THE HILL (June 7,
2019), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/447513-treasury-pushes-back-at-report-critical-of-trumptax-laws-effects (reporting criticisms by Treasury Department and Grover Norquist).
485 See, e.g. Margot Sanger-Katz, Byrd Bath: Seven Provisions that Could Disappear from the
Senate Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/upshot/byrdbath-seven-provisions-that-could-disappear-from-the-senate-health-bill.html (covering Byrd bath
over Affordable Care Act repeal); Dylan Scott, Senate’s Budget Rules Invalidate Key Provisions in
Republican Health Care Bill, VOX (Jul. 21, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/7/21/16012950/senate-health-care-bill-byrd-rule-rulings (same); Staffer Interview
(noting political scrutiny of Parliamentarians for Affordable Care Act rulings).
486 When a new party took over the Senate in the 1980s and 1990s, it regularly installed a new
Parliamentarian. See HATCHER, supra note 236, at 32; Gould, supra note 16, at 2005 (“Senate
parliamentarians have been removed several times . . . .”); see also Wallner, supra note 224, at 392
(noting that “in 1981, the new Republican Majority Leader Howard Baker removed Murray Zweben
as Senate parliamentarian and replaced him with Robert Dove”); David E. Rosenbaum, Rules Keeper
is Dismissed by Senate, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001, at A20. In 2001, Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott also dismissed the Parliamentarian after disagreeing with rulings on tax and budget bills
and reinstalled a prior Parliamentarian. See Altman & Shactman, supra note 238 (on role of
reconciliation ruling in firing); Gould, supra note 16, at 2006 (on return of prior Parliamentarian).
Since then, the position has stabilized, with each of the next two Senate Parliamentarians surviving
party transitions. See id.
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argued that the Vice President should play the role of Parliamentarian487—a
threat made possible by virtue of the fact the Senate Parliamentarian exists
only for the grace of Congress.488 As the only nonpartisan congressional
institution without an organic statute, its very existence is especially
precarious. As we were told, the Senate Parliamentarian “is out there without
a net.”489
Staffers from all nine offices told us that congressional bureaucrats “would
never take those jobs so they can carry out some [political] purpose,” even as
some noted “the atmosphere has changed” and “nonpartisan staff are being
impugned.”490 They worried about the “huge effort to minimize CBO and
GAO and other organizations we use to function every day,” which often
comes in the form of public criticism of those offices’ outward-facing work.491
The more transparent the bureaucracy work has been, the greater the public
oversight and the more it has come under this kind of pressure.492
6. Authoritative Versus Permissive
Some of Congress’s nonpartisan institutions have limited mandatory
responsibilities. Others are a statutorily required step in the legislative
process. But one difference across the board from the executive bureaucracy
487 See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Cruz: Let’s Override Senate Office to Expand ObamaCare Bill, THE
HILL (March 9, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/323272-cruz-lets-overrulesenate-officer-to-expand-obamacare-bill [https://perma.cc/PC9K-2LBA] (describing Ted Cruz’s
statements that Mike Pence should wield more power over the Senate in order to permit inclusion
of additional provisions in health care reconciliation bill).
488 The Senate Parliamentarian has no independent originating statute but exists per the
statutory authority of the Secretary of the Senate to establish positions under her purview. 2 U.S.C.
§ 6539 (2018). There is also a statutory provision setting forth the maximum compensation for the
Senate Parliamentarian. Id. at § 6535.
489 Staffer Interview.
490 Staffer Interview.
491 Id.
492 See, e.g., Jeff Stein, Ellen Nakashime, & Erica Werner, White House Hold on Ukraine Aid
Violated Federal Law, Congressional Watchdog Says, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2020)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/white-house-hold-on-ukraine-aid-violatedfederal-law-congressional-watchdog-says/2020/01/16/060ea7aa-37a3-11ea-9c01d674772db96b_story.html [https://perma.cc/M5VC-VYJW] (reporting that Russell Vought, the
acting director of the Office of Management and Budget, derided GAO assessment that the Trump
administration broke the law by withholding Ukraine aid, tweeting that GAO’s “opinion comes from
the same people who said we couldn’t keep National Parks open during the shutdown”). For a
connection to the executive bureaucracy literature, see ROGER TAYLOR & TIM KELSEY, Critiques of
Transparency, in TRANSPARENCY AND THE OPEN SOCIETY 34-45 (2016) (discussing the negative
effects of transparency); Alesina & Tabellini, supra note 404, at 434; Albert Meijer, Understanding
the Complex Dynamics of Transparency, 73. PUB. ADMIN. REV. 429, 429 (2013) (“Government
organizations take decisions on and implement government transparency, but they are influenced in
this process by various stakeholders in their environments concerning whether and how to enhance
or decrease transparency.”).
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is that most of the work of the congressional bureaucracy does not have formal
legal effect without some additional action from Congress.
Use of CRS and the Legislative Counsel is voluntary.493 CBO’s cost
estimates, on the other hand, are a necessary hurdle most bills must clear.
Federal law mandates that each bill or resolution approved by any
congressional committee (other than an appropriations committee) receive a
CBO estimate.494 House rules additionally require these estimates to be
published in committee reports495 and that legislation may be considered in
the House only if, over various timeframes, that legislation does not increase
the deficit or reduce the surplus—a determination that, partly by statutory
mandate and partly by custom, is made by reference to CBO’s cost
estimates496 (but a House majority vote can waive the rule, and legislation has
been passed without a score, or with a score after passage).497 JCT plays an
analogous, mandatory role with respect to revenue-raising legislation.

493 This is in contrast to many other countries where legislators are required to use professional
drafters. In Canada, England, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and France, use of professional
drafting services is required, not optional. See John Bell, What Is the Function of the Conseil D’etat in
the Preparation of Legislation?, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 661, 662 (2000) (“[I]n France, there are
constitutional requirements that the Conseil d’Etat and the Conseil Economique et Social are
consulted on a wide range of legislation.”); Serge Lortie & Robert C. Bergeron, Legislative Drafting
and Language in Canada, 28 STATUTE L. REV. 83, 92 (2007) (“All government Bills are drafted by
the Legislation Section of the Department of Justice.”); Reed Dickerson, Legislative Drafting:
American and British Practices Compared, 44 AM. B. ASS’N J. 865, 865 (1958) (“almost all the public
laws enacted by Parliament are drafted by one small group of men, the expert draftsmen of the
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.”); Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, U.K. GOVERNMENT,
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-the-parliamentary-counsel/about (last
visited May 12, 2020) (The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel is “responsible for drafting all
government
bills”);
What
Parliamentary
Counsel
Do,
OFF.
ATT’Y
GEN.,
http://www.attorneygeneral.ie/pc/pc_do.html (last visited May 11, 2020); About the Office of
Parliamentary Counsel, AUSTL. GEN., https://www.opc.gov.au (last visited May 12, 2020) (the Office
of Parliamentary Counsel is responsible for drafting and publishing the laws of the Commonwealth
of Australia); Role of the Parliamentary Counsel Office, PARLIAMENTARY COUNS. OFF.,
http://www.pco.govt.nz/role-of-the-pco (last visited May 11, 2020) (the Parliamentary Counsel
Office is New Zealand’s law drafting office responsible for drafting all of New Zealand’s legislation).
494 See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
§ 402, 88 Stat. 297..
495 See RULE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule XIII.3(c)(3) (“The
report of a committee on a measure that has been approved by the committee shall include . . . [a]n
estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office . . . .”). For
tax legislation, CBO simply publishes the estimate made by the JCT. See Pub. L. No. 99-177 § 273
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) (2018)) (requiring CBO use of JCT estimates for revenue effects).
496 Technically, the Committee on the Budget determines, relative to a baseline calculated by
the Congressional Budget Office, whether the legislation complies. In practice, CBO determines
both the baseline and the impact of the legislation.
497 See, e.g., Kelsey Snell, Here’s How Much Congress Has Approved for Coronavirus Relief So Far
and What It’s For, NPR (May 15, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/15/854774681/congress-hasapproved-3-trillion-for-coronavirus-relief-so-far-heres-a-breakdown (noting that “In several cases
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GAO publishes a “Red Book” of appropriations opinions that are viewed
as precedential inside Congress. These opinions are not binding on the
judiciary, and GAO has no enforcement powers, but courts do give them
“special weight.”498 When the Comptroller General exercises its statutory
power to “settle all accounts of the United States Government and supervise
the recovery of all debts,” the balance the Comptroller certifies is “conclusive
on the executive branch.”499
Parliamentarian decisions are often treated as conclusive within Congress,
even though statutes and chamber rules do not mandate their use in the
legislative process. On a few procedural matters over the last few decades,
Senators have ignored (or overturned by a majority vote) Parliamentarians’
decisions500—including in the much-discussed instances in which the Senate
has invoked the “nuclear option” in order to override supermajority rules for
federal judicial appointments.501
Notably, many offices in the congressional bureaucracy with authoritative
powers are required to exercise those powers transparently, through public
reports or opinions. We think it is no coincidence that those offices are the
ones most at risk of politicization.502 The combination of their visibility and
the importance of their rulings puts them in the oversight spotlight.
7. Trust with Low Salience Tasks: Why OLRC? “No Members Know
We’re Here”
It is worth noting that OLRC inhabits an odd place on this spectrum.
OLRC is required to prepare the U.S. Code for publication; that aspect of its
work is mandatory. But it is up to OLRC to decide when a new title should
be created and what it should contain, and Congress is not required to take
any action on codification bills prepared by the office. OLRC can organize
and reclassify enacted statutes into coherent legal titles, but it is up to
Congress whether to formally enact those titles as so-called “positive law.” As
[on the emergency Coronavirus relief bills], Congress voted on the relief spending . . . without an
official cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office.”).
498 Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 400 F.3d 9, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); supra note
287 (citations to Red Book by the Supreme Court).
499 31 U.S.C. §§ 3526(a), (d) (2018).
500 See Gould, supra note 16, at 1976-77. By one count, such an appeal has been successfully
carried out seventeen times between 1980 and 2013. See Wallner, supra note 224, at 391 (“In the 30
years since the Republicans took over the majority in 1980 . . . [t]he full Senate overturned the
decision of the Chair only 17 times . . . .”).
501 On the “nuclear option” and its recent uses, see supra note 250.
502 In the case of the Affordable Care Act and its repeal, for example, see supra note 485
(discussing politicization of Parliamentarians); supra note 368 & infra note 370 (discussing
politicization of CBO).
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noted, half of the titles of the U.S. Code (including important titles like Title
42, which contains the civil rights laws) have been organized by OLRC (or
prior codifiers) but never formally enacted by Congress as positive law titles.
OLRC staff told us several times there is a “total lack of political will” to
enact codification bills:
Members don’t care about positive law codification bills. Members care about,
at best, policy and constituents, but making law easier to read and understand
and navigate or correcting technical errors? They don’t care about that . . . .
What member ever went back to a town hall meeting and said, you know, “I
got a U.S. Code title codified!”?503

We were surprised to learn from our interviews of partisan staff that most
staffers do not even know what OLRC does, or where it is! Due to this lack
of political salience, OLRC is not sought out by members. As they put it:
“No members know we are here.”504
Why have an office no one cares about enough to use? The need to
organize the U.S. Code in ways that make statutes and their amendments
accessible to the public is uncontroverted. But why give that responsibility to
a nonpartisan agency? Why not the Speaker’s Office?
One reason, we believe, is precisely because no one is watching. As one
interviewee put it: “Someone needs to do this. You need someone to run this
stuff down. You have to have someone who isn’t going to slip something by.
Congress isn’t going to be tracking it down.”505 In other words, the
nonpartisan and politically dull stance of OLRC, ex ante, gives it the
credibility to do work that is needed, but that Congress does not care about
enough to supervise.
As with other studies of bureaucracies, OLRC’s institutional design
enables it to take on projects with long-term, diffuse benefits (but
correspondingly low political salience). Its staff are incentivized not by the
electoral connection, but by their own commitment to professionalism far
beyond the next election cycle.506

Staffer Interview.
Id. But see Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No.
114-187, § 6, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) (statutory provision directing Law Revision Counsel where to place
a provision in a non-positive title). Stephen Lubben, who first brought attention to this provision,
found no other examples of Congress directing placement for non-positive provisions. See Stephen
J. Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About Uniformity, 12 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 53, 60 n.54 (2017).
505 Id.
506 See Alesina & Tabellini, supra note 404, at 434 (noting that “bureaucrats care about their
professional reputation in the eyes of their peers”).
503
504
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8. Timing
Finally, expertise comes in all stages of the legislative process—including
both pre- and post-enactment. The timing of congressional bureaucratic
intervention is particularly interesting because, in addition to shedding light
on the modern Congress’s operations, it also creates a far more nuanced view
of where “lawmaking” stops and starts. We return to this point in Part IV.
Some offices play a mobilizing role in the generation of legislation. GAO
produces policy reports containing specific recommendations that can inspire
legislators and staff to take action.507 CRS submits to Congress a list of
expiring provisions in current law, thereby identifying possible topics for
legislation.508 And OLRC even notifies members and Legislative Counsel of
errors and inconsistencies in the law as enacted so that corrective measures
can be passed.509
The Parliamentarian interjects expertise very early when called upon to
make the critical decision about referrals to committee. (Consistent with the
findings in the Gluck/Bressman study, it was repeatedly emphasized that
“referral to committee remains hugely important.”510) Legislative Counsel
translates policy staff goals into statutory language, and CBO and JCT
calculate the cost of the legislation. JCT staff, as noted, is directly involved in
nearly all stages of the legislative process.511 CRS drafts the bill summaries
that appear on Congress.gov after their introduction.512 Germaneness rules
and the Byrd rule create an important role for the Parliamentarians’ Offices.
During this iterative process, the congressional bureaucracy’s various
offices have different roles, but they do not operate as silos. CBO relies on
JCT estimates in the tax and revenue context. Partisan staff bring the
Parliamentarians into dialogue with Legislative Counsel to develop statutory
text that receives a desired committee referral. CRS may draft a report on
proposed legislation that partisan staff will pass to Legislative Counsel to
draft. JCT describes their role as one of transforming a concept into a
concrete plan, but told us they then work hand-in-hand with Legislative
Counsel to translate that plan to text. Language and substance are tweaked
See supra notes 278–280 (discussing GAO policy reports).
2 U.S.C. § 166(d)(2) (2018).
Staffer Interview. One of the authors also has first-hand experience with this because, as a
drafter in Legislative Counsel, he received such edits.
510 See Staffer Interview (discussing committee referral). With regard to committee referral,
LRC staff were particularly attuned to how legislation is often carefully drafted to obtain (or avoid)
a certain referral: “From the inside, where the real acid wars take place is committee jurisdiction.
How things are written in the law has to do with, ‘My God, we have to keep it away from so and so
in the subcommittee.’” Staffer Interview.
511 See supra Part I.E.
512 See Staffer Interview (noting that CRS writes bill summaries that are published on
Congress.gov).
507
508
509
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and tweaked again to get legislation within the budget and revenue goals
members have set. A GAO staffer remarked:
We talk to each other all the time. We are very supportive of each other; we
want to be sure we stay in our lanes. At the end of the day, we are all here to
serve Congress and support congressional prerogatives. We do it in our own
way. Some of CBO’s work overlaps with GAO; everyone is respectful of that.
Same with CRS. Congressional staff knows how to use us.513

A CRS staffer similarly noted: “There is a complementary relationship
across GAO, CRS, and CBO in terms of our various mission spaces . . . [as]
defined by Congress.”514
Later in the process, JCT also drafts the legislative history for tax aspects
of most bills before they are passed (usually for the Senate Finance and House
Ways and Means Committees). CRS may be called in at any stage, whether
to assess new ideas, analyze proposed legislation, or evaluate already passed
legislation. CRS also provides data and analysis for committee reports.515
Legislative Counsel drafts some special legislative history, conference reports,
and even amendments on the floor until the moment of the vote.
Most interestingly—in part because it is least well known—OLRC begins
its influential work reorganizing and editing the positive and non-positive law
titles of the U.S Code only after enactment. This includes textual changes
(those changes, for positive law titles, are voted on in codification bills but
not for the nonpositive titles). Other offices have post-enactment roles as
well. JCT comes back into the picture to draft the “Blue Book,” its influential
post-enactment synthesis. And GAO, in its role as the watchdog that oversees
agency implementation, often begins the cycle anew by producing policy
reports that contain specific recommendations for new legislative action—
whether to address gaps in in oversight or to reign in agencies who are
implementing laws improperly.516
III. LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION THEORY
At one of his last oral arguments before his death, Justice Antonin Scalia
debated with Justice Stephen Breyer over how to resolve ambiguity in a

Staffer Interview.
Staffer Interview.
See id. (discussing that CRS conducts “complex economic or political analysis” at the
request of committee staff). Interviewees noted that committee requests tend to be more complex
and robust than most other queries. Id.
516 See supra notes 278-280.
513
514
515
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statute where the text alone, including rules of grammar, was of no help.517
Justice Breyer suggested looking to legislative history. Justice Scalia instead
suggested relying on a judge-created source outside the legislative process—
a policy-based presumption of statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s
rationale: “You don’t think Congress can leave it to its staff to decide what a statute
means, do you?”
***
We now turn to the implications of our study for the theories of legislation
and statutory interpretation. There are several deficits we seek to remedy and
several debates in which we intervene.
First, no matter where one comes down in the statutory interpretation
wars, those debates are almost entirely based on empirical assumptions about
Congress. Even those who think that lawyers should ignore the realities of
the legislative process ground that argument in empirical claims that
Congress has no collective intent, that Congress operates irrationally, or that
Congress shares special drafting conventions with courts that are better
substitutes for an approach focused on how Congress actually works.518 One
cannot legitimate (or refute) such claims without doing the work of learning
about Congress to determine if they are true.
We should be clear, too, that no one’s approach is merely: “read the text
and stop.” Every approach in the mainstream debates depends on sources
external to enacted text when statutes are unclear, whether those sources are
dictionaries, congressional operations, legislative history, or judge-crafted
interpretive presumptions. Just because some sources, such as the courts’
common presumptions of linguistic consistency or dictionaries, have legally
attractive features (because some interpreters think those sources are
“objective”), that does not make those sources less external to the text
Congress enacts than sources linked to Congress’s work.
517 Transcript of Oral Argument at 39-42, Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2015) (No.
14-8358). Grammar rules were not helpful because there were applicable grammar rules supporting
both sides.
518 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 8, at 23-25 (discussing textualist justifications for
statutory interpretation); Doerfler, supra note 11, at 981-83 (noting that “as an empirical matter,
members of Congress do not share intentions” (emphasis in original)); John F. Manning, Textualism
and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2005) (describing the textualist argument that
Congress does not share a “collective will apart from the outcomes of the complex legislative process
that conditions its ability to translate raw policy impulses or intentions into finished legislation”);
see also Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 915 (2013) (cataloging the many fictions judges apply,
including the lack of collective intent, “the notion of a single ‘congressional intent’”, and the idea
that canons are background assumptions that Congress knows and against whose background
Congress legislates).
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John Manning’s argument for shared interpretive conventions—that is,
using judicially-developed canons of statutory interpretation instead of
material more tied to Congress—is expressly legitimated on the assumption
that Congress in fact shares those conventions. Justice Scalia’s argument for
the use of canons was similarly dependent on the assumption that Congress
uses those conventions or knowingly drafts in their shadow. However, the
Gluck–Bressman empirical study of congressional drafting practices seriously
undermines those assumptions.
A more recent critic, Ryan Doerfler, argues that information about
Congress is irrelevant because “context consists of information salient to both
author and audience” and that the ordinary public, and perhaps also agencies
or other legislators, do not know about Congress’s operations.519 There is zero
evidence, however, that the courts’ interpretive presumptions are salient to
anyone other than judges. The congressional bureaucracy’s materials—
including the CBO score, the Parliamentarians’ rulings, legislative history,
JCT explanatory outputs, and the organization of statutes in the U.S. Code—
are more salient to all of the actors Doerfler identifies.
Doerfler also aligns himself with others520 in claiming that any arguments
about collective intent—for instance that Congress, like corporations, can act
collectively—are false because one cannot impute the intention of any one
member of Congress to the whole. But that is not the point. Arguments about
individual or subjective intentions are distractions here. Even Doerfler
recognizes that Congress speaks collectively when it passes procedural rules
or when it votes on final text of legislation, and that “it is plausible to attribute
to an institutional group an intention to [do x] despite some members of that
group failing to intend that ‘we’ [do x].”521
The congressional bureaucracy’s formal work is precisely this kind of
collective activity. As we stated earlier, Congress is sometimes an “it” as
well as a “they.” The offices of the congressional bureaucracy are the
creatures of Congress’s own enacted laws, and those laws direct the
Doerfler, supra note 11, at 983.
See Nourse, supra note 10 (collecting the criticisms); Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary
Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2014) (same);
see also Eskridge, supra note 8, at 651–52 (arguing that Justice Scalia adopted Max Radin’s critique
against collective intention); Manning, supra note 518, at 430 (noting that “textualists deny that a
legislature has any shared intention that lies behind but differs from the reasonable import of the
words adopted.”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“The
chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind
as possible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small.”); Antonin Scalia & John
F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH L. REV. 1610,
1611–12 (2012) (describing textualism); Shepsle, supra note 13, at 254 (arguing that “[i]ndividuals have
intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not”).
521 Doerfler, supra note 11, at 1007.
519
520
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bureaucracy to produce statutory inputs. If the JCT says a law will raise
$100 million, it does not matter if a particular member of Congress opposed
the law for other reasons and it does not matter if the law actually would
raise $100 million; regardless, we can assume that Congress had before it
the conclusion the law it was enacting would raise $100 million. If the
Parliamentarian says a piece of legislation should be referred to committee
Y instead of committee Z because committee Z has no jurisdiction over
oceans, then it is fair to assume that the bill covers oceans. So, too,
legislators voting for a bill produced through Congress’s professionalized
drafting process, can be assumed to enact what the professional drafters
themselves aimed the legal text to convey, not what any single member
might have sneakily thought to herself. Just because legislators sometimes
act individually, does not mean Congress does not act collectively.522
Second, we are part of a new movement in the field that has a civiceducation bent. Legislation is now a subject taught in the first-year
curriculum at many law schools. It would be preposterous to teach
administrative law without teaching students about the components,
structures, rules, and operations of the administrative state. And yet when
it comes to statutes—the lion’s share of modern American law—that is
exactly how the topic has traditionally been approached, both as a matter of
pedagogy and as a matter of legal doctrine. Statutory interpretation theory
has engaged more deeply with dead philosophers than it has with Congress.
Congress also has changed over time, and yet barely a dent has been made
from those changes in even those interpretive theories and doctrine that are
purportedly based on Congress’s own operations. Work by us and our
coauthors—as well as other scholars including Judge Robert Katzmann,
Elizabeth Garrett, Victoria Nourse, Rebecca Kysar, and Jonathan Gould—
has pushed to change this.523
522 It might be said that locating legislative meaning with Congress’s internal bureaucracy only
reproduces aggregability problems at the sub-congressional level, given that drafting bodies are
themselves comprised of many people. While a response goes beyond the contours of this article,
the bureaucratic form of such bodies is particularly amenable to ascriptions of collective intent. For
one, drafters are much less likely to diverge in their understandings of a legislative text in favor of
individual preferences than are legislators themselves, given drafters’ politically neutral character
and close cooperation. Second, internal drafting bodies themselves reflect hierarchical arrangements
that consolidate agency in a head or lead drafter.
523 See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (discussing utility of legislative
history to everyday work of Congress and judges); Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework
Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 717 (2005) (arguing that different interpretive methods might
apply to omnibus legislation because of the unique circumstances of their enactment); Gould, supra
note 16 (descriptive account of the Parliamentarians’ offices); Rebecca M. Kysar, Dynamic Legislation,
167 U. PA. L. REV. 811 (2018); (discussing special kinds of laws, ideal for bypassing gridlock, that
automatically evolve with changed circumstances); Kysar, supra note 480 (detailing modern realities
and instabilities of the budget process); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory
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Third, regardless of the first two points, the fact of the matter is that
judges do consistently interpret statutes in ways that judges claim are
usually tethered to Congress. That means lawyers have to engage those
arguments, too. Judges tell us they interpret statutes as not using redundant
language because they assume that is how Congress uses language (but at
least one prominent textualist judge (now Justice) has questioned that rule
in the face of empirical evidence to the contrary.524) Judges tell us they rely
on statutory organization instead of legislative history precisely because
they assume the organization of statutory text is voted upon by members as
part of the text, whereas legislative history is written by staff. This is not
true. Students of the congressional bureaucracy now know that statutes are
organized into the U.S. Code after passage by OLRC. Judges also presume
that Congress uses the same words in the same way throughout the U.S.
Code, when in fact, the structure of Congress and its bureaucracy points
toward consistency and coherence only within subject matter areas and not
within the Code as a whole.
With the exception of former Judge Richard Posner, we have not
encountered a judge in the modern legislative state who has claimed that his or
her interpretive approach is the result of judicial invention, federal commonlaw lawmaking, or the imposition of external norms—norms like notice,
coherence, and consistency that could indeed justify some linguistic
presumptions—atop the congressional process even in the face of evidence that
Congress does not operate in the shadow of those norms. We emphatically believe
that one could justify modern approaches in that way, but modern judges have
never been willing to assert the mantle of being anything other than “faithful
agents” of Congress with their work tethered to the principle of legislative
supremacy. If that is to remain the justification, then for the doctrines to be
legitimate our understanding of Congress has to be more accurate.
In the exchange set out at the top of this Part, Justice Scalia debated
Justice Breyer over how to resolve a statutory ambiguity. Breyer would have
used legislative history, but Scalia refused to because legislative history was
the product of “staff.” But turning to a policy presumption instead, as he
suggested, simply means the Court decides the question itself. How is that more
faithful to Congress or more democratically legitimate if a theorist is
focused—as textualists say they are—on legislative supremacy?

Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 80-86 (2012) (advancing theory of
interpretation based on Congress’s own procedural rules); Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for
Framework Legislation (USC Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 04-23, 2004).
524 Loving v. I.R.S., 742 F.3d 1013, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442,
1453 (2020) (building on Loving).
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Further engagement in these debates requires separate treatment. Our
aim in this Article is (mostly) not to argue that the realities of the
congressional bureaucracy necessarily must be utilized by statutory
interpreters. Rather, our aim is to illustrate how our analysis of heretoforeoverlooked congressional functions sheds light on those debates and offers a
challenge to interpreters with theories and doctrines tied in one way or
another to Congress. This Part examines how the congressional bureaucracy
contributes to ongoing debates about the nature of the legislature, including
modern changes and deviations from the textbook process that theory and
doctrine rarely take into account. In Part IV, we conclude by suggesting how
the bureaucracy changes our understanding of the very concept of a “statute”,
and the implications this may hold for the rules of interpretation.
A. What the Congressional Bureaucracy Tells Us About Congress’s Rationality and
Changes in Modern Lawmaking
Recall the famous assumption about Congress advanced by Legal Process
titans Hart and Sacks: “the legislature was made up of reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”525 Modern textualism pushed that
assumption aside, grounding interpretation instead in realist- and economicbased theories of Congress as an impenetrable, deal-making, compromisedriven, incoherent institution that courts can never hope to understand.526
The Court today has no loyalty to the Legal Process approach (although
one of us has argued that Chief Justice John Roberts is actually of that
school527), and the Court as a whole is quite textualist.528 But ironically,
textualism’s main interpretive doctrines—which are the ones the Court
applies in virtually every statutory interpretation case—do implicitly
attribute rationality, sometimes even perfection, to Congress. In other words,
the assumption of a reasonable Congress underpins the central textualist
canons of interpretations, even as textualism itself is grounded in the opposite
assumption. Among the presumptions that federal courts (including judges
of all stripes) routinely apply are assumptions that Congress legislates

HART & SACKS, supra note 7, at 1378.
See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION 67 (3d ed. 2017) (“Rather than seeing the legislative process as coherent and
reasonable, the new textualists emphasize the rough-and-tumble of political compromise.”).
527 Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 10.
528 Justice Kagan has made this point several times, see, e.g., Ryan Lovelace, Elena Kagan: The
Supreme Court Is a ‘Textualist Court’ That Reasons More Like Scalia Than Breyer, WASH. EXAMINER
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/elena-kagan-the-supreme-court-is-atextualist-court-that-reasons-more-like-scalia-than-breyer [https://perma.cc/U9TX-M5B8] (“[W]e
are a generally, fairly textualist court . . . .”).
525
526
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constitutionally;529 does not bury elephant-sized changes in statutory
mouseholes;530 does not unnecessarily repeat itself;531 uses similar words in
the same way throughout statutes;532 and so on. The Gluck–Bressman study
has shown that some of these assumptions are mistaken, but that does not
change the larger point that even textualists, despite their purported values,
maintain an idealized vision of a rational Congress for purposes of doctrine.
Modern lawmaking further complicates this view. The Gluck/O’Connell
study of “unorthodox lawmaking” documents for legal readers the pervasive
deviations from the textbook, “schoolhouse rock” legislative process that has
been the paradigm for the past half century.533 If textualists thought the
Congress of the 1970s was incoherent, they should find the gridlocked,
unorthodox Congress of the 2000s much worse.
Enter the congressional bureaucracy. The congressional bureaucracy’s
interaction with the modern unorthodox Congress makes three interventions
in this debate. First, it challenges these pessimistic views of Congress as an
institution. Second, it helps us see how even common interpretive methods,
including textualist interpretive presumptions, might be better tailored to the

529 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089-90 (2014) (construing statute
implementing an international convention on chemical weapons does not apply to local crimes
involving chemicals to avoid constitutional question); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 40203 (2010) (narrowing potentially unconstitutionally vague statute, regarding the intangible right of
honest services for vagueness, to avoid the constitutional issue”). For a full explanation and
additional examples, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW
TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 317 (2016) (describing the development of the
“Modern Avoidance Canon”).
530 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006) (striking an interpretive
regulation that would have dramatically altered the landscape of drug regulations and physicianassisted suicide); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125-27 (2000)
(finding that Congress would not have delegated major question of tobacco regulation to FDA
without expressly saying so); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 529, at 337 (explaining the “No
Elephants in Mouseholes Canon”).
531 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-98
(1995) (discussing the “reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage”); Kungys v. United States,
485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (describing how the concurrence “violates the
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely
redundant”); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 529, at 112 (discussing the “Anti-Surplusage (Redundancy) Canon”).
532 See, e.g., Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 702 (describing the way the word “harm” came to have a
particular meaning throughout the entirety of the Endangered Species Act); see also West Va. Hosp.
v. Casey, 546 U.S. 243, 265-68 (2006) (assuming Congress drafted fee-shifting statutes the same way
in 41 instances across the U.S. Code); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 529, at 108 (discussing the
“Consistent Use Canon”).
533 The late political scientist Barbara Sinclair first introduced the concept. See Gluck,
O’Connell & Po supra note 1, at 1794 (“[I]t seems that the Schoolhouse Rock! Cartoon version of the
conventional legislative process is dead. It may never have accurately described the lawmaking
process in the first place.”).
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facts of modern lawmaking. And third, it illustrates gaps in prevailing
doctrine that must be addressed.
B. Unorthodox Lawmaking Is the New Orthodox Lawmaking: Implications for
Understanding Statutes
The concept of “unorthodox lawmaking” (a term coined by political
scientist Barbara Sinclair) was almost entirely absent from legislation and
statutory interpretation theory and doctrine even a few years ago.534 The
nonpartisan offices studied in this Article both fill out and complicate the
unorthodox lawmaking account that has recently gained more traction in
legal scholarship.
1. Congress Is Still Informed in Key Ways
On the one hand, the experience of the congressional bureaucracy
substantiates the notion that the textbook process is increasingly rare and that
new procedures—which to many internally already are understood to be the
new orthodox lawmaking—have replaced it. Each of the offices we studied
volunteered these congressional-process changes as extremely significant and
pervasive. On the other hand, however, our account adds nuance that may be
cause for at least some optimism. “Unorthodox,” we learn from the
nonpartisan institutions, does not necessarily mean “uninformed.” Regular
order—the now-traditional process that emerged in the 1970s to publicly vet
a bill through committee, hearings, floor debates, bicameral conference, and
more—was designed to ensure that legislation was studied, deliberated,
transparent, precise, and error-free. Today, those processes have changed, but
the congressional bureaucracy, and its expertise, continue to be utilized, even
if they are less visible.
When it comes to a broad swath of legislative activities (including
drafting, estimating, auditing, analyzing, and following the procedures for
amending legislation), Congress continues to seek out rational deliberation
and expertise—even within unorthodox lawmaking. Of course, the
534 References to Sinclair’s canonical work in political science on unorthodox lawmaking were
almost entirely absent from legal scholarship before the Gluck–Bressman study. A search of law
reviews on Westlaw found just fifty-one results for “Barbara Sinclair,” and just 13 for “unorthodox
lawmaking,” prior to 2013. By contrast, a similar search of law reviews published after 2013 found
209 results for “Barbara Sinclair” and 228 for “unorthodox lawmaking.” One critical exception is
Elizabeth Garrett, whose excellent work documented deviations from the textbook process much
earlier. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH 294, 297-318 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (cataloguing various types
of modern statutes with special rules that deviate from textbook account, including omnibus laws,
the budget process, and statutes that use commissions as automatic decisionmaking regimes);
Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, supra note 523, at 718 (same).
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bureaucracy’s institutions are not Congress’s main source of substantive
subject-matter expertise—except for JCT (and legislative commissions like
MedPAC and MACPAC). Future scholars therefore still bear the burden of
showing that the partisan expert policy staff—the committee staff who
provide the bulk of Congress’s substantive policy expertise—continue to act
in ways that contribute to a rational account of Congress (our anecdotal
impression is that they do). But to say that modern federal statutes are not
vetted or deliberated is simply wrong. Reasonable legislators still try to
pursue reasonable purposes reasonably—just not in the ways the old orthodox
model recognizes.
It is undoubtedly true that things are much more rushed. As Gluck,
O’Connell, and Po detailed,535 unorthodox lawmaking changes the timing and
transparency of legislative interventions and, with it, the structure,
complexity, and legislative materials that accompany legislation. This proves
to be as true for the congressional bureaucracy’s role. As one staffer put it:
The expectation today is totally different. Before, it used to be the joke was
the complexity of the tax code, but now that is spreading to other areas of the
law. This creates more challenges for practitioners. The amount of time spent
on legislating, having to do everything in one large bill, ram it all in, in fewer
steps, leads to more mistakes, more inconsistencies.536

Parliamentarians are increasingly doing their work off the floor. The
Legislative Counsel still drafts bills but now rarely has the chance to draft
amendments from the floor or clean up in conference (because there is rarely
a conference anymore). JCT still provides the policy backbone of tax
legislation and the accompanying legislative materials, but legislative history
is evaporating thanks to unorthodox processes. The JCT now puts those
materials in other formats—including the post-enactment Blue Book—in the
absence of legislative history. CBO has an iterative back-and-forth with
drafters before an official score is released as drafters “slice and dice” to get a
statute within target score. The public cannot see any of that. The public just
sees legislation rushed from formal introduction to passage.
Sometimes, bills simultaneously undergo the more public journey
through the steps of the old orthodox lawmaking process. Some legislative
reformers, nostalgic for the olden days, have called for changes to bolster
those old steps.537 But, at least some of the time today, the tools of old
535 See Gluck, O’Connell & Po supra note 1, at 1819-20 (discussing the impact of unorthodox
lawmaking on timing and transparency of the legislative process).
536 Staffer Interview.
537 See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2008) (arguing
Congress has become dysfunctional); Neil S. Siegel, After the Trump Era: A Constitutional Role
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orthodox lawmaking—hearings and floor debates—are for C-SPAN cameras,
not for internal fact-gathering and deliberation.538 Other times, it is true,
public airing of issues—much like an oral argument in court—is a way to mull
the issues, or hear where other colleagues stand. Substantive markups are still
typically core legislative work. At the same time, however, Congress has
remade these old orthodox steps into opportunities for external
communication with constituents—and a great deal of deliberation and
refinement now occur largely off the radar behind closed doors. But they do
occur, and to a great extent they still rely on the bureaucracy.
The Gluck–O’Connell study details many distinctive features of the new
unorthodox lawmaking and their implications for statutory interpretation and
administrative law doctrine, and it raises questions about the risks and
benefits of these modern departures from so-called “regular order.”539 Below,
we highlight those areas that are of particular relevance to the congressional
bureaucracy and that emerged as especially salient from our interviews. The
main takeaways are:
• Preconference replaces conference: textual changes to bills are less
visible, come earlier, and party leaders aggregate more power; no
more conference reports
• Statutes are longer, and have more errors and gaps
• Text relating to procedural hurdles and budget scoring is
painstakingly negotiated
• There is less legislative history
• The bureaucracy becomes more politicized as procedural tactics gain
importance

Morality for Presidents and Members of Congress, 107 GEO. L.J. 109, 166 (2018) (arguing for imposing
“role morality” on Members of Congress to preserve “important rules and practices,” including
regular order); ; Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135, 139
(2011) (noting the problem of rushed legislation and arguing for “a Read the Bill norm, coupled with
a norm of writing bills in readable and understandable language . . . .”); Improving Congress, C-SPAN
(July
22,
2015),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4722150/returning-regular-order-congress
[https://perma.cc/B3GF-N5M3) (discussing comments of John Fortier, Director of the Bipartisan
Policy Center’s Democracy Project); Derek Willis & Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped Working,
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-congress-stopped-working
[https://perma.cc/6B5A-NUZ4] (recounting the problems Members of Congress attribute to
Congress’s deviation from regular order and several ideas to remedy the issue, including remaining
in session for longer).
538 Cross, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 140-50 (providing survey results on the uses of,
and intended audience for, different congressional statements and fora than hearings, to learn the
contents of proposed legislation).
539 See generally Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1; Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 1.
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2. New Timing and “Preconference”—and Their Challenges for Textualists
The new timing is different, not only with respect to compressed
timeframes for legislating, but with respect to the point in the process at
which expertise is sought and utilized. A new procedure—”preconference”—
has largely replaced the last stage of the legislative process (conference) where
changes between House and Senate bills were traditionally worked out. Many
of our interviewees, without prompting, referenced to this term—
”preconference”—as the new norm.
Conference has largely disappeared because any changes made at that
stage require a new vote from both chambers; in today’s era of extreme
gridlock,540 party leaders are reluctant to take that step and seek to get bills
done with just one vote.
Preconference was described this way: “Senate staff, they might negotiate
more informally to get a bill the House can pass after Senate [passage].” There
are “amendments back and forth.”541 But because of the traditional importance
of conference, courts typically give great weight to the textual changes made
at that stage,542 and many judges give special weight to the conference
committee report.543 The new unorthodox timing changes this because there
are almost no conference reports. The new timing also makes less visible the
various changes made to bills between introduction and the vote. This is also
an important change for interpreters, given that judges and advocates,
including and especially textualists, often look to that statutory evolution for
textual evidence of statutory meaning.
The Parliamentarians told us that now they “try to negotiate . . . out
[policy compromises ahead of time] rather than fight them out on the
floor.”544 GAO told us that, even while most of its work is transparent, it now
gives more nonpublic, early informal technical assistance than in the past.545
We were also told that procedural decisions are “becoming a lot more front-

540 For a discussion of whether nonpartisan staff themselves reduce gridlock, see MICKEY
EDWARDS, THE PARTIES VERSUS THE PEOPLE 91–128 (2012) (arguing that nonpartisan committee
staff could reduce gridlock); Yin, supra note 18 (questioning this idea).
541 Id.
542 See, e.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND
INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION & ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 72-73
(2014) (noting that conference reports typically sit atop the hierarchy of legislative history as
reviewed by judges); Nourse, supra note 9, at 93-97 (noting the Supreme Court’s reliance on
Conference history).
543 Even scholars who urge attention to the legislative process place great weight on this now
largely absent stage. See Nourse, supra note 9.
544 Staffer Interview.
545 Id.
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loaded” and decisions about germaneness are “happening earlier and earlier
in the process.”546
We were told there are rarely presidential vetoes anymore, “because the
administration sends out statements of policy . . . . and the Senate and House
are coordinating. Things are scheduled and done ahead of time. [They] are
dealing with this stuff earlier.” Staffers characterized this new normal as
“more pointing out landmines in advance . . . rather than on the floor.”547
Staffers stated: “Fast track processes can feel like cheating. You are never
going to spend three weeks on an energy bill, again.”548 One staffer told us
that the national defense authorization process used to be a “robust
amendment process” in committee and on the floor. But now, the staffer
added, “today we do it one day on the floor as opposed to two weeks . . . .”549
JCT staff noted that under regular order, JCT had a role with conference
[i.e., with reconciling House and Senate versions]. They told us: “behind the
scenes, bills still look different now on the House and Senate side, but now
they do preconference more to reconcile bills before they come out.”550
Even apart from losing the conference report, these timing changes make
the basic amending process less transparent. Under old orthodox lawmaking,
much of Congress’s expertise-seeking occurred in display of the public.
Congress undertook these activities, for the most part, on chamber floors or
in committees. Today, with most vetting, changing, and analyzing of
legislation now happening before a bill hits the floor, there is less opportunity
for outsiders to see Congress actually grappling with difficult issues and
tradeoffs. There is less formal procedural precedent being created and less
explanatory material to inform other members and later readers of statutes.
This leads to the often-false perception that Congress is not doing its job in
a thoughtful way.
It also means that one kind of textualists’ favorite materials—what they
call “statutory history” (as opposed to legislative history), the textual
evolution of a bill, including rejected and accepted amendments—is
disappearing. We were told, for instance, that “appropriations has
traditionally had a more open process. Legislative Counsel used to come to
the floor to be ready to write amendments, but that is [a] relic of the past.”551
This does not mean that appropriations bills are not being amended or that
Legislative Counsel is not writing the amendments. It would be a mistake for
546 See id.; see also Gould, supra note 16, at 1974 (reporting similar references in his own
interviews to “frontloading”).
547 Staffer Interviews.
548 Id.
549 Id.
550 Id.
551 Id.
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judges to assume these things do not happen just because they are now less
visible, with fewer published materials. It just means that the negotiations
and drafting happen before the bills come to the floor. Instead, policy staff
exchange notes and negotiate changes behind the scenes, often together with
their bureaucracy supports, and typically before the bill goes to the floor, to
avoid a conference.552 Policy staff may continually adapt the proposed
legislation outside of the public view to account for the feedback, debates,
and discussions that these entities now facilitate more informally—whether
through early projections of a budget score, procedural advice on
germaneness, or the drafting of language.
This movement away from the action on the floor to these earlier behindthe-scenes procedures may also have implications for our internal separation
of powers point, detailed in Part II. The Gluck–Bressman study established
that unorthodox lawmaking has shifted power away from committees and
toward the party leaders.553 Our bureaucracy interviewees corroborated those
conclusions and added to them. They told us that the timing changes make
regular members less visible, and that there is instead more interaction with
the bureaucracy directed by party leaders. CRS staff ’s comment was typical:
“The nature of work is largely unchanged . . . [but] the avenues by which they
come to us are . . . different . . . . Decades ago we worked primarily [with
Members] through committee constructs . . . [but now it’s coming] primarily
through Leadership.”554 This account suggests that increasingly centralization
might be happening with respect to bureaucratic information and expertise—
centralization that would undermine some of the internal separation of
powers benefits the congressional bureaucracy brings.
3. More Mistakes and Gaps
There is now a higher expectation of errors and gaps. We were told by
several offices that, for Legislative Counsel, usually charged with cleaning up
statutes, unorthodox processes and timing now make it “harder to fix
problems in bills on the floor,” and that as a result, statutes may be more
“Delphic.”555 We were also told by OLRC that “as Congress has become
contentious . . . it’s hard to get [the law] passed” that would make technical
corrections after enactment. They added that departures from regular order
can get a bill passed but that they “come out messier and later in the
552 Staffer Interviews. Hearings and markups occurred before congressional committees, for
example, while debate over solutions occurred both in committee rooms and on the floor of
Congress.
553 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1, at 976-77.
554 Staffer Interview.
555 Id.
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session.”556 In the 114th Congress, we were told, 75% of the passed legislation
was passed at the end of the session. In addition, OLRC observed: “They can
throw things in omnibus bills; those bills tend to be more complicated, have
more errors. This has complicated things for us.”557
As one of us has previously detailed, the federal courts do not have a
clearly articulated doctrine of legislative mistakes.558 Instead, the courts have
an exceedingly harsh rule: effectively, that if the statutory language reads in
plain English, apply it as such. The courts mitigate this rule with case-by-case
exceptions meted out with little rhyme or reason apart from the fact that it is
most often high-stakes cases (e.g., the recent Affordable Care Act challenge
in King v. Burwell) that get the leniency.559 The lack of usable doctrine in this
area is a major gap, and the quality-enhancing effects of the bureaucracy
institutions notwithstanding, courts must develop a more rigorous and wellconsidered approach to legislative mistakes.
4. Highly Specific, Negotiated, Language Used to Clear Procedural Hurdles
On the other hand, and in some tension with our point about mistakes,
there may be a reason to give heightened weight to the particular words used
to clear procedural or budgetary hurdles and to consider text especially
carefully in the context of those procedural and budget rules. Our
interviewees strongly emphasized the very careful language-slicing that
occurs to bring bills with the desired procedural or budgetary goals.
One staffer compared this parsing of language to “slicing garlic with a
razor blade.”560 When it comes to procedures for reconciliation—the
procedural mechanism that avoids a filibuster—our interviewees emphasized
that, to get a bill within the rules: “[we] are ripping things out of [it] . . . [l]ike
weeds in a garden.”561
Anyone looking at such a law, they emphasized, has to “presume it’s not
just because you are pleasing a particular constituency; it’s about
reconciliation.”562 Any interpretation of the text that does not account for the
Id.
Id.
Gluck, supra note 10, at 99-102; cf. Cross, Staffer’s Error, supra note 1, at 121-122 (describing
how in King “[t]he Court essentially reviewed statutory text for a specific, particularly egregious
type of staffer error” of the type that would “undermine core statutory purpose—which is to say . . .
the basic goals that members of Congress would have entrusted to [the staffers]”).
559 Compare, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015) (reading likely erroneous
statutory language expansively in order to uphold statutory plan), with Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540
U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (holding Congress to its word despite a clear error in the bankruptcy code
because the statute could still be read intelligibly).
560 Staffer Interview.
561 Id.
562 Id.
556
557
558
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constraints of the reconciliation process, we were told, is considered a
misinterpretation of the law Congress tried to pass—plain and simple.563
OLRC’s work has changed in a different way. Unorthodox lawmaking has
made that Office’s job much more complex. Omnibus bills are the current
favorite vehicle for passing mega-legislative deals together, and, as such, they
bring together many different subjects. OLRC’s job is basically the opposite—
that is, to cohere the U.S. Code by subject matter. What OLRC must now do,
then, is effectively reverse-engineer Congress’s omnibus process. They told us:
“We are breaking up what they are bringing together.”564
5. Less Legislative History
JCT and Legislative Counsel emphasized the important legislative
materials that are often lost in the modern processes. Many omnibus bills
do not have legislative history at all, or they bring together previouslywritten, separate bills with legislative history that may be old and outdated.
JCT noted that, in particular, without the conference report “you lose an
important part of the legislative history, which can be a significant loss.”565
JCT also told us that unorthodox lawmaking consequently increases the
importance of the Blue Book—the influential summary of tax legislation
produced by JCT after statutes are enacted. The Blue Book takes on greater
significance in conveying congressional intent to agencies and the tax bar,
we were told, “when there is no regular order, because often there is no
conference report [or] committee report.”566 This is the case even though
the Blue Book has often “been more aggressively expansive [than]
legislative history”—it makes bigger statements.567
The House Parliamentarian’s Office similarly emphasized that legislative
history looks different now:
When looking to legislative history, there needs to be a modern look that
takes into account [the fact] that the process [on the House floor] is much
more structured [now]. The amendments and remarks need to be construed
using a modern lens . . . . [T]he amount of remarks on the floor that are
generated for purpose of legislative history has shrunk tremendously and
[these remarks are now] reserved to bills where there are likely to be
practitioners: judiciary committee, election law . . . . I don’t think the process

563 On highly specific language being used to clear procedural hurdles, see also Gould, supra
note 16, at 1971-73 (discussing the Byrd bath process).
564 Staffer Interview.
565 Id.
566 Id.
567 Id.
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is as static as some academics or judicial branch folks may have learned in
civics.568

6. More Visibility and Politicization
Unorthodox lawmaking is not solely about doing things behind closed
doors. It has actually elevated the visibility of some of the nonpartisan
institutions—as we have noted, not always in ways that are beneficial.
For the Senate Parliamentarian, resort to special procedures that get
around the filibuster and other hurdles has made a difference in the public
perception of the role. We were told: “The job is same as before, but it’s
gotten a higher profile and more personal largely because of the Byrd
rule . . . [and] fast track [procedures]. More light will be shone . . . where
expedited procedures have been written. And [they] have to make Solomonic
decisions here and there.”569 Budget reconciliation proceedings, it was
emphasized, “are very high profile, and criticized in the news . . . the Byrd
rule is the thing that makes Parliamentarians almost ‘Washington famous’
every few years based on decisions that [they’re] making about what is or isn’t
appropriate in reconciliation bills.”570
Just as CBO became more politicized once the importance of its reports
became more salient, the Parliamentarian becomes a divisive figure when
unorthodox processes put pressure on complex procedural workarounds.
C. What Does the Supreme Court Think About Unorthodox Lawmaking?
Congress is routinely disparaged and unorthodox lawmaking makes
Congress appear even less deliberative than it did before. Years ago, some
scholars had urged a theory of interpretation that considered whether
Congress had adequately deliberated—in former Oregon Supreme Court
Justice Hans Linde’s words, whether Congress had engaged in “due process
in lawmaking.”571 Until recently, courts had resisted any kind of direct
engagement with the question of how the seriousness of a statute’s legislative
process should affect how that statute is interpreted.572 As noted, the Court
has no coherent doctrine of statutory mistakes, and does not seem to want to
Id.
Id.; accord Gould, supra note 16.
Id.
Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 241 (1976).
By contrast, in the constitutional law context, Courts often scour the legislative record for
proof that Congress deliberated. See William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record
Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 109 (2001) (outlining the theory of legislative record review in the
constitutional law context); cf. Kwoka, supra note 563, at 97-98 (noting legislative record review not
based on accurate assumptions about legislative process).
568
569
570
571
572
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understand how aspects of the process—including the disappearance of
committee and conference reports—have changed.
The Court has just started to grapple with these issues, but has a long way
to go. The notable example is King v. Burwell, the 2015 challenge to the
Affordable Care Act’s insurance subsidies. Dealing with a likely
amalgamation error in the ACA—an ambiguity caused by the sloppy merger
of two different versions of the law without an opportunity for conference to
clean up errors—Chief Justice Roberts opined:
Congress wrote key parts of the Act behind closed doors, rather than through
“the traditional legislative process.” . . . And Congress passed much of the
Act using a complicated budgetary procedure known as “reconciliation” . . . .
As a result, the Act does not reflect the type of care and deliberation that one
might expect of such significant legislation.573

For all the Court’s salutary interest in Congress—this was the first time
the Supreme Court strove to bend interpretation to the realities of a statute’s
unusual legislative process—it largely got the story wrong. The ACA’s
unorthodox history was no parliamentary aberration; plenty of legislation had
gone through reconciliation before (and only a portion of the ACA went
through it). The statute also was exceedingly deliberated by a record-breaking
five congressional committees for two years (including hundreds of hours of
hearings). Legislative Counsel was intimately involved in the drafting. CBO
and JCT were constantly engaged on scoring and estimating. CRS and
MedPAC wrote numerous reports.574 It is true there was no conference, and
as such the opportunity for Legislative Counsel to correct errors was indeed
forgone. Arguably that means the final product was sloppy, but not necessarily
that the law was not carefully deliberated and reviewed along the way.
Studying the congressional bureaucracy substantiates the account that there
is a “new normal” when it comes to the legislative process; how courts account
for that has to be part of the project in statutory interpretation if the field is
to have a democratic link to Congress.
Finally, we note that, we did not hear from anyone that Congress is
eschewing congressional bureaucracy consultations due to unorthodox
lawmaking. But Congress could always pass rules requiring such consultation,
135 S.Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015).
See, e.g., JENNIFER STAMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40725, REQUIRING
INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2012); Hinda
Chaikind et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40942, Private Health Insurance Provisions in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) (2010). Compare MARCH 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS:
MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY, http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/march-2009-report-tocongress-medicare-payment-policy.pdf?sfvrsn=0 (last visited May 11, 2020) (proposing hospice
reforms) with the Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3132, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (hospice reforms).
573
574
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just as it has in requiring a CBO score.575 Congress could also develop a
practice of noting in the materials accompanying legislation which
bureaucracy institutions were in fact consulted—a practice that might assuage
some public concerns about the lack of deliberation in our lawmaking process.
At the same time, as we have noted throughout the Article, there are risks to
elevating the profile of the congressional bureaucracy—risks to the
institutions’ perceived neutrality and the lack of politicization around them.
Mandating use of the bureaucracy might introduce new pathologies into the
process, just as some have already argued that PAYGO has skewed the
drafting process by excessively elevating the importance of the CBO score.576
***
In the next and final Part of the Article, we offer more takeaways for
courts, both for purposes of statutory cases and for overarching
conceptualizations and assumptions about Congress’s rationality. Our aim in
this Part has not been to advocate for specific legislative reforms, or to
criticize unorthodox lawmaking, or to argue that courts should develop
doctrines to curtail it—as Hans Linde and others likely might have. Rather,
we have primarily aimed in this Part to show how courts’ assumptions about
lawmaking and the materials produced therein have changed, even as courts
have retained out-of-date assumptions about them; the congressional
bureaucracy’s modern experience corroborates earlier accounts of those
changes.
And of course, we want courts to notice the congressional bureaucracy.
American federal courts rarely cite to the institutions’ work. In the past
decade, the Supreme Court has cited only a handful of times to CBO (five),
the Legislative Counsel drafting manuals (two), GAO (two), and to CRS
(eleven).577 It has never cited to MedPAC, MACPAC, parliamentary rulings

575 Section 402 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, while not
framed as a rule binding on Congress, has a similar effect. It directs CBO to estimate the costs of
bills and resolutions approved by Congressional committees other than the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees, thereby cementing a default practice of soliciting CBO input.
576 See, e.g., John B. Wells, As It Applies to Veterans, It Is Time for Pay-Go to Go, THE HILL (Jan.
24, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/426773-as-it-applies-to-veterans-it-is-timefor-pay-go-to-go [https://perma.cc/EBF5-D65W].
577 See Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, _ S. Ct. _, at *19 (June 1,
2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing CRS report on Puerto Rico’s Current Fiscal Challenges);
Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1319 (2020) (citing GAO, Principles
of Federal Appropriations and referencing CBO score); Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S.
182, 203 (2012) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing GAO Principles of Federal Appropriations Law);
Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) (citing Legislative Counsel drafting manual): United
States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010) (citing Legislative Counsel drafting manual); cf. U.S. v.
Woods, 571 U.S. 31 (2013) (dismissing JCT’s “Blue Book” as relevant).
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or precedents, and cited only once, in 1975, to OLRC.578 The Courts of
Appeals have cited them more frequently: GAO (fifteen); CBO (twentyfour) CRS (eighty-four); OLRC (five); Parliamentarian (two); MedPAC
(five); JCT (twenty-four); and Legislative Counsel drafting manuals (eight).
The next and final Part offers more concrete doctrinal payoffs for courts.
IV. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS AND STATUTORY
“DECONSTRUCTION”
Is there a way to translate this Article’s findings to on-the-ground
statutory interpretation doctrine? Remember, the question is not whether to
ignore enacted text. Assume the text is always consulted first, but the question
is where to turn when the text runs out. Would looking more frequently to
the JCT’s report or revenue score, or considering Legislative Counsel’s
established drafting conventions, or the parliamentarian’s jurisdictional or
procedural rulings, or the CBO score, or GAO Red Book or its report that
prompted new legislation shed as much—if not more—light on textual
meaning than a dictionary or judicially crafted policy presumption?
Recall the presumptions currently in use. They range from presumptions
about language (e.g., it is not used redundantly) to presumptions about policy
that judges, not Congress, devise (e.g., the presumption that construes
statutory ambiguities in favor of Native American tribes, or in favor of
bankruptcy debtors, or in favor of arbitration, or extraterritorial application
of securities law, and scores more). Those judicially developed presumptions
reflect the normative choices of the courts that created and later perpetuated
and entrenched them. Which sources are more relevant and why?
This is a doctrinal legitimacy question. As Gluck’s work emphasizes, we
do not have to have statutory interpretation tethered to Congress. But if a
connection to Congress is going to be the justification—including through
policy presumptions the courts claim Congress knows or uses—then the
doctrines should be tethered. Many canons simply are not.
At least three possible paths forward present themselves. First, ignore the
congressional bureaucracy on the grounds that Congress does not act
collectively, or cannot be understood. We have already discussed how
Congress does indeed act collectively when it comes to the formally delegated
work of the congressional bureaucracy. Moreover, if Congress can never be
understood, then the answer is to move away entirely from a faithful-agent

578 Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 472 n.11 (1975) (referencing a point made “by the Law
Revision Counsel to the House subcommittee which held joint hearings on the revision to the
Judicial and Criminal Codes”).
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approach to a judicially centered one, not to continue what we have now.579
We will not devote further space to those arguments here.
Second, assuming some link to Congress is desired in at least some cases,
we can consider how to utilize the outputs of the congressional bureaucracy,
just as we utilize other outputs from Congress, like legislative history. In at
least some cases, the bureaucracy’s outputs may have more credibility than
legislative history because they are nonpartisan and ex ante approved by
Congress as a whole.
Third, we might draw some lines as to which aspects of the bureaucracy’s
work should be considered or consider some inputs as stronger than others,
just as we prioritize different kinds of legislative history and canons. For
instance, those inputs that are directly part of the legislative process—scoring,
parliamentary rules, Legislative Counsel drafting—might be considered more
relevant than reference materials like CRS reports.
Another place to draw a line might be at the vote. That is, perhaps postenactment work to organize and clean up the U.S. Code (OLRC) or explain
changes to the tax codes (JCT) should be discounted because Congress
votes before they happen. For those who take such an approach, the Statutes
at Large presumably should replace the U.S. Code as the source for federal
statutory law, especially for non-positive titles.
But we also want to suggest a more provocative reconceptualization of
“lawmaking” and the resulting statutory “text” that would include all the
inputs and processes Congress sets up for itself when it creates and puts in
motion its massive bureaucracy. Some of those inputs and processes are
indeed explicitly set up by Congress to occur after the vote. The
Constitution would seem to permit this: the text of Article I does not
specify the rules, procedures, positions, or offices to create a functional
legislature. Instead, it gives Congress the power to construct the
institutions it finds most useful, including the power to create and choose
its own officers, create its own rules, and use any necessary and proper
powers to execute its functions.580 The fruits of those efforts are evident in
Title 2 of the U.S. Code, where one finds the organic statutes for the
congressional bureaucracy.581
579 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1864-66 (1998).
580 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 5, 8; see also CHAFETZ, supra note 32, at 267 (“The ability
of each chamber to determine its own cameral rules can be thought of as its authority to create its
own constitution: the rules constitute it as a certain type of body with certain powers and procedures
for exercising those powers, as well as certain constraints on its powers.”).
581 2 U.S.C. § 166 et seq. (2018) (Congressional Research Service); 2 U.S.C. 281a et seq. (2018)
(House Office of the Legislative Counsel); 2 U.S.C. § 275 (2018) (Senate Office of the Legislative
Counsel); 2 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (2018) (Congressional Budget Office); 26 U.S.C. 8021 (2018) (Joint
Tax Committee); 2 U.S.C. § 287 et seq. (2018) (House Parliamentarian); 2 U.S.C. § 6531 et seq. (2018)
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We start with a discussion of these and other ways that the congressional
bureaucracy complicates the concept of “a statute.” We then introduce several
more specific potential doctrinal moves.
A. Deconstructing the Concept of “a Statute”
Perhaps the most provocative output of our study is how the various
duties of the congressional bureaucracy contribute to—and destabilize—our
common understanding of what a “statute” is.
Everyone knows that words must be understood in context, but the
context of legislative language is much more than the surrounding words on
the page. In fact, in many instances what we see when we pull up laws on
Westlaw is not the entirety of what Congress wrote or how Congress arranged
it at all. Lawmaking does not begin with the vote, and neither does it end
with it. Final text reflects, incorporates, and assumes the various inputs from
the bureaucracy, some of which are provided after enactment.
Statutory text is changed, reorganized, and reconceptualized by OLRC
after enactment—and also explained and interpreted by JCT at that time.
One of OLRC’s primary missions is to pull apart the individual texts that
Congress enacts and recombine and reorganize them with other texts
enacted at different times into coherent subject-matter areas. The OLRC
organic statute actually (and aptly) uses the term “restatement”—not faithful
reproduction but rational reorganization—to describe its work on positivelaw titles. The statute expressly calls the output a “revision” of the law—
another reference to an editorial function (in full: “complete compilation,
restatement, and revision”). Congress also expressly directs OLRC, in its
authorizing statute, to interpret its enacted language purposively, not
literally, in carrying out its codification tasks, even those tasks that occur
after the vote.582
Indeed, the JCT staff emphasizes the importance of “congressional
intent,” as reflected not only in the text but also in the revenue estimates, the
legislative history, and other explanatory materials that accompany tax
legislation. It thinks carefully about “what words should be in the statutes,
and what words should be in the legislative history,” but it does not view them
as of dramatically different importance.583
Congress structures itself across the board to think about law more as
“topics” or fields, than as individually coherent or consistent texts. The
(Secretary of the Senate, which includes Senate Parliamentarian); 2 U.S.C. § 285a (2018) (Office of
the Law Revision Counsel); 31 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. & 3511 et seq. (2018) (Government Accountability
Office).
582 2 U.S.C. 285b(2) (2018).
583 Staffer Interview.
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committee system, OLRC’s work to “restate” the Code into subject-matter
areas, and the division of the bureaucracy—including Legislative Counsel,
CRS, JCT, CBO, GAO—into staff that specializes within topics and not
across the entire Code all reflect this consistent congressional organizational
norm. The bureaucracy brings coherence to a subject-matter field but
affirmatively does not attempt to bring coherence across subjects. But that is
not how our dictionary-wielding, statutory-interpreting, whole-codecohering courts think about text.
Members focus only on broad policy brushstrokes. Staff, particularly
Legislative Counsel, is responsible for the textual language. To say, as
textualists do, that legislative history is especially unreliable because it is
written by staff and not members is to say that the entire U.S. Code is
unreliable: it is all produced by staff.
The entire process is iterative, with inputs from all of the bureaucracy.
The real work of the modern legislative process, and especially members’ role
in it, has more to do with figuring out large-scale policy for complicated
problems, not debating individual words and phrases. Two cheers to Chief
Justice Roberts in Burwell for seeing that, but no third cheer to the Court for
reverting to strict hyper-textualism in cases immediately afterward.584
What, then, is the “text?” Consider the Medicare statute. There is no
“text” of that statute. The “text” of the Medicare “law” is a concept—one made
up of many different statutory texts enacted over time. It is only the postenactment, multi-year custodial work of OLRC that creates the illusion of a
single, coherent text. They are the ones who take the original, thirty-six page
Medicare statute enacted in 1965,585 along with the thousands of laws
amending this original statute, and transform them into a single 1,183 page
tome.586 However, this is simply their best guess at how to assemble a “text” of
“Medicare law.” So is anyone else’s attempt to assemble that “text.” This is
true of any law that has been amended—positive or non-positive law.
Statutory law’s complexity—all of these layers—may be its modern
defining feature. And yet courts place great weight on the structure of those
584 See Lockhart v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 958, 964-66 (2016) (majority and dissenting
opinions based on grammar canons). For contrasts of Burwell and Lockhart, see Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 86 (2017); Abbe
R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism
Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2072-76 (2017) (comparing interpretive methodology in
both cases).
585 Even the original statute was actually just an amendment of an older text, the Social
Security Act.
586 Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, as amended through Pub. L. No. 115-271 (Oct. 24,
2018),
https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Social%20Security%20ActTITLE%20XVIII(Health%20Insurance%20for%20The%20Aged%20and%20Disabled).pdf
[https://perma.cc/D4E9-NAWM].
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“laws” as they appear in the U.S. Code, as if each law was birthed with its
final structure. Not so. Understanding the bureaucracy helps to reveal this.
Getting more granular, a statute that is parsed “like slicing garlic with a
razor blade” to get the Parliamentarian to refer it to the jurisdiction of a
certain committee incorporates an understanding of what subjects that statute
is supposed to cover, because each committee only has jurisdiction over
certain subjects.587 A statute that is repeatedly amended to get within a
revenue or budget score incorporates the assumptions of those estimates.
Statutes drafted with purpose clauses that no longer appear in the Code
because OLRC moves purpose clauses to small side notes does not make
those statutes less purposive and it does not erase the fact that Congress
actually enacted purpose into statutory text in the first place. Should textualist
courts ignore this?
To understand that Legislative Counsel drafts only operative statutory
text, and never legislative history except in the case of some explanatory
statements for conference reports (detailing differences between House and
Senate versions of bills and how they are resolved) and some appropriations
legislative history, is to understand such history carries special operative
weight—and is more akin to enacted text than legislative history—inside
Congress. Many judges do give extra weight to conference reports, but the
special weight for some appropriations legislative history that is produced by
Congress’s own practices thus far has been ignored by courts.588
On the other hand, it is interesting that Legislative Counsel typically does
not draft those enacted purpose clauses—and disproves of enacting nonoperative text (that is, text without specific mandates). OLRC marginalizes
those materials too. But the partisan policy staff puts those materials in. What
does that tell us about the weight they should be given?
This is complicated, and one has to be honest in evaluating this evidence.
It is not that all of it is unequivocally clear or that all unequivocally points in

587 See supra note 560. The Gluck–Bressman study likewise showed that committee jurisdiction
is a strong proxy for which agency—the one under the committee with jurisdiction—is a statute’s
primary delegate. This is not to say that staff might not sometimes try to enlarge jurisdiction with
statutory language, but if we are focusing on collective rather than subjective, individual decisionmaking, then the focus belongs at the objective, transparent, institutional level.
588 See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191 (1978) (“Appropriation Committees have expressly
stated their ‘understanding’ that the earlier legislation would not prohibit the proposed expenditure.
We cannot accept such a proposition.”); see also Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 J. L.
& CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669, 688-89 (2005) (describing that the Court’s “appropriations canon
rest[s] on a series of controversial assumptions”). Legislative Counsel also will draft motions when
those motions operate as an amendment to bill text (e.g., a motion to recommit that instructs a
committee to report back a bill with a specific amendment made to its text).
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the direction of “use it!” But this evidence, no matter how one slices it, is
much more tethered to the legislative process than what courts use now.
B. What You Think Is the “Statute” Is Not; OLRC As a Deeper Example
The best way to fully understand our point about deconstructing “text” is
through a detailed example. Due to the post-enactment nature of OLRC’s
work, the formidable role it plays in shaping the language as it appears in the
U.S. Code, and how courts—and, to our surprise, many partisan staff inside
Congress—simply do not understand what OLRC does or how it affects text,
we use it as our illustration.589 As we have emphasized, OLRC has broad,
widely unknown, statutory mandates to rearrange federal law for various
ends. For codification bills it also is charged to “remove ambiguities,
contradictions, and other imperfections both of substance and of form.”590
1. When You Open the U.S Code You Only See About Half of Enacted
Statutory Law
For starters, there is the often-overlooked distinction in federal law
between the “positive law” and “non-positive law” titles of the U.S. Code.591
Positive law titles are arranged and edited by OLRC and then formally
enacted as titles of the U.S. Code by Congress, which is also supposed to
repeal the various underlying statutes collected therein at the same time.592
By contrast, a non-positive law title of the Code has still been arranged and
edited by OLRC (or OLRC working with a title previously organized), but
the newly arranged title does not go through this bicameralism-andpresentment process (the underlying statutes, of course, did previously).593
In codifying titles, and in publishing both positive and non-positive law
titles, OLRC makes consequential determinations that affect what we
understand as the statute’s “text.” First, OLRC’s statutory mandate is to

589 Gluck, supra note 1, at 208-09, argued several years ago that courts have ignored OLRC’s
work. Tobias Dorsey previously offered a pair of important meditations on the Code, with the the
principal thrust of reminding readers that the Statutes at Large provide a truer source of law than
the non-positive titles. See Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates and the Statutes We Threw
Away, 18 GREEN BAG 377 (2015); Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading the Statutes, 10
GREEN BAG 283 (2007);. A new project, Shobe, supra note 16, offers extremely valuable and detailed
descriptions of OLRC’s functions. See infra note 642 and accompanying text for our disagreement
with some of his conclusions. Shawn Nevers and Julie Graves Krishnaswami, The Shadow Code, 112
L. LIBR. J. (forthcoming 2020), is a terrific descriptive account.
590 2 U.S.C. § 285b(1) (2018).
591 See Shobe, supra note 16, at 4-5; see also Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589.
592 Positive Law Codification, supra note 135 (noting that “the original enactments are repealed”).
593 Id. (“A non-positive law title of the Code is an editorial compilation of Federal statutes.”).
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codify only “general and permanent” laws.594 OLRC deems some important
provisions to be nonpermanent, such as most appropriations riders and many
pilot/demonstration projects. Those are not codified at all. Second, OLRC
often moves ancillary or nonoperative provisions (provisions that do not
directly command) into statutory notes—a practice that has resulted in
OLRC moving more than half of the words in the U.S. Code into statutory
notes.595 That is, notes not visible when one pulls up a page of the Code on
Westlaw or Lexis.
OLRC regularly moves not only preambles and purpose clauses into notes
but also effective dates, and sometimes even severability clauses and other
provisions.596 OLRC emphasizes that those provisions in the notes or omitted
from the Code as temporary are still law. Our point is that lawyers often miss,
or misunderstand them.
These decisions involve considerable discretion. Take the example of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, the authorizing statute of which
required a statutory repeal of the law to occur in 2003.597 That repeal
eventually was undone by Congress in 2018598—but between 2003 and 2018,
the Office continued to exist (and be funded), even though it had no statutory
authorization.599 OLRC deemed the office permanent during that interim
period—and consequently its statutory authorization was above-the-line in
the U.S. Code despite being repealed.
A different example, and one that also illustrates the kind of judgment
calls OLRC has to make, is the Hyde Amendment, an influential
appropriations rider, which bars the use of federal funds to pay for abortions,
and which is re-enacted every year. Per OLRC’s judgment, the Hyde
amendment does appear in the U.S. Code, because it is consistently reenacted.600 On the other hand, an appropriations rider—again, part of an
enacted statute—that defunded part of the Affordable Care Act in 2014, and

594 See 2 U.S.C. 285b(1) (2018) (directing OLRC to prepare “a complete compilation,
restatement, and revision of the general and permanent laws of the United States”).
595 Harlan Ming-Tun Yu, Designing Software to Shape Open Government Policy, at 90 (Sept.
2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with authors).
596 The terms nonoperative and ancillary are ours, not those of OLRC. For effective dates and
severability clauses, this placement also often results from these provisions applying to amendments
made to scattered provisions in the main text of the Code, but (unlike the amendments themselves)
without any explicit instruction to modify the Code text. For a detailed explanation of how OLRC
makes these determinations, see Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589.
597 Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
§ 715, 112 Stat. 2681.
598 SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 8202(b)(2), 132 Stat.
3894 (2018).
599 Staffer Interview.
600 See 10 U.S.C. 1093 (2018).
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even became the subject of a Supreme Court case, does not.601 When we look
at the Code, we only see part of enacted statutory law.
Jarrod Shobe insightfully has posited that OLRC’s editing work in
pushing prefatory and purposes language to the sidelines makes the Code
look less purposive than it really is and gives courts more leeway to ignore
congressional intent than they might otherwise.602
Even lawyers well versed in statutory research are likely to be surprised by
how much of enacted law is now in notes. It has been calculated that 50 percent
of the statutory text of the enacted laws of the United States are in the notes—that is,
not in the main text of the U.S. Code.603 Shawn Nevers and Julie Graves
Krishnaswami found that the Code contains a staggering 32,424 notes in total.604
As an exercise, assume a hospital general counsel is searching for her
hospital’s Medicare payment amounts. Searching for “hospital Medicare
payment” on Lexis or Westlaw would bring up 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww,
“Payments to hospitals for inpatient hospital services,” and the familiarlooking text of that section of the U.S. Code, as Figure 1 shows.

601 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235,
§227, 128 Stat. 2130, 2491; Me. Community Health Options v. United States, No. 18-1023 (S. Ct.
Apr. 27, 2020) (holding Congress could not repeal in appropriations rider payment promised to
insurers in text of ACA).
602 Jarrod Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 669 (2019).
603 Yu, supra note 595.
604 Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589.
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Figure 1

The text goes on for dozens of pages, but the counsel will not find
anything about payment amounts for her particular hospital’s classification
unless she takes the additional step to “read below the line,” and scroll through
to Lexis’s “Annotations” Section (which comes after the source notes), as
Figure 2 shows.
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Figure 2

Once in the Annotations, the general counsel would still need to scroll
through dozens of pages of other notes—amendment histories, OLRC
editorial explanations, effective dates, and rules of construction—before she
would find this provision, “Application § 15008(a) of Act Dec. 13, 2016”, as
Figure 3 shows.
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Figure 3

This is where the correct payment calculation for her hospital’s Medicare
classification is found—duly enacted statutory text, but far outside the
bounds of the “law” as displayed in the U.S. Code, and buried beneath more
than one hundred pages of other material.
Westlaw does not even display statutory notes on the landing page for each U.S.
Code section.605 To even know whether there were notes of relevance, the
attorney would have had to affirmatively navigate a drop-down menu (first
the “History” tab and then the “Editor’s and Revisor’s Notes” tab), then scroll
through the dozens of pages before the “Effective and Applicability
Provisions,” which contain the relevant provisions of law, would appear.
These payment policies were passed by bicameralism and presentment
along with the rest of the statute, and carry the full force of the law, yet they
605 Nevers and Krishnaswami similarly note that Westlaw’s display of notes is even more
problematic than that of its competitors. See Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589, at 34
(describing how “Westlaw is the only major legal research provider that breaks the mold [in its
presentation of notes], but not in a good way”).
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are nowhere to be found in the “text” of the law as encountered by most
practitioners and judges.
OLRC sometimes even inserts entire laws into statutory notes—so they
do not appear as “law” at all to the uninformed when a title is pulled up on
Westlaw.606 This often occurs when Congress enacts a freestanding law that
relates, in terms of subject matter, to a topic within a codified (positive law)
title. If Congress does not amend a codified title directly—an error that
happens with relative frequency—the new freestanding law cannot simply
be added to it.607 But OLRC wants to group like subjects together, so it
appends the new law as a note to the codified title for subject-matter
coherence. Westlaw and Lexis then make those notes not visible to the
average researcher.
The Wounded Warrior Project is an example of this problem.608 It was
enacted as a freestanding law, but it was related to the topic of medical care
for the armed services—a topic within Title 10, a positive law title. Because
the bill that passed as law did not explicitly amend Title 10, but rather was
drafted as freestanding new law, OLRC was forced to locate the program
wholly in a statutory note under that title.609 Nevers and Graves identify
many other examples.610
Through the use of these notes, OLRC manages to keep seemingly similar
subject-matters grouped together in the Code, while also keeping Congress’s
enacted, positive law intact. It accomplishes this at the cost of accessibility,
however, as lawyers and judges easily overlook these out-of-the-way
provisions.611 Some nonexpert lawyers even dispute whether these outsidethe-code provisions are “equal laws” to those OLRC puts above the line.
This accessibility problem is significant enough that actors within
Congress—in particular, in Legislative Counsel—have sometimes tried to
devise their own creative workarounds, both to overcome this problem for
themselves and to assist outside interpreters (although we would note here
that failure to draft a particular law properly into the Code in the first place
606 Accord id. at 34 (“When presented with a U.S. Code section . . . . in Westlaw, there is no
indication on the face of the page that statutory notes even exist).
607 This is because codified titles are positive law; Congress enacts them like statutes, in
codification bills that simultaneously repeal the underlying public laws.
608 Shobe, supra note 16, at 34, uses it as well.
609 10 U.S.C. § 1071 note (2018).
610 See Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589, at 24 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(2012), the Torture Victim Protection Act, which is placed in its entirety in a statutory note); id. at
16 (citing Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), the First Step Act, recent criminal justice
legislation which includes provisions regarding reports, appropriations, statutory construction,
faith-based considerations, data collection, and a provision requiring the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons to make feminine hygiene products available to prisoners for free, that did not explicitly
amend Title 18 and so are placed in the notes even as the rest of the law is in Title 18).
611 See Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589.
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might have been the responsibility of Legislative Counsel itself). We were
told of attorneys in Legislative Counsel who, at times, maintained personal
collections of slip laws to assist in the ongoing challenge of locating provisions
that OLRC excludes or relocates. We also were told of attorneys in that office
adopting creative drafting techniques, such as inserting effective dates
directly into the language of operative statutory rules, in an effort to tie
OLRC’s hands and require them to include such dates in main text of the
Code.612
Ironically, a big part of the resulting transparency problem comes from
relying on commercial providers like Westlaw and Lexis and the systems they
design. Recall that OLRC itself was founded in part because Congress feared
such reliance on outside compilers, namely West Publishing.
As Nevers and Graves Krishnaswami additionally note, the fact that
Westlaw places the editorial notes—which are explanations provided by
OLRC about the statute’s history, references, amendments and other matters
but are not actual law—together with the statutory notes, which are indeed law,
“with no clear distinction, makes it difficult for researchers to find statutory
notes or to understand their importance.”613 We have begun an effort to have
Westlaw and Lexis address this problem.
Congress’s own work-product makes statutory notes more accessible than
do commercial databases—the printed U.S. Code lists the notes in the side
margins. The official Code website lists them as searchable text beneath the
relevant codified provisions. Even so, where there are rules of construction
or other notes that apply to more than one section, a reader just clicking one
tab is unlikely to see them,614 because they are listed too far from the relevant
provisions with no indication that the reader should look for them. To the
uninitiated, even when found, they still appear to be of subordinate status to
the Code’s “text” and thereby similarly invite confusion and
misinterpretation.615
612 Today, House Legislative Counsel also maintains its own internal, continually-updated
collection of the major statutes that are in non-positive law, so that it can view these statutes with
subsequent amendments added but without the other editorial alterations made by OLRC. See
Statute Compilations—Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/comps (last visited May 11, 2020) (providing “frequently
requested compilations of . . . public laws”).
613 Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589, at 30.
614 For example, the relevant rule of construction for Yates appears in the Front Matter to title
18 (before section 1 of the title), and the relevant provisions appeared hundreds of pages later in
sections 1512(c) and 1519 (which are found in Part I and Chapter 73 of the title, which each have their
own “Front Matter” sections). See Title 18 of United States Code, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION
COUNSEL, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18&edition=prelim (accessed
June 8, 2020).
615 Underscoring this risk, Nevers and Graves Krishnaswami note a 2003 case in which the 11th
Circuit was required to correct the district court’s mistaken conception that statutory notes were of
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2. Text Is Added, Edited, and Rearranged After Enactment
In deciding the breadth of each topic that it will reorganize into a title for
codification, OLRC is statutorily directed to capture the presumed intent
(specifically, “the understood policy, intent, and purpose”) of Congress—
including by modifying statutory language.616 An interviewee said: “The idea
is to carry forward the precise meaning and effect without any change [in that
meaning] . . . but [also] to make any adjustments to make it easier to
understand and to navigate, to correct technical errors, and to resolve
ambiguities.”617
The changes that are made as a result to enacted text may surprise not
only outsiders. Even most of the partisan staffers we interviewed, many of
whom have worked in Congress for a long time, had no knowledge of OLRC’s
editorial work.618 In combining, reorganizing, and restructuring statutes into
new subject-matter documents—whether for a new codification bill or to
arrange a non-positive title—OLRC determines statutory structure, and it
inserts cross references, subtitle divisions, and headings.619 In codification
bills, it sometimes even adds new textual provisions, like definitions(!). We
see all those items when we look at the Code, and courts derive much meaning
from them—where a provision is placed, what provisions it is near, what the
title of the section is, and so on.
For example, OLRC may insert what it calls a “no source” provision into
a new positive title that it is preparing for Congress. A “no source” provision
is one that did not exist in any congressionally enacted law, but that OLRC creates
out of whole cloth.620 For example, if OLRC concludes that a new defined
term will help it more easily articulate the policies that it is assembling in the
title, it may insert a new definition into the title, and then use this newly
defined term throughout the title.621 In the chapter of title 46 labeled
“Liability of Water Carriers,” for example, the very concept of a “carrier” is a
lesser authority. See Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589, at 15 (discussing Schwier v.
Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003)). It additionally was suggested to us that Legislative
Counsel might consider releasing the compiled statutes that it now publishes as PDFs, see supra
note 612, in a format that outside companies could readily use and adapt (known as “USLM” format,
which OLRC already uses). Email from Former Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Jan. 26, 2020)
(on file with authors).
616 2 U.S.C. 285b(1) (2018).
617 Staffer Interview.
618 None of the partisan staff we interviewed for the article was familiar with these details of
OLRC’s work.
619 Staffer Interviews.
620 Staffer Interview.
621 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 9101 (2018) (noting no-source provision defining “Government
corporation”); 51 USC §10101(2) (2018) (providing no-source provision defining the “Administrator”
of NASA).
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defined term added by OLRC in a “no source” provision (the term that
indicates OLRC created it).622 While these the Revision Notes flag those
provisions as having no source, those notes are hard to find and do not appear
in the main text—whereas the “no source” provisions themselves do appear
in the main text of the Code unflagged, just like provisions that Congress
actually had enacted in prior law. “In a positive law codification bill,” an
interviewee reported, “we create these definition sections pretty
frequently.”623
The Westlaw version of this title 46 “carrier” definition is shown below.
Figure 4 shows the definition as it appears in the main text of the Code, where
it looks like any other provision—no indication is given that the definition
was added via an OLRC-drafted “no source” provision. As Figure 5 shows, it
is only when the reader selects the “History” tab (flagged with a yellow arrow)
and selects “Editor’s and Revisor’s Notes” from that drop-down tab menu
that one encounters the table and explanation where OLRC identifies these
as “no source” provisions (also flagged with yellow arrows); Westlaw’s mere
“no source” heading does not explain for the initiated what that means.
Figure 4

622 46 U.S.C. 30701 (2018) (definition of “carrier”). Explaining the insertion, OLRC wrote in
the notes: “A definition of ‘carrier’ is added based on language appearing in various provisions of
the Harter Act. The definition avoids the need to repeat in various sections of this chapter the list
of persons to whom the requirements and restrictions of this chapter apply, and it ensures that the
list of persons is consistent in the chapter.” Id.
623 Staffer interview.
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Figure 5

OLRC also exercises its editorial discretion by formulating novel
provisions to clarify what otherwise might only be implicit. Consider, again,
Title 10, which contains a chapter entitled “Retirement of Warrant Officers
for Length of Service.”624 This chapter contains three provisions. Under
section 1293, it authorizes the Secretary to retire a warrant officer (upon their
request) after twenty years of creditable active service, and under Section
1305, it provides that warrant officers shall be retired after thirty years of
service (with some exceptions).625 These Sections, codifiers believed, implied
that warrant officers would receive retired pay (e.g., by discussing eligibility
for such pay).626 However, Sections 1293 and 1305 never made that
entitlement explicit. Consequently, in preparing Title 10 for codification in
1956,627 codifiers at that time (predecessors to OLRC) created a “no source”
provision to be added to the chapter: Section 1315, which would “make explicit
the entitlement to retired pay upon retirement” for warrant officers under the
chapter.628 It remains that way today.
When Congress passes the codification bill it effectively blesses these edits
and changes. As formal matter, they are enacted by Congress. But they are
10 U.S.C. ch. 65 (2018).
10 U.S.C. §§ 1293, 1305 (2018).
See 10 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (describing provision as added to “make explicit” the
entitlement).
627 Title 10 and Title 32, United States Code, Pub. L. No. 84-1028 (Aug. 10, 1956), available at
https://uscode.house.gov/codification/2Stat_at_Large_Title10andTitle32.pdf.
628 10 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018).
624
625
626
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certainly much further removed from the core legislative process—in Justice
Scalia’s terms, much more the product of staff—than many other materials
courts eschew. The point is not that OLRC is acting ultra vires or secretively.
OLRC actively solicits input from key staff, administrative agencies, and
academics for its codification bills, but it is difficult to find evidence that many
members and even most staff pay much attention to them.
Looking to the legislative histories of the past five codification bills that
have been passed, no committee hearings were held; all passed the Senate by
unanimous consent and the House by voice vote, except for two recorded votes
of 409-0 and 385-0. The sponsors of these bills consistently emphasize that they
make no substantive change in existing law and that there has been a comment
process that includes the agencies. These bills were rarely amended, and when
they were, it was to make technical corrections or to incorporate revisions
arising out of the OLRC review and comment process.629

629 For example, for the most recent codification bill, 113 H.R. 1068 (12/19/2014 Became Public
Law No. 113-287), To enact title 54, United States Code, “National Park Service and Related
Programs”, as positive law, the bill passed the House on a motion to suspend the rules to pass the
bill and passed the Senate without amendment by unanimous consent. Representative Bob
Goodlatte introduced the bill stating, “The bill was prepared in accordance with the statutory
standard for codification legislation, which is that the restatement shall conform to the understood
policy, intent, and purpose of Congress in the original enactments, with such amendments and
corrections as will remove ambiguities, contradictions, and other imperfections.” 159 CONG. REC.
H2228 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2013) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte). Representative Bass spoke in support
of the bill as well, referring to it as a “commonsense, noncontroversial bill that enjoys strong
bipartisan support.” Id. For similar elements in the title 41 codification, see Markup of H.R. 1107, To
Enact Certain Laws Relating to Public Contracts as Title 41, United States Code, “Public Contracts”; H.R.
1139, the “COPS Improvements Act o” 2009”; and H.R. 1575, “The End GREED Act”, 111th Cong. 4445 (2009) (statement of Rep. Lofgren, H. Comm on Judiciary) (Rep. Lofgren thanking the sponsors
for doing this “unglamorous work; but it is necessary”). The bill was reported without amendments.
Similarly, at the markup session of a previous version of the bill, Representative Bobby Scott gave
an opening statement and stated, “We have a waiting period after introduction so that the bill could
be reviewed by the relevant federal agencies, congressional committees and practitioners.” There
were no further comments on the bill. Hearing To Consider a Resolution and Report Finding Karl Rove
in Contempt for Failure To Appear Pursuant to Subpoena and Recommending to the House of Representatives
That Mr. Rove Be Cited for Contempt of Congress; and Markup of . . . H.R. 4779, To Enact Certain Laws
Relating to Public Contracts as Title 41, United States Code, “Public Contracts,” 110th Cong. 198 (2008)
(statement of Rep. Bobby Scott, H. Comm on Judiciary); 156 CONG. REC. H104 (daily ed. Jan. 13,
2010) (statement of Rep. Smith).(“H.R. 3237 and similar law revision bills are important because
they ensure that the U.S. Code is up to date and accurate, without making substantive changes to
the law.”). On title 46 codification, see 150 Cong. Rec. H7,654 (daily ed. Sep. 28, 2004) (statement
of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that it had been circulated by OLRC to interested parties and
congressional committees, that the Federal Maritime Commission and Department of
Transportation had provided extensive comments, and that “Members should understand that
because of the nature of this bill, supporting it does not imply support of the underlying provisions
that are being reorganized and cleaned up”).
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3. Yates v. United States—A Legislation Chestnut Misunderstood
With respect to how OLRC reorganizes statutory text and the weight
courts give such actions, a prominent recent example is Yates v. United
States630—already a legislation-course chestnut for its memorable fact pattern
(is a fish a “tangible object” for purposes of the evidence destruction
provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act?) and its dueling textualist opinions by
liberal Justices Ginsburg and Kagan. Writing for the plurality, Justice
Ginsburg emphasized the provision’s Code placement, noting that it sat
alongside rules for specific kinds of evidence, not generally-applicable
prohibitions.631 By focusing on this issue, as commentators have noted, the
plurality overlooked a rule of construction for Title 18 prohibiting considering
placement as evidence of meaning—a rule added by the codifiers themselves
to flag that they arranged the title.632 Of course, the rule was voted on by
Congress when it approved the codification bill. The plurality likely missed
the rule because OLRC had relegated it to the Code’s notes.633
Both sides’ textual analyses also fall short in other ways in light of our
knowledge of the enactment process. Take the Court’s use of the “same
Act”/“whole act” canons. Interpreting Sections 1512(c) and 1519 of the federal
criminal code, the plurality applied a heightened rule against redundancy,634
and the dissent applied a heightened rule of consistent usage,635 both of which
apply specifically to provisions passed in the same Act. Sections 1512(c) and
1519 both were enacted as part of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, so these
rules were assumed to apply.
However, both Justices missed a relevant piece of Sarbanes–Oxley: the
titles that added sections 1512(c) and 1519 had “short titles” labeling each a
separate “Act.”636 (Short titles, too, are moved into notes in the Code,

574 U.S. 528 (2015).
Id. at 1077 (arguing that “[s]ection 1519’s position within Chapter 73 of Title 18 further
signals that § 1519 was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the destruction of physical
evidence of every kind”).
632 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, Pub. L. No. 772, § 19, 62 Stat. 862.
633 See Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates, supra note 589, at 386 (“I simply observe that while a
congressional instruction on how to interpret title 18 exists, no one mentioned it (and everyone
violated it).”); Daniel B. Listwa, Uncovering the Codifier’s Canon: How Codification Informs
Interpretation, 127 YALE L.J. 464, 474 (2017) (same); Shobe, supra note 16, at 45 (same).
634 See 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1085 (noting that canon applies to sections “passed in proximity as part
of the same Act”); see also id. (emphasizing the “contemporaneous passage” of the two provisions).
635 See id. at 1096 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing that canon applies “identical words used
in different parts of the same act”) (quoting Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 (1986)).
The dissent does at least also contemplate a belt-and-suspenders interpretation. Id.
636 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 801, 116 Stat. 745 (“This title may be
cited as the ‘Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002’.”); id. at § 1101 (“This title
may be cited as the ‘Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002’.”).
630
631
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making them easy to miss.)637 As the House Legislative Counsel’s drafting
manual specifies, provisions are labeled as separate short “Acts” specifically
to signal that, rather than being drafted together, they were assembled by
cobbling together separate, previously-drafted bills.638 This means that
Sections 1512(c) and 1519 were drafted with a dual blindness to each other—
each was drafted when the other was neither in the same bill nor in alreadyenacted law, making it impossible for drafters to account for the other.639
Absent evidence that these provisions were then modified to fit together, it
makes no sense to interpret them via the “same Act” / “whole act” canons,
which assume that neighboring provisions are drafted with each other in
mind.640 If anything, a lessened rule of redundancy and consistency—not a
heightened one—makes sense in this instance. The plain statutory language
of Sarbanes–Oxley, understood in the light of Congress’s operations,
therefore reveals that the Court’s application of its “same Act” canons to
Sections 1512(c) and 1519 was misguided—at least, to a reader who knows:
(1) to look at statutory notes; and (2) to interpret in light of published
Legislative Counsel drafting practices. Others have produced the same
conclusion about these provisions using legislative history; our point is that
these more objective inputs from the congressional bureaucracy’s own exante-defined rules are as instructive and can be easier to apply.641
637 See 18 U.S.C. 1501 note (2018) (short title for title VIII); 15 U.S.C. 78a note (2018) (short
title for title XI).
638 THE OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE 26-27 (1995),
https://www.llsdc.org/assets/sourcebook/manual_on_drafting_style.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LAA5W6H] (explaining that, while “[t]he practice of providing a short title for each title . . . generally
should be avoided,” congressional drafters make exceptions “[i]n cases of omnibus bills . . . that
consist of proposals that had been . . . separate legislation.”). The drafting manual cites only one
other instance where such short titles may be appropriate—one not applicable to Sarbanes-Oxley.
See id. (appropriate when full Act’s short title misrepresents provision’s contents).
639 Sure enough, this explanation proves correct for sections 1512(c) and 1519. On July 10, 2002,
Senator Leahy proposed an amendment to Sarbanes–Oxley that contained the new Section 1519,
and that was a repackaged version of companion bills previously introduced by Senator Leahy and
Representative Conyers. See S.Amdt. 4185 to S.2673, 107th Cong. (2002) (Leahy amendment); 107
Cong. Rec. S6578 (2002) (same); S. 2010, § 2, 107th Cong. (2002) (earlier Senate companion); H.R.
4098, § 2, 107th Cong. (2002) (earlier House companion). Also on July 10, an administration-crafted
package of amendments containing the new section 1512(c) was proposed by Senator Lott and
adopted (with a companion bill introduced shortly thereafter in the House). See S.Amdt. 4188, 107th
Cong. (2002) (Lott amendment); 107 Cong. Rec. S6542 (2002) (same); H.R. 5118, § 3, 107th Cong.
(2002) (House companion).
640 Moreover, the short titles for sections adding 1512(c) and 1519 are nearly identical,
suggesting some overlap in content and thereby further heightening the concern for redundancy.
Compare § 801 (giving title VIII the short title, “Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act
of 2002”); with § 1101 (giving title XI the short title, “Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002”).
641 The legislative history thereby confirms the lesson from statutory text. Senator Leahy
proposed the amendment that added the new 1519, and Senator Lott the amendment with the new
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We recognize this feels like inside baseball. And courts could easily
articulate other reasons for applying consistency rules to statutes—like public
notice—reasons that would openly acknowledge “this might not be what
Congress intended.” But instead, we have courts doing the kind of closereading and statutory-parsing, including deep dives into statutory history,
grammar, and word meaning, that the Yates Court performed.
Opinions like Yates are not easy public meaning opinions, as textualists
would have us believe; rather they are textual detective missions to figure out
what Congress meant. Congress’s own conventions are uniquely importantly
to any such mission and are no less text-tethered than some of the Court’s
own tools.
4. Positive v. Nonpositive Law
To be sure, in the case of codified titles, Congress formally votes on the
title and structure when it votes to approve the codification bill. But that
distinction gives too much credit to the kind of vetting it is assumed Congress
does in the process of codification. We disagree with Shobe that enactment
or nonenactment makes a dramatic difference in how little weight should be
given to Code placement in statutory interpretation; this distinction only
makes sense for pure formalists, not for anyone focused on linking statutory
construction to what Congress actually meant. Far more reliance on “staff ”
happens in this context than in other contexts, like committee reports, that
judges who mistrust staff are not willing to consider. As OLRC told us, there
is “no political will” for its work, and in fact Congress has not taken up a
codification bill in more than 5 years.642 In reality, it is OLRC that edits,
reorganizes, and adds to both positive and nonpositive law.
As another indication, OLRC sometimes also drafts rules of construction,
(OLRC’s predecessor codifiers drafted the one at issue in Yates), to instruct
courts not to rely on its work—for instance not to rely on organization of the
title—as evidence of congressional intent, but the courts tend to overlook
those provisions or not even realize they were added after the initial public
law was enacted, in the codification process.643
1512(c), which had ties to the administration. There is some floor debate about potential overlap, but
changes were not made to the text. Having both in there was part of the compromise. See WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK, & VICTORIA F. NOURSE, STATUTES, INTERPRETATION, AND
REGULATION 127-29 (Supp. 2020) (explaining how these conclusions can be drawn both from
bureaucracy’s inputs and from legislative history).
642 Staffer Interview. The most recent enactment was Title 54, National Park Service and
Related Programs, in 2014. See Pub. L. 113-287. For the current status of codification bills that OLRC
has prepared for Congress, see Positive Law Codification, supra note 135.
643 See Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates, supra note 589, at 379 (stating that section 5600 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States of American included a provision that “no inference or
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OLRC does flag the significant changes that it has made, via historical
and revision notes, disposition tables, and data tables.644 But, again, they
are difficult to locate on third-party sites and appear in the sidebar of the
paper book.
For non-positive law titles—the ones OLRC arranges for the Code (like
Title 42, which includes the Civil Rights Act) but that Congress has not
blessed by enacting into positive law—the current leadership of OLRC told
us that it is their practice not to change text or add new provisions like
definitions.645 Even in those titles, however, OLRC will rearrange provisions,
add headings, and modify cross-references.
For an example, consider sections 3 and 4 of the Robinson-Patman
Antidiscrimination Act. They are found in Title 15, a non-positive title, but
codifiers have renumbered, rearranged, and modified cross-references and
section headings.646 Figure 6 presents these sections as they appear in the
Statutes at Large. Figure 7 then shows those sections in the Code on the
OLRC website. In each Figure, the relevant provisions are identified by a
yellow box. Notice that the Code provisions have been renumbered, given
section titles, and relocated between provisions from 1914 and 1938 (as flagged
with red arrows). Additionally, note that these Code provisions appear in a
Code chapter entitled “Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade”
and a title labeled “Commerce and Trade”—labels not in the original statute.

presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the Title, under which any
particular section is placed”).
644 Positive Law Codification, supra note 135 (discussing the preparation of these items and
their inclusion in the Code).
645 Nevers and Krishnaswami refer to this as OLRC’s preference for “act-code coherence”––
an approach that, as they observe, increases use of statutory notes in non-positive titles. See Nevers
& Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589, at 19 (explaining this “principle of act-code coherence”).
646 Compare Act of Aug. 27, 1894, § 76, 28 Stat. 570, Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No.
63-212, §§ 2-3, 38 Stat. 730, and Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, §§ 1-4, 49 Stat. 1526 with
15 U.S.C. § 11-14 (2018) (reorganizing provisions, modifying cross-references, and adding headings).
For an example with an antitrust statute enacted after OLRC’s creation, compare Curt Flood Act of
1998, § 3, 12 Stat. 2824 with 15 U.S.C. 26b (reorganizing provisions and adding headings).
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And while the present-day OLRC emphasizes editorial modesty in its
editing of non-positive law, previous codification offices were sometimes
more ambitious, on occasion significantly rewriting enacted statutory text,
and those changes remain. For example, 2 U.S.C. § 271 (the Senate
Legislative Counsel charter) was prepared by a predecessor to the current
OLRC. Among other editorial changes, it breaks up a long paragraph from
the original 1918 Act into individual provisions with headings; modifies the
language to reflect new labels for the Drafting Service and the draftsmen
created by a 1924 Act; and strikes references in the text to the House
Legislative Counsel and the Speaker of the House that Congress forgot to
delete in a 1970 Act.647
Present-day OLRC still also makes use of statutory notes in non-positive
law titles. For example, the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 contained mostly
Sense of Congress provisions, reporting requirements, and quasi-temporary
provisions—and the entire act was put in a statutory note.648 Severability
provisions also sometimes will be located in statutory notes for non-positive
titles, despite their high importance for judicial and other interpreters.649
Figure 8 shows how the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 appears on
Westlaw. To locate it, a reader must navigate on Westlaw to the U.S. Code
provision for 22 U.S.C. § 5811 (which contains only a findings section for a
different statute), click on the “History” tab, and select “Editor’s and
Revisor’s Notes” from the drop-down tab menu (as noted with yellow
arrows). The reader then must scroll through roughly seven pages of material
to reach the heading of “Belarus Democracy Act of 2004” as it appears in Fig.
8. There, the reader finds the full text of the statute. OLRC also adds the
bracketed phrase “[enacting this note]” into the text of the statute (as flagged
with yellow arrow) in order to clarify what the statute’s reference to “This
Act” means in this context: a full act located in a statutory note.

647 See supra note 90; see also Dorsey, Not Reading the Statutes, supra note 589, at 285-86
(discussing this provision).
648 See Pub. L. No. 108-347 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5811 (2018)) (referencing Belarus
Democracy Act of 2004 in the statutory note).
649 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 900 note (2018) (stating the severability provision in the note section);
15 U.S.C. 1601 note (2018) (same); supra note 596. Severability clauses instruct courts whether to
strike entire laws down if provisions are found invalid.
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Figure 8

As one interviewee put it:
Should someone trying to understand the law skip over the notes? No! You’re
not going to understand what [the law] is. . . . If there is a [provision] saying
that “the above amendments only apply to people with blue eyes” or “[only
apply] after such a year,” where do we put that information? In the notes.650

OLRC is just one office in the congressional bureaucracy, but it offers an
extreme and very important example of bureaucratic work that has gone
unnoticed. Other inputs of the bureaucracy, including JCT’s post-vote Blue
Book, CBO’s pre-vote score, and Legislative Counsel’s drafting work, including
certain legislative history, are much more salient to members and as important.
The “text” has more inputs than most courts and lawyers assume.
C. New Canons, Canons, Canons
This is not the place to spin out every possible implication of our study for
statutory interpretation doctrine. We reserve those efforts mostly for future
work, and instead offer some big-picture points, as well as some low-hanging
fruit, for lawyers and judges, including textualists, by way of conclusion.
Which aspects of the congressional bureaucracy are most relevant for
those courts interested in the statutory meaning intended by Congress? If
courts want to understand what elected members thought they were voting
on, pre-enactment inputs like the CBO score and JCT estimate, legislative
history, committee jurisdiction assignments, budget reconciliation rulings,
and requested analyses of bills from CRS or MedPAC/MACPAC may be
most relevant to the operating assumptions of elected members.
650

Staffer Interview.
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We have already discussed the complexity of post-enactment bureaucratic
work. If courts were concerned about bureaucracy work after the vote, they
could construct “anti-deference” rules for that, as they have in other
contexts.651 Alternatively, courts might respect Congress’s right—safeguarded
in Article I of the Constitution—to establish its own procedures. That is,
precisely because Congress has created OLRC and charged it with making
those post-enactment edits, we should view those delegated responsibilities
to be legitimate contributions to the statutory text that results. That is a much
more expansive view of the lawmaking process than one cabined by the
discrete moment of a vote.
To make things simpler, as a start, we suggest some specific moves as lowhanging fruit that eschews the harder questions of post-enactment work.
Courts have actually proven quite willing to consider drafting realities when
presented in small-scale form, case by case.652 As one example, after the
Gluck–Bressman study’s finding that Congress often legislates with
intentional repetition, some judges have resisted applying the presumption
against redundancy.653
Judges of most interpretive stripes also should be attracted to the new
canons we suggest—all of them are based on objective, not subjective, outputs
that are the direct results of collective congressional direction. To those who
would already consider legislative history, these outputs may be even more
representative of collective intent. To those who would look instead to an
objective source like a dictionary to glean how words were understood at the
time of enactment, these outputs are similar but more closely tethered to
Congress’s own democratic process.

651 This is essentially what Listwa suggests with respect to OLRC code placement decisions.
Listwa, supra note 633, at 468 (“[T]he interpreter ought to follow a simple rule: ignore editorial
decisions made by the nonlegislative codifiers—i.e., the OLRC—but consider those made by
Congress.”).
652 For examples of courts relying on CBO calculation, see, e.g., Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d
390, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing the CBO analysis as inconclusive evidence of congressional
intent); King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 374 (4th Cir. 2014) (relying on a CBO report to establish
congressional intent to combine subsidies with the individual mandate); King v. Sebelius, 997 F.
Supp. 2d 415, 430-31 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citing the CBO analysis and CBO director letter as indicative
of congressional intent to create insurance subsidies for every state); Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp.
3d 1, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2014) (same); see also Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1320 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(relying on CBO report for assumption Congress intended Veterans courts to allow class actions);
U.S. House of Reps. v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 172 (D.D.C. 2016) (relying on CBO
characterization of cost-sharing reductions as direct spending). But see Ohio v. United States, 154 F.
Supp. 3d 621, 642 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (claiming that “the CBO does not and cannot authoritatively
interpret federal statutes”).
653 See supra note 17.
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1. The CBO Canon—And Now, the JCT Canon, OLRC Canon,
Parliamentarian’s Canon
In 2012, one of us suggested a new “CBO canon,” to push courts to take
into account assumptions about the statute—including the understandings of
its words—that CBO used in computing its budget score.654 The CBO canon
is especially appropriate when the score is a matter of serious attention (the
Affordable Care Act is a prominent example). This canon quickly found its
way into law and policy blogs,655 official congressional correspondence,656
litigation briefs,657 and court opinions.658
Other scholars have followed upon this approach, and we now have a
recent proposal, from Clint Wallace, for a JCT canon, building off the CBO
canon as the revenue analogue: look to JCT’s understanding of the tax law to
resolve ambiguities.659 Wallace notes that, like the CBO canon, his approach
has “democratic bona fides” of having been generated and required by

654 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 1, at 782 (justifying the CBO canon based on interviews
with legislative drafters). See also Gluck, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1 (illustrating how CBO
canon would work and why, in some cases, it would be more reliable indicium of statutory meaning
than other common tools); Gluck, The “CBO Canon,” supra note 1 (“[The CBO canon is [a]n
interpretive presumption that ambiguities in legislation should be construed in the way most
consistent with the assumptions underlying the congressional budget score on which the initial
legislation was based.”).
655 Timothy Jost, Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges Are Consistent with the Affordable
Care Act’s Language and History, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 18, 2012),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20120719.021337/full/ [http://perma.cc/3QZJ-7ZBK]
(noting CBO’s assumption that “premium tax credits would be available to all Americans in all
states”); Jonathan Cohn, The Legal Crusade to Undermine Obamacare—and Rewrite History, NEW
REPUBLIC (Dec 4, 2012), online at http://newrepublic.com/article/110770/legal-challengeobamacare-insurance-exchanges-full-holes [https://perma.cc/X9LT-NA53] (discussing Jost’s article
and the CBO canon).
656 See, e.g., Letter from, Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir. of the Cong. Budget Off., to Rep. Darrell
E. Issa, Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform at *1 (Dec 6, 2012)
(responding to a query regarding “CBO’s assumption that the premium assistance tax credits
established by [the Affordable Care Act] would be available in every state”).
657 See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at *21, Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-00623, (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2013) (arguing that Congress’s intent
was manifest through its heavy reliance on CBO’s assumption that tax credits would be available
in every state); Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at *3, 4, 12, 18, United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-01967,
(D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2016) (describing how Congress relied on CBO’s scoring of the Affordable Care
Act’s insurance subsidy as mandatory spending); Brief of Appellants at *12, 51, Ohio v. United
States, No. 16-cv-3093 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2016) (relying on CBO descriptions to bolster point about
reinsurance tax definition).
658 For examples of relying on CBO calculation, see supra note 652.
659 See Clint Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, 71 TAX L. REV. 179, 225 (2017)
(“Under the JCT Canon, courts (and Treasury and IRS personnel) should construe ambiguous tax
statutes in the same manner as the JCT did in producing revenue estimates and other analysis and
explanations for the statute.”).
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Congress itself.660 Indeed, the JCT staff we interviewed emphasized that
members “care about budgetary effect” and view them as “part of the day to
day policy design.”
Daniel Listwa also suggested a “codifier’s canon,”661 which would direct
courts to use captions and placement only when Congress itself enacts them
directly into positive law—a conclusion that makes sense if we wish to ignore
post-enactment modifications, thought not if we more provocatively view
OLRC’s work as part of Congress’s delegatory authority.662
Most recently, Jonathan Gould suggested a “Parliamentarian’s canon,”
which would resolve ambiguities by interpreting them consistently with
parliamentary precedent and “especially rulings of the chair.”663 We would go
further and extend this deference to parliamentary decisions regardless if they
are made from the chair, in public. Thanks to unorthodox lawmaking, we have
seen that the most consequential rulings of late are not from the public chair
at all, but rather resolved before a bill ever reaches the floor. We think
committee jurisdiction referrals would be as important, especially because
such referrals are directly tied to statutory meaning and other important
matters, including often which agency is the lead administrator.664 Staffers in
the Parliamentarians’ offices told us they help partisan staff who “might be
putting their finger on the scale to rewrite [bills] for jurisdictional
concerns.”665 We would also emphasize rulings on reconciliation.
Reconciliation bills, once unorthodox, are now a central means of legislating.
Recent major statutes—e.g., the 2017 tax bill and parts of the ACA—were
passed using this special process. The Byrd rule plays a pivotal role in shaping
those bills, and so any “Parliamentarian’s canon” should also counsel not to
interpret a reconciliation bill in a way that would have clearly violated the
Byrd rule.
Some scholars have voiced skepticism about the extent to which
parliamentary or congressional-rules-based interpretations can be
attributed to the larger Congress.666 But it matters not whether individual
members of Congress subjectively agreed with the Parliamentarian’s ruling.
660 Wallace, supra note 659. Ultimately, he predicates the canon on the unique ability of JCT
to add agency-like virtues to tax. Id.
661 Listwa, supra note 633.
662 For Listwa, even codification bills are not good enough because OLRC decides placement
there and Congress gives such bills very little attention. Id.
663 Gould, supra note 16, at 2022.
664 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 1006-1007 (detailing internal view that the agency
under the jurisdiction of committee who drafts the bill is typically the lead agency, because the
committee wants to oversee implementation).
665 Staffer Interview.
666 For an excellent recent example, see Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting by the Rules, 99 TEX. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021).
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What matters is that language inserted or deleted was necessary to clear
procedural hurdles and should not be given short shrift by courts. For
example, under the Byrd rule, a reconciliation bill cannot include any
“extraneous” provisions (a complex standard more fully set out in the
notes).667 When points of order are raised about language that does not fit
this requirement, Legislative Counsel works with staff to modify the bill
text (sometimes creatively) bring it into compliance with the rule.668 As one
interviewee colorfully told us: “If it’s reconciliation, they are ripping things
out of there left and right. It’s only when you see the final product and say,
‘What is this crap?’”669 The result is a bill that may not be as internally
consistent or coherent as the Court would assume. For the court to impose
its usual canons here would undermine the specific moves Congress made
to clear its procedural hurdle. There are other doctrines, like severability,
under which courts are loathe to impose something on a statute that
Congress never would. This should be no different.
Gluck and O’Connell made the same suggestion about eliminating the
presumption of consistency for omnibus legislation. Even more extreme than
omnibus bills, interpreters cannot assume consistency even within provisions
in a reconciliation bill. Because the Byrd rule is applied on a provision-byprovision basis, drafters often will unnaturally cram together unrelated (or
only semi-related) rules into a single provision for Byrd rule purposes.670
Additionally, courts should have a heightened sense of budgetary windows
when interpreting reconciliation bills, since reconciliation bills often are
contorted in order to comply with year-specific fiscal rules.
What about Legislative Counsel canons? The Gluck–Bressman study
offered some prospects. For example, Legislative Counsel drafts only one
type of legislative history: certain parts of appropriations legislative history.
By Congress’s own rules, appropriations bills list only outlays; the legislative
history provides the programmatic direction. That is why Legislative Counsel
667 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2018). A provision is defined as “extraneous” if it:
a) does not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
b) produces an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues that does not follow the reconciliation
instructions in the budget resolution;
c) is not in the jurisdiction of the committee that reported the provision;
d) produces changes in outlays or revenues that are merely incidental to the non-budgetary
components of the provision;
e) increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the period specified in the budget resolution;
f) recommends changes to Social Security.
668 See Gould, supra note 16, at 19-20 (discussing the behind-the-scenes “Byrd bath” process).
669 Staffer Interview.
670 In particular, this is done to satisfy subsection (a) of the Byrd rule (which requires each
provision to have a budgetary impact). Here, a policy with no budgetary impact is combined with
one that has such an impact, and so the provision is treated as compliant with the Byrd rule—thereby
smuggling a “non-scoring” provision into the bill.
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drafts the report language for part of the appropriations history—in this
unique context, the history is effectively an operative provision. But courts
do not give this kind of history any special deference.
Legislative Counsel has its own drafting manuals, too.671 They include
directions that contradict some judicial presumptions. For example, the
House manual says that statutes need not have severability clauses to be
presumed severable. Courts, however, sometimes attribute false meaning to
the lack of a severability clause, especially if the House version of a bill has
one and the Senate does not.672 We already have pointed out how the House
Legislative Counsel manual directions on short titles would have informed
the Yates case.
It is true that a multitude of new canons might emerge from this kind
of inquiry, and some judges might balk at the further complication of
statutory interpretation doctrine. But this does not strike us as more
onerous than the legislative history courts currently consider, or the more
than one hundred policy presumptions courts already devise and apply to
statutes. Concerns about volume are something of a straw man. And there
are limiting principles. We focus on those stages in the lawmaking process
that are critical turning points or hurdles for legislation or member focus.
All of this comes with the important caveat that Gluck and others have
noted—namely, that elevating Congress’s bureaucracy in this way could
inject more pathologies into the legislative process—unhealthily skewing
statutes, for instance by leading Congress to draft bills even more to the
CBO score than they already are.
D. Anti-Canons
“A court that would look at placement in the Code to somehow imbue
meaning into what a provision says is barking up the wrong tree.”

1. Drop Canons on Code Organization
The above quote comes from OLRC staff. If the goal is a formalist one
of blessing the matter actually voted on, courts should emphatically reject
any continuing use of the Code placement as evidence of intent for the

671 See B.J. Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory
Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185, 195 (2010) (discussing the Legislative Counsel’s drafting manuals).
672 See, e.g., Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1301 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (reasoning ACA’s lack of severability clause “can be viewed as strong evidence
that Congress recognized the Act could not operate as intended without the individual mandate”).
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entire half of the U.S. Code—27 titles—that is not positive law.673 For those
titles, courts should not presume that statutory section arrangement,
headings, or title structure has anything to do with statutory meaning unless
those details come from the public law enacted by Congress before it was
reorganized in the U.S. Code.674 Frankly, we have doubts about relying on
the organization of the Code for positive-law titles too. When OLRC
creates those titles, it “restates”—reconstructs and reorganizes Congress’s
work, sometimes years old. Although Congress as a formality blesses those
acts by voting for codification, the kind of legislative (especially high-level
partisan staff) attention to substance that attends the legislative process is
wholly absent from this technical process of codification (Listwa agrees
with us as to this point675). Indeed, some statutes even have provisos telling
courts not to infer any intent from structure.676 No one seems to realize
those provisions are written and inserted by OLRC precisely for this reason.677
And yet, courts still grasp onto structure and placement because doing so
“feels” more textualist than looking to legislative history, CBO scores, and
so on—that is, Congress’s actual inputs and assumptions.
2. Drop Grammar Canons
Likewise, we suggest applying greater skepticism to grammar canons.
Grammar is often changed after enactment by OLRC, for positive and—
especially in earlier eras—non-positive law alike.678 Even before the vote, to
assume that any staff or member other than Legislative Counsel focused on
comma placement is pie in the sky.

673 See, e.g., United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 926 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Code placement
in title 21); Reyes v. Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 141, 153 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Code placement in title
15 while noting that OLRC determined placement).
674 For a rare example of Congress directing Code placement for an amendment to a nonpositive title, see the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L.
No. 114-187, § 6, 130 Stat. 549 (2016); see also Lubben, supra note 504 (noting this provision, and
finding no other examples of Congress directing placement for non-positive provisions).
675 Hence his recommendation that only when Congress itself actively amends already positive
titles should code placement matter—because Congress would be effectively placing the amendment
when it decides what and where it is amending.
676 See Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates, supra note 589, at 379 (stating that section 5600 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States of American included a provision that “no inference or
presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the Title, under which any
particular section is placed”).
677 Contra others who have written on OLRC, we also think it matters little whether a title
has been enacted into positive law or not, since Congress has explicitly blessed OLRC’s postenactment organization.
678 On the greater editorial discretion exercised by prior codifiers, see supra notes 647, 624628, 645–646 and accompanying text.
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3. Drop Anti-Purpose Canons and Recognize Congress’s Own Instructions
to Construe Purposively
For the same reasons—and here we agree with Shobe—we are disturbed
by the practice of courts undervaluing or even overlooking entirely purpose
provisions and findings enacted by Congress.679 We also agree that
understanding OLRC’s work reveals Congress to be a more purposive
institution than courts typically acknowledge. OLRC’s practice of placing
purposive (but enacted) materials into notes—compounded by the way those
notes appear on commercial research sites like Westlaw and Lexis—likely
contributes to the court’s propensity to underemphasize them.
We do not mean this as any critique of OLRC. Throughout our study, the
staffers across the entire bureaucracy spoke of “statutes” far more holistically
than legislation scholars commonly do. The nonpartisan staff share customs
and views about what belongs in the “text” and what is better put in legislative
history, notes, or other materials.680 We heard that from JCT, Legislative
Counsel, and OLRC, even as each of those entities emphasized the
importance of consulting those other materials in actually understanding the
law. This desire not to overcomplicate the words in the “text” seems to have
been overread by courts and scholars to view statutes unduly narrowly. If
something about the way that courts are dealing with those materials elevates
some over others, to some extent that is the courts’ and lawyers’ problem, not
the fault of the bureaucracy. At a minimum, Westlaw and Lexis could change
the way it displays these materials to highlight them more. And textualists
might start by reading the public laws themselves, if they really want to see
what Congress considered and in what form it appeared. At best, we would
like to see more dialogue between courts and Congress; previous efforts to
launch such a dialogue have been very difficult.681
As far as a purposive legislature goes, recall that Congress itself directs
OLRC to draft a U.S. Code that “conforms to the understood policy, intent,
and purpose of the Congress in the original enactments,” rather than a Code

Shobe, supra note 16.
Staffer Interviews; see also Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note 589, at 17 (citing
“legislative drafting manuals [that] show a distaste by drafters for including provisions in legislation
that are ‘not legally useful,’ such as ‘findings that are nothing more than rhetoric, definitions that
merely state the obvious, and precatory language . . . that has no binding effect’”).
681 See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 523 (suggesting checklists for drafters highlighting
common statutory interpretation issues); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit
Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1430 (1984) (arguing for congressional committees that “would
take a second look at a law once a court opinion or two highlighted the measure’s infirmities”);; cf.
Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in
Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045 (1991) (detailing difference between close
communication in state court/legislative systems as compared to Congress and the federal courts).
679
680
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that preserves enacted statutory text verbatim.682 This seems to be statutory
evidence that Congress shares three beliefs that are central to purposivist theory: (1)
that Congress has an intent or purpose when enacting laws; (2) that statutes
are, above all, an expression of intent and purpose; and (3) that Congress’s
overriding desire is to see that intent or purpose carried forward. If courts
wish to position themselves as “faithful agents” to Congress, they ought to
consider this evidence of their principal’s principles.
4. Drop the Whole-Code Canons
Finally, we want to drive home the Gluck–Bressman study’s cry to
abandon the courts’ beloved “whole code rules” and other canons that
presume consistency and coherence across the U.S. Code.683 First of all, the
“U.S. Code” is a construct made after legislation is enacted. Second, even
OLRC told us they try to carry consistent language within titles, but not
further than that. Third, as we have emphasized, not only every substantive
committee but virtually every one of the congressional bureaucracy
institutions works—and remains siloed—within topics, not across the Code.
We think there is much to be said about resituating methods of interpretation
around subject-matter areas, a point one of us has made elsewhere. Other
scholars have shown that agencies likewise operate differently in different
subject areas and even deploy different interpretive presumptions. The titles
of the U.S. Code itself are the very result of ripping statutes apart to
reconceptualize them this way.
CONCLUSION
We recognize the can of worms a study like this opens. But we do not
think that an ostrich burying her head in the sand is any better a metaphor
for how lawyers and judges should interpret statutes than the sausage factory
is for the legislative process. Most practicing judges, including textualist
judges, claim their legitimacy as statutory interpreters derives from their
connection to and respect for Congress. Shouldn’t courts respect the inputs
that Congress sets up for itself to face the challenges of the modern era?
Aren’t the inputs of Congress’s own bureaucracy—a set of internal
institutions Congress founded to be self-sufficient, to resist an encroaching

2 U.S.C. § 285b(1) (2018).
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 936 (demonstrating whole code rule does not reflect
how Congress drafts); Gluck, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 203 (advocating a new rule:
“Absent clear evidence to the contrary, consistency presumptions should not be applied for
exceedingly lengthy statutes, for different statutory sections within a single statute drafted by
multiple committees, or across different statutes.”).
682
683
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executive, and to meet the needs of the increasingly complex statutory state—
as relevant as a dictionary or a judicially crafted policy presumption?
We could go much further than we have. The exemplary canons and anticanons we offer here are the lowest hanging, most formalist-friendly, fruit. It
would be wildly richer and more provocative to reconceptualize “lawmaking”
and the resulting statutory “text” to actually include all the inputs Congress
sets up for itself, ex ante, when it creates and puts in motion its massive,
important, and—until now—overlooked bureaucracy.
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